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Realism about the external, natural world

The method

hypothesis.

REALITY

is

an overarching empirical

of hypothetical realism rejects as an excessive

concession to the skeptic these two assumptions of constructivist
intuitionism:

first,

that everything real

must be exhaustively

inspectable;

second, that our beliefs are to be justified to the point of certainty.
to say that

world

is

nothing

is

ever

known

directly; that all of

We

and

prefer

our contact with the

mediated by thoughts, words, and percepts construed as signs having

referents distinct from themselves.

and possibly true hypotheses
metaphysics

as

we

We

organize these signs into meaningful

speculate

— in practice, science and

— about a world we have not made.
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CHAPTER
HYPOTHESIS

1.1

1

AND REALISM

Introduction

Realism about the external world
hypothesis.

is

an overarching empirical

In our efforts to locate ourselves within a natural

environment, responsible speculation,

in the

the ineliminable risk that falls to thought as

form
it

accommodations

We

to a

directs actions

meant

first

of

is

to secure

all,

for

direct our successful

us.

can specify the relation of these maps and plans to reflection or

inquiry as follows.
aspects: (1)

map

maps which might

world that pre-dates

social

of testable hypotheses,

us there. Those actions will consist of behaviors required,

formulating and testing plans and

and

we

Every behavior-directing plan

prescribe a sequence of behaviors;

will

(2)

we

have these four
rely on, or devise, a

representing the terrain where these behaviors are to be enacted, as well

as the instrumental relations tolerated there (as

through doorways but not

walls^); (3)

we

we might

consider walking

evaluate the plan as

within a hierarchy of values and ends; and

(4)

we

we

place

it

situate these behaviors.

is
seemingly fsr— fetched examples are common in the literature. Here, for example,
black
that
von Glasersfeld: "1 can no more walk through the desk in front of me than I can argue
however, is not quite the same.... That the
is white at the same time. What constrains me,
I

'j'jiQgQ

distinctions
desk constitutes an obstacle to my physical movement is due to the particular
which
I have come to
in
way
particular
the
and
to
sensory system enables me to make
coordinate them" (von Glasersfeld:1989d:6).

1

my

plans,

and values

and our place

within a more or less integrated account of the world

all

there.^

These four are the mutually reinforcing conditions

for success in

dealings with a physical and social world, the greater part of which

not made. These

maps and

we have

plans are commonplace: a hungry person hoping

some food

to secure for herself

our

will begin

by specifying a succession

behaviors to that end. Her plan will include a more or

less detailed

of

map

the proper location for performing those behaviors: she speculates that

places have food, while others do not.

and value
need

is

of her plan,

which

is all

not satisfied. Her plan and

the larger world of

relying on this

the

Her hunger helps

more urgent

which she and they are

map, she supposes,

some

to define the utility

as time passes

map presuppose

of

and

that

more general theory

a

of

a part: enacting this plan while

will help to secure her within the

world by

satisfying her need.

Noting the

practical control that

question in particular

often

— one which divides

presses to the fore: Are

helped us find our

we

way

we

to achieve,

realists off

justified in the belief that

in a

independent of the things

seem

from

one

anti-realists

our maps and plans have

world whose character and existence are

we might

say or think of

those beliefs to the point of certainty, or

if

the real

it?

is

Not

if

we must

who

2500 years ago were the first to point out the
flaw in this fallacious cartography, wondered how such
comparison could be made, since "reality" is accessible only

^

skeptics,

These distinctions are Weissman's (1989b:18).

2

justify

limited to that which

directly inspectable:

The

—

is

through maps.
proper map?^

Moreover, the question remains,

who owns

the

Yet the method of hypothesis declares that our maps and plans, as
linguistic

and conceptual

artifacts, are

extra-linguistic matters of fact.

knowledge

is

no more than

instruments for the representation of

Contemporary pragmatists who claim

that

effective action^ are likely to neglect the second

condition for success listed above in favor of value-bestowing

c:>r

"sense-

giving interpretations. "5 Success, they say, cannot serve as evidence for the
representational accuracy of our maps, since truth and meaning are either
"internal" to the

conform or
I

map,^or "there

fail to

suppose

conform

that a truly

is

no such thing

pragmatic realism

generally pragmatic outlook in this way:

and receives

its

world

for

anything

all

its

owe nothing

will

to these

traditional connection to a

of inquiry

confirmation from, practice.

We

and

reflection begins

should persist

in the

"naive" conviction that the success and confirmation of our plans and

^

von Poors ter :1987:x. This

to

to."^

"internal" varieties.^ Realism re-establishes

with,

as the

dissertation represents an extended

criticism of realism.

Maturana and Varela:1988:29-30; see

also chapter

^ Weissman:1989b;18.

^ Carnap:1966:219.

^ Goodman:1972:31; sec also section 2.4.3.2 below.

^ Putnam:! 987; see also section 4.2. 1.1 below.

3

111

below.

comment on

maps

just that sort of

speaks to more than the bare

common

fact that they

sense would rightly have

Errant speculation

is

relations specified

by

wet, and hungry

allow us to "cope."9 Indeed, as

it:

ciuickly exposed:

a plan

when

the

do not

map

for

The instrumental

obtain; or

applying

we
it

are frustrated,

misdirects us.

Behavior is successful only as our maps and plans look beyond
personal concerns to things in themselves. It is the truth of

maps and

these

and not only our neeci and convictions,
whether personally or socially founded, that explains the success
of our thought-directed behavior.io
the

Still,

truth of our
cut

up

plans,

modern pragmatist may wonder:

maps

How

or representations of the world?

do we determine

Is it

not the case that

the world"^^ into the objects and relations of our

maps

one or another conceptual scheme, framework or theory?^^
response

to these anti-realist

whole represents, requires

concerns, which

that our realism

I

hope

withdraw

the

as

^n

we

chose

adequate

this dissertation as a

in part

from

its

often

Q

"modern science does not enable us to cope because
enables us to cope" (Rorty:1981:xvii).

In Contrast, Rorty claims that

corresponds,

it

just

it

Weissman:1989b:28-9; emphasis added.

A common

assumption of

express in language what

is

all

varieties of "internal" realism

extra-linguistically the case.

It

appears to be that

follows,

we

we

cannot

are told, that truth

cannot consist in a correspondence or mapping relation between a sentence and a part of the
world, since the latter, either as a product of the use of language or as a "completely
unspecified and unspecifiable" thing-in-itself (Rorty:1981:14), is simply not available to
language. Two problems emerge. First, the rejection of correspondence as the nature of truth
usually requires defending an extreme, possibly incomprehensible, form of relativism. In that
case, truth becomes a redundant notion, or warranted assertability, "or even just as socially
respectable assertability
what our peers will. ..let us get away with saying"
(Millikan:1984:7). Second, beneath the claim about language there lies a "repressed" claim
that conflicts with the relativistic strictures of the first. That claim is this: "that we can know

—

—

—

in fact is; that we know
its epistemic, its ontological status
what the status of language
what is the case about language; that we know what the truth of the matter is" (Pols:1982:89).

^2putnam:1981:49-53.

4

naivG beginnings, as

we admit from

the start that there can be

no unmediated

or direct access to the world.

h2 Realism and Hypothesis:

Five Guiding Principles

The hypothetical realism
assumptions.^^

method

defend

sets out

of hypothesis here, characterizing

alternative to this

(chapter

III)

(1)

—

a

Most

five basic

and saving

as assumptions,

— following an exposition of the one major

method

more

them

(chapter

and IV) and an extended example

II

of

it

detailed defense of those basic principles (chapter V).

generally,

I

assume

fundamental

that philosophy's

theoretical one.

More

philosophize as

we recommend and defend

exactly, philosophy

is

a kind of narrative:
a conceptual

role

a

is

we

network designed

While knowledge of that world

a coherent story about the world.

tell

from

will only briefly outline these essential features of the

I

subsequent chapters

for

I

is

to

our

goal, inquiry to justify our beliefs remains our instrument, as these stories

represent the extensions of our

The

utility of

first

accommodations

metaphysics remains obscure until

discoveries of practice and science,
possible to

successful

do and

be."^^

I

think

it

it

we

functions to

agree

tell

to reality.

that, like the

us "what

is

and

is

hard
not

likely that infants are capable of telling

themselves private stories of the most spartan kind, having their source
prelinguistic

no

rather,

There will be

and genetically programmed sorting-behavior.

identifiable point at

which those

our accounts evolve

in

stories

become

complexity as

scientific or philosophical

we move from

our

The main outlines of my defense and characterization of realism owe much
David Weissman, especially Weissman:1989a; 1989b; 1987a; 1977.
Weissman:1989b:203.
See Russman:1987:12; Weissman:1989b:198.
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in

first

to the

work

of

behavior-directing plans^^ through science to the
speculations of philosophy.

At the furthest reaches of thought's
metaphysics, where

we have

generality, these are the stories of

extended, by the methods of abstraction and

variation, our information about our place in nature,

conditions.

But, even here, theory's

bond

to

its

form, and

our original maps and plans

undeniable, as these stories have their more remote source in our
successful abductive inferences

place within

is

first,

and generalizations about the world and our

it:

Science and metaphysics are overlapping orders of reflection
coming after the maps and plans of ordinary practice. Indeed,
much of the evidence relevant to our metaphysical hypotheses

have been available

moment of our first encounters
with the world.... [F]or we have no detailed, a priori knowledge
of the world. We can only speculate about its character, using
whatever hypotheses we have for finding our way, here in the
will

at the

middle of things. This tentative, speculative attitude infuses
of our reality-testing behaviors.
(2)

Despite the apparent diversity of philosophical methods for

investigating the nature of things,

Weissman,

1

A
”

all

that our choice of

I

would suggest, along with

methods reduces

to these two:

Engels"^^

we

and

inspect the

assume those first reflections, arising out of the urgencies of practical life, often involve the
use of abductive (or "retroductivc") inference. Those inferences, well-known to science and
practice, have the following form: (1) Some unexplained phenomenon P is observed; (2) P would
1

be explicable as a matter of course

Thought

true. (Kordig:1971:12).

is

if

H

were

true;

hence

(3)

there

is

reason

to think that

H

is

way when we infer from something
smoke, we think of fire. Considering mind's

speculative in this

thought or observed to its conditions: "Seeing
various ways of behaving, we ask if these might be the activities of an exclusively physical
system.... [And in all practical thinking] we infer from a result desired to the sequence of
behaviors required for achieving it" (Wcissman:1989b:27).

Wcissman:1989b:l 18-131.

Engels' "two great

on

camps

a series of disputes

thesis" suggests that the history of philosophical

between materialism and idealism.

6

thought centers

things set before us

when

they have been given to or "constructed''^^ by our

minds, so that every difference creditable
thought or language; or

we

to the

world has

its

source in

use thoughts, words and percepts as signs, creating

thereby the plans and hypotheses representing possible states
of

we have

locating us in a world
to the first of these

two

as the

not made.^^

method

only viable alternative to the realism
chapters, especially
(3)

assume

I

II

and

that

I

I

shall follow

of intuitionism .^^

affairs

and

Weissman and

It is, I

refer

suppose, the

defend, and will be the focus of later

IV.

most

of the thinking, talking

and perceiving we do

is

not any kind of making or constructing.22 The character and existence of the

world are independent of the

fact that

we may

talk or think

about

it:

Some

thinking and talking is a kind of making, as we invent the
laws or encourage the expectations which distinguish our
culture. All the rest is only a way of talking or thinking about
matters which are discovered, not made. Perception too is not a
way of making the world. It does alter the world, as seeing an
apple creates in us the color it is seen as having. But the apple

19

In their efforts to secure every claim to

intuitionism

moves ever

intelligible difference

knowledge against

closer to a "constructivist a priorism"

within the matters

it

the skeptical arguments,

where mind has created every

thinks or describes (Weissman:1987a:104).

shall see (chapter IV) that all versions of constructivism have, like the realism

I

We

defend, an

instrumental, pragmatic expression. These constructivist appropriations of pragmatism are not,

however, theories of things and relations used (like a map or tool) in our dealings with an
While hypothetical realism relies on practice and
inquiry as a test of truth, constructivist pragmatics sees language or thought as the mind's

extra-linguistic or extra-mental world.

principle instruments in creating a thinkable experience: "mind," individually or corporately,
to satisfy our interests and needs. This
moral consequences: we are the sole authors
a world, moreover, that is designed to satisfy our particular

creates a thinkable because coherent experience

worldmaking

of the intelligible world
interests

meant

activity (section 3.6) holds out clear

—

and needs.

Weissman:1989b:l.

Weissman:1987a; 1989b.
See Watzlawick:1984 for a book-length defense of the idea that every aspect of reality

human

"construction."

7

is

a

was already determinate in every respect. It may also be
true, as
quantum physics implies, that some other properties discovered
in the world result from the ways that we
affect it, as when
measuring

for velocity or position. But here too, the world
is
determinate in every regard. It is either qualified or not, at
every
moment and place, with each of the infinity of possible

properties.23
It is

it,

important

amounts

to

more than

constructivism.

pragmatic

to note that the

method

just a negative

response to

realists,

due emphasis on the

placing

abstraction. ^4 Yet the

suggest that there

no need

its

is

in order to account for

who

ious unless

splacing

We

do

all

practical

understand

forms of
if

only implicitly)

(Piagetian) notions of

above remarks are designed

to

invoke constructivism of a radical variety,

do. ..worry that our

observer-independent natural world,

knowledge

of the

world

is

precar-

we

bridge the gap between mind and the world by diof thinkable form from the world into mind.^^

actively discover

Yet the realist

and

I

our knowledge:

purposes, preferring those
fail us.^*’

to

anti-realist elimination of the

Those

all

Constructivists ought to be (and often are,

accommodation and

with

of hypothesis, as

is

and manipulate the world

maps and

right to

to serve our

plans that seem "viable" over those that

emphasize

that this

is

mostly a process of

scientific discovery, not invention or creation in the "radical"

Weissman:1987a:l.
See Piaget:1967, and von Glasersfeld, especially 1989c and 1987. Indeed, all except for the
last of the following "basic principles" of von Glasersfeld's "radical constructivism" are
entirely consistent with our pragmatic realism: (a) knowledge is not passively received either

through the senses or by way of communication;

(b)

knowledge

is

actively built

up by

the

cognizing subject; (c) the function of cognition is adaptive (in the biological sense of the term);
and (d) cognition serves the subject's organization of the experiential world, not the discovery
of

an objective

reality

(von Glasersfeld:1988a:2).

Weissman:1989b:4.

von Glasersfeld:1989c:124.

8

I

criticize (d) in section 4. 2. 1.3

below.

sense of those words. As

I

will argue in

more

detail

below (chapter

discover the differentiations and orders of a world
that

every respect before our interventions take place. That
that the

world remains the same

we

determinate in

is

is

V),

not to say, of course,

after those interventions, for there is

something very creative (and, therefore, potentially destructive)
about

human

behavior.

to the material

and

unemployment,
existing things

But that activity

is

not god— like; our creations are limited

cultural artifacts, like chairs, governments,

that are

still

essentially

and

dependent on a world of naturally

— including humans — that we have in no sense made or

constructed.
(4)

From

the assumption that

product of evolution,

—

physical system
discover.

It

is

it

follows that

humans
mind

are natural creatures and a

— as essentially the

located, naturalistically,

follows too that

among

the things

knowing must be some kind

that sentient creatures bear to their world.

activities of a

we know and

of natural relation

In particular,

...knowing must be something that man has been doing all
along. ...and that has adapted him to that world, by contrast with
which not knowing, being ignorant, is something objectively
different

An

and

less

advantageous.

important implication of

this naturalistic

epistemological and ontological questions
late in the

order of inquiry:

we

Maxim"

to

that realist metaphysics

are to locate ourselves in thought "as

already located in being. "28 This
"naturalistic

is

approach

is

is last

we

are

apparently the impulse behind Devitt's

(#3): settle the realism issue before

Millikan:1984:7.

Weissman:1989b:17; 203^.

9

or

any epistemic or

semantic issue.29

if

mind-independent

we

him

interpret

as saying that our life-long inferences to

states of affairs can serve as prior evidence for the claims

of metaphysical realism, then

think he

I

is

right.

The emphasis here

is

on

implied by the "linguistic turn" in philosophy that claims

just the reverse

to

have discovered a "theory of meaning" underlying metaphysics.^o Those

who would

neglect Devitt's maxim, in other words, are attempting to derive

world

a theory of the

— most often an anti-realist one^^ — from a theory of

language or understanding.
scientific theories; they

I

take these latter theories to be ordinary

can have no special role in determining our

comprehensive view of the world.
(5)

Lastly,

will

I

assume

of our contact with the world

construed as signs
themselves.

They

that nothing

is

is

ever

known

directly.

Rather,

all

mediated by thoughts, words, and percepts

— signs, moreover, having referents distinct from
are the natural signs of perception

and the conventional

ones of thought and language. Signs serve as the "vehicles of our thinking,"
while

all

of the things that they

proper objects of thought. ^2
hypotheses as

world

we

we have

speculate

not made.

complete answer

We

might signify

(or represent)

remain the

organize these signs into meaningful

— in practice, science and metaphysics — about a

How

does a hypothesis come

to

be meaningful?

A

to that question requires a detailed specification of the

29 Devitt:1984:3-4.

Dummett:1978:xi.

Putnam’s a prioristic emphasis on the necessary "internal" determination of
pieces of the world
all reference relations between the sentences of a theory and
4.2.1.1 below.
section
and
Devitt;1984:Chll;
also
(Putnam:1987:23-32). See

One example

is

^2 Weissman:1989b:160; see also Millikan:1984;Part

10

11.

ontology of our chosen method (chapter V), as a domain
consisting of signs,
actuals,
this;

and possibles

to

which our hypotheses apply.

A

shorter answer

Hypotheses are meaningful, hence capable of being true or

of signifying possible states of affairs. Hypotheses
are true

because

false,

when

is

the

possibilities signified are actual.

Each of us formulates a map having two tiers, one for the world
of possibles, the other for the actual world. The first is a tier
of
meanings; the other is a tier of truths. Meanings are the objects
intended by our thoughts and words. These objects, the senses of
our worlds, are the more or less complex differences and
relations existing eternally as possibilities.

The

truths are

hypotheses. They signify those possibilities that do obtain.
Accordingly, their objects are the actual states of affairs
comprising our world. ^3

The speculative nature

of these reality-testing behaviors

our every factual claim and perceptual judgement
possible state of affairs.

"She

hungry" as

is

much

is

is

undeniable:

a hypothesis addressing a

as "That rose

is

red" are

speculative in this way, as each assertion involves a factual claim about a
possible state of affairs that

method amounts
case were

we

to

may

more than

to limit

a

mere

our analysis

claim about contingencies

is

may

or

open

not obtain. Yet the hypothetical

fallibilistic attitude.

to the

simple recognition that our every

to error, as

we

person's physical state, attitude or very existence.

constructing the behavior-directing

more

maps and

could be wrong about a

Our problem,

hypothesis

is

in

plans of practice and their

refined counterparts in science and metaphysics,

one of formulating responsible, because

That would be the

is

the

testable, hypotheses,

more complex
where

a testable

one whose truth would make an observable difference

specifically, the difference signified

by the hypothesis:

Wcissn'ian:1989b:199.

11

—

Observability

is

the measure of instantiation, and of truth,

although we must avoid the easy confusion of
sensory affects in
us with the possibilities instantiated, i.e., the actual
things
observed. Sensory data are the evidence of these things,
and the
evidence for our hypotheses about them.34
Certainly
In particular,

much more needs

we

will

have

be said about the testing of hypotheses.

to

to address the notorious "overdetermination" of

evidence by theory, where our claims about the world are forever
exceeding
the possible evidence for them.

We

can suggest that some reactions to

phenomenon

are excessive, as the idea that

seems

But

to be.

The Two Dimensions
will

be "brains in vats"

— or even of ourselves and our place there — we

should admit the possibility that

It

all

in the end, lacking all access to a detailed, a priori

illumination of the world

1-3

we might

this

be helpful

we

could be wrong about anything.

of Realism

two

to identify the

claims about the external world:

independence dimension.

(1)

traditional

dimensions of

the existence dimension

The former

everyday physical objects of experience

and

(the existence of the

like cats

and mats,

usually doubted by the philosophical opponents of

realists.

for

(2)

realist

the

common,
example)
It is

this

is

not

second.

Ibid:110.

be concerned with the nature of our commitment to the existence of things, not with the
itself. Existence is, I suppose, a basic and intuitively clear notion that stands
in no need of explanation. Moreover, "attempts to offer an explanation have either lapsed into
triviality or changed the question to an epistemic one (about how we tell what exists) without
noticing" (Devitt:1984:43). Obviously, for the realist that commitment entails a respect for the
irreducible reality and essentially mind-independent nature of the external world (see
I

will

nature of existence

Ruben:1977:97).

Even Berkeley and Hume accept certain statements about the existence of physical objects.
However, since they also claim that such statements are reducible to statements about the
contents of the mind that thinks them (though not necessarily to statements about mental
activity or thought, see Ruben:1977:20), they would not accept traditional realist claims about
the mind-independent existence of those objects.
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independence dimension of

main point

of dispute

traditional realist claims that will serve as the

between

and

realists

idealists.

the entities mentioned above exist independently of

While

we

or,

most generally, "depend

hold that

what we might think

say of them, idealists maintain that these entities are either
sense data,

realists

for their existence

made up

or

of ideas,

and nature on what

believe or can discover. "37

Nothing

in

what

Putnam, who claim

I

have said should give comfort

that metaphysical realism

is

to those, like

an incoherent doctrine that

requires the impossible task of comparing our representations with an

unconceptualized

reality. 38

dimensions of traditional
the world

makes

it

That

realist

is

to say that, taken together, the

claims do not entail that the objectivity of

an unknowable "world-in-itself;" or even that

incapable of having true or false beliefs about
like

mine requires

two

that

we

it.

are

Indeed, a naturalistic realism

view of the world as

reject this

we

forever

beyond our ken. 39 The independence dimension

emerge

as a discovery of metaphysics:

a

noumenal realm

of realism does not

comes after the time when reality and our
need for accommodating to it are already acknowledged. Its
theories confirm and complete an understanding that does not

Realist metaphysics

wait for metaphysics to direct
In Kantian language, then,

it.'^^

we

are committed to the independent

existence of those things our critics are likely to say exist only in the

Devitt:1988:159.

33 See Salinas:1989:114.
3^ See Devitt:1984.

40 vVeissman:1989b:204.
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phenomenal, or known, world.

This point obviously requires identifying

the nature of this independence in a

way

that does not

fall

victim to the

plausible Davidsonian criticism of the very idea of a
reality "outside

schemes. "42 Failing a general distinction between what
the world (our "conceptual schemes") and the

unable

to

make any

way

we

all

say and think of

the world

is,

we

will

sense of the independence dimension of realism.

clear that realism only escapes the charge of banality as

it

be

It is

adopts some kind of

scheme-reality dualism; otherwise, the following dilemma

is real.

Either our

descriptions of reality in terms of any one of our present schemes vitiates the

independence of that

reality

from

all

schemes; or

we

persist in talking of a

principled distinction between our schemes and a "scheme-neutral" reality,

invoking, once again, the better-off-lost notion of a unconceptualized given.

As Rorty himself explains
want to claim that 'the world' is either the purely vacuous
notion of the ineffable cause of sense and goal of intellect, or else
a name for those objects that inquiry at the moment is leaving
I

alone.43

But that cannot be right,
intrinsic but discoverable

if

the objects of present inquiry have an

form of

that inquiry for their existence

their

and nature. Rorty

independence dimension of realism

who

own, and so remain independent

he

as

fails to

of

loses the sense of the

sustain a dichotomy

main tendency of nineteenth-century thought
was towards the conclusion that both "things" and facts about things are dependent for their
existence and their nature upon the operations of a mind" (1984:164). It is clear, as Devitt
Devitt refers us to Passmore

remarks, "that the things
are not committed

to, in

writes; "The

in question are the known ones, not the ineffable ones" (Ibid:164).
other words, the world that Rorty considers to be "well lost"

(Rorty:1981:14).

Davidson;1985.

Rorty:1981:15.
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We

between concept and thing conceptualizedd4 Contemporary philosophers
language persistently

vacillate

between

"talk of theory

and

of

talk of the

world. "45
This vacillation

enormous help to the anti-realist because,
of course, theories really are mind-independent So, if the
distinction between theories and the world is blurred, an antirealist position will seem much more plausible.46
is

of

.

Rorty's mistake

comes

to this:

he equivocates on the theory-dependence of

our descriptions and the theory-dependence of that which

would be
to

the case

were the hungry person described

is

described. That

at the start of this chapter

mistake the theory- or language-dependent nature of her maps and plans

for

an indeterminacy
Clearly

we

in the

world there represented.

are witnessing in this debate an "unhealthy vacillation"47

between two senses of what

it

means

to say that the real exists

"independently" of us. Those two senses

independent of our
of our

efforts to describe

judgements on what there

is);

it

are: (1) that the real exists entirely

(denying, in

and

(2) that

fact,

the epistemic nature

what there

is

exists

independently of discourse or theory per se (the ontological question of what
there

is).

In this sense, the

well-known Wittgensteinian phrase,

of our language are the limits of our world"

some form

of linguistic relativism

what there

is

must be couched

—

far

"the limits

from signalling necessarily

— says only that our ontological talk about

in a language.

Trigg:1980:104.

Dcvitt and Sterclny:1987:201.

lbid:201.

47 Salinas:1989:n4.
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On

this account, the

Davidsonian idea that
to failure rests

distinct

on the

all

attempts to disjoin scheme and reality are

implicit acceptance of this conflation of

meanings of theory-dependence. Accordingly,

I

doomed

two very

suggest that the

following condition of independence (Cl) of the objects of thought from our

thoughts of those objects must be satisfied in order

to sustain a realist

view

of

the external world:

The independence

(Cl):

of the

common-sense

anei scientific

world from our schemes of representation does
not render the world an ineffable, inaccessible realm of

entities of the

unspecifiable objects.
1.4

Foundationalism and Realism
It

should be clear that

my

defense of realism represents a positive

response to Richard Bernstein's injunction
dualities of "objectivism

attempts

at

and

to

relativism," as

it

"move beyond"

the apparent

rejects as ill-conceived all

securing a fixed "foundation" (usually consisting of a level of

indubitable truths or perceptual judgments) for knowledge.'^^
therefore, that

one can

at the

same time be an

It is

a truism,

"antifoundationalist"

and

a

realist.

In terms of rejecting foundationalism, the realist can agree with

Richard Rorty
discipline

when he

claims that philosophy

which legitimizes or grounds the

is

not an "all-encompassing

others"^^^

Realists can agree also

that philosophers should set aside the skeptical problematic

which often

serves as the impetus to foundationalism in epistemology, as the skeptical

Sec also, Salinas:! 989:1 13.

Bernstein:! 983:1 8.

Rorty:l 979:6.
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fear of being

lead

some

to claim that sense-experience

productive

The

up

permanently misled by our natural and conventional signs may
is

grounded altogether

to the

mind's

activity.
realist

demurs, however,

as Rorty suggests that philosophers take

"edifying [rather than constructive] discourse."5i

attacks

in

on the idea

of philosophy as the mirror of nature, Rorty remains true

very intuitionism that gave

and meaning, he

Despite his well-known

says, are

rise to the

warranted

appropriately presentable to a mind.

"copy theory" of ideas. Truth

assertibility

From

—

propositions

i.e.,

the idea that

"we can never

encounter reality accept under a given description," he infers that
see ourselves. ..as

making worlds

we

"should

rather than finding them";^^

There might be any number of interpretations that are coherent
and effective in this way, though each of them might differ from
others in regard to the differences, relations and entities ascribed

Mind has authority for formulating, then
accepting any one of these interpretations, then the freedom for
taking up one interpretation after another: Mind is empowered
to the world.

for creating a succession of coherent experiences, truths, existing
states of affairs
It is

and worlds.^^

correspondence truth of the sort appropriate to maps and plans and

the features of the world they are thought to represent
certifying truths associated with
to secure

and

"world-making"

locate ourselves in a

— not the

self-

— that we require

world not of our making.

I

and

its

associated ontology of actuals and possibles,

Ibid:360.

5^ Rorty:1981;xxxix; emphasis added.
53 vVeissman:1989b:65-66.
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is

we

are

have said that

true hypotheses will have instantiated possibilities as their referents.
claim,

if

That

expanded and

defended

in chapter V.

First

we

consider the major alternative to our

hypothetical and pragmatic realism

— the method of intuitionism.

18

CHAPTER
INTUITION

2.1

AND

2

IDEALISM

Introduction
Idealism

is

a variety of intuitionism:

skeptical about the character
inspect.

it

mind remains

thrives as

and existence of everything

Rather than speculate,

it

cannot directly

about those deeper structures and

fallibly,

conditions of the world that happen to escape direct inspection

our place within nature as

its

creatures

— including

— intuitionists would prefer

to limit

the conditions for the existence of possible worlds to the value-bestowing or

sense-giving interpretations used for creating a thinkable experience.
2.2 Intuition

We

and Idealism

might construe

this

world- or experience-making, interpretative

activity as involving three of the four

plans listed in section

1.1.

Only the maps

gap between mind and the world
the preferred

there

is

used

to

way

components of behavior-directing

is

are missing.

Rorty's reaction to the

emblematic: "world-making" becomes

of putting the best face

on the

terrors of skepticism;

no world apart from the many "versions" created when
schematize sensory data or organize behavior.

Maps

and

theories are

that

were

to

represent the features of the world constraining our plans and resisting our
interpretations have lost
"there are

all

separate authority, as

no non-human forces

to

we now

say with Rorty that

which human beings should be
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^

responsible."!

Idealism, this implies,

This hermetic idealism

we make

it

usually individual and solipsistic, but
cultural by extrapolation. For thought's horizons are

by mind's own

fixed

is

by the language or theory used
thinking about the world. Reflection is, on either telling, a
structure, or

kind of light that mind directs
content, then onto itself.

The
are

one consequence of adopting the

method:

intuitionist

for

is

intuitionist

prompted by the

method has

first

these

onto

own

two notable

skeptical fear that our

our access

its

determining

features, both of

knowledge

of the

world

precarious

if

First is the

notion that every subject matter be presentable, in

to

it is

forever mediated

by representations

inspecting mind: everything determinate within experience
the interpretation, or conceptual system, used for

Nothing
Second,

that

we

is

To

the extent that

the world into objects" as

world,

we

is

is

or signs.

entirety, to

to originate in

the data thinkable.^

be hidden, as "every reflection brings forth a

note the certainty that

these contents.

up

real can

making

its

we

mind achieves

we

follow

as

it

Putnam

which

world.""!

thinks or perceives

in saying that

we

"cut

choose a sense-giving interpretation of the

eliminate every chance of error by closing the gap between thought

^

Quoted

^

Weissman:1989b;64.

in Bhaskar:1989:153.

among themselves about (1) the conditions for and (2) character of those
things that are presentable to the mind. (1) These inspectable contents may be (i) given to, or
is, finally, given
(ii) more or less created by, then set before the mind. In both cases, something
about
(1) is a task
claims
these
Defending
inspectable.
will
be
real
everything
inspection;
for

^ Intuitionists differ

The data which is assumed to be given can vary from sensory
moods and impressions, to Platonic Forms. These various emphases
phenomena, through
thought correspond to important and obvious differences
intuitionist
of
circle
within the larger
left for

chapter IV.

(2)

ideas,

hypothetical
between, for example, Hume and Kant. Yet their common antagonist remains the
of what we
independent
are
things
of
character
and
existence
method, with its claim that the
might think or say of them.

^ Maturana:1988a:26.
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and

its

objects.^ Yet

separate from the
jointly

make up

Gadamer,
presents

mind

the

now

scarcely intelligible

it is

that thinks

mind and

that "[w]hat the

it,

is is

say that the world

or even that "the

the world."^

world

to

It is

mind and

is

the world

better to admit, along with

not different from the views in which

it

itself."^

Intuitionist

skepticism,
idealism,

method

where nothing

represents, therefore, a combination of
exists

where everything

inspecting mind.
intuitionism,

It

we

radical

not thought or perceived; and

have been

significant for reality will

follows that Descartes' cogito

where the

our world. This

if it is

(1)

is

a

paradigm

self-reflecting, thinking subject

is

(2)

set before

for

the central fact of

see in Maturana:

Nothing precedes

its

distinction; existence in

any domain, even

the existence of the observer. ..is constituted in the distinctions of
the observer in the explanation of his or her praxis of living.^
I

my

can imagine

at this

point the following

common

sense objection to

characterization of intuitionism (or idealism):

Surely few philosophers doubt the reality and existence of the
everyday objects of the world, like tables, chairs and other
people. You are confusing their legitimate analyses of the

language- or concept-dependent nature of all these objects for
an (absurd) idealism that would admit as real only those very

words or concepts.
I

have two responses.

this sort of

First,

idealism and

still

and somewhat
hold

trivially,

to theories

which

it is

tacitly

^Putnam:1981:53.
^ Putnam:1987:l.

^

Gadamer:! 975:406; sec

also section 2.4.3.1 below.

^ Maturana:1988b:80; see also section 2.4.1

and chapter
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111

possible to renounce

below.

support

it:

"idealism

is

not only a theory that one professes."^ In such cases, idealism

follows without regard for the professed interests of the theorists

methodd^ Indeed, most people seem

the intuitionist

comes

to talk

own two

about such things as the existence of

feet.

Many

— but not

would not

as intuitionists

Yet that talk

is

all

to

New

be

who

realists

when

York City or

— of the philosophers

I

will

adopt
it

their

be referring

to

dissent from this naive, realist talk.

ingenuous, as

we

consider their understanding of the

necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such things. Descartes
is

emblematic, as the cogito requires God's goodness to reach beyond the

perimeter of inspecting mind to the world of physical objects. Descartes'

modern

successors (like Maturana), having dispensed with God, are no more

able to provide within their philosophical systems for the mind-independent

common

reality of these

committed

sense objects. Indeed, they are theoretically

to anti-realist conclusions

about those objects, and their ad hoc

disclaimers are unconvincing.

Here

my

initial

is

the second,

and most important, response

characterization of intuitionism.

intuitionists (like

As

I

noted in section

Goodman, Maturana and Putnam)

the natural world to a flux of Kantian,

to the objection to
1.3,

are inclined to reduce

unknowable things-in-themselves,

all

the while equivocating on the independence of the world from our theories

or descriptions.

inference from

Specifically, this point
(1)

is

often missed: there

is

no valid

there can be no theory- or language-independent

description of a thing, to

(2)

there can be

no theory independent

things.

It is

^ Wcissman:1987b:12.

our discussion in chapter III of the contradictory nature of Maturana
the observer" sets out from just this point.
In fact,
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s

ontology of

true that

of reference

all talk

language; yet

it is

between our words and the world must involve

equally true that every philosophical method presupposes

both a psychology and ontology, identifying the necessary
or organization of the

mind

domain

method

to

which

that

that

is

faculties, structure

capable of using that method and the

applies, respectively.

We

do not theorize

in

an

ontological vacuum.

We

shall see (chapter IV) that the

ontology of intuitionism

is

a

"psycho-centric" one that identifies reality with a mind-inspected given.

But

first

we must make

plausible the prior claim that every

method

presupposes an ontology. Descartes will be our example.
2.3

Between Method and Ontology
I

suspect that every philosophical method has psychological and

ontological assumptions.

The method we have been discussing,

intuitionism, effects a reduction of these

psychological.

That

is,

the

domain

two domains

domain

of application of the intuitionist

restricted to qualifications of the (structures

presupposed by that method. This

to the

is

and

faculties of) the

a psychological version of

of the

method

is

mind
what Bhaskar

refers to as the "epistemic fallacy," signalling, broadly, a reduction of being to

knowing, and limiting a method's ontological domain
things which are set clearly and fully before

to

mind and

those

it.^2

Weissn'ian:1987a:Ch4.

Bhaskar:1989:13.

We

might wonder

at Bhaskar's choice of

words

here:

what

sort of fallacy

generally accepted
is this? There are formal fallacies, usually involving the violation of a
denying the antecedent while affirming the consequent, for example.
rule of valid reasoning
Informal fallacies are much more commonplace, involving context-dependent judgments about
universally
the validity, soundness or accuracy of an argument. More often than not, there is no
decision-procedure to establish the inadequate nature of any particular inference

—

agreed upon
force, meaning to
in advance. The word fallacy has, therefore, polemical or even political
set of premises
direct our attention toward some aspect of an argument (roughly consisting of a
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Given the reciprocal

relations that hold

ontology, and the features of a

mind capable

places limits on the kinds of assertions
intuitionism, for example,

is

make

world that

independent of what

anything that

adopt

this

is

of using

sensible assertions about

we

(1)

its

we

the existence

think or say of

it;

and

(like

When
we

find that

and nature

(2)

of a

the reality of

who

Maturana)

idealistic results, are

idealists despite themselves: their ontological

its

our choice of method

beliefs,

not exhaustively inspectable. Those

method while renouncing

it,

can justifiably make.

expected to justify our

are unable to
is

we

between a method,

most

likely

commitments, however

extensive and complex, do not exceed the qualifications of the

mind

that

thinks them.
I

turn

now

to Descartes to clarify the

modern,

historical roots of

intuitionism and to provide an extended example of the necessary reciprocity
of

method and

same time we

the psychology
will

and ontology of method's

be tracing that method's restriction of the

inspected given, so that

we may comment

further

on

At the

application.
real to a

mind-

intuitionism's idealist

consequences.

meant

to support a particular conclusion) that call for reconstruction or interpretation to exhibit
something, that from a particular perspective, has been left unsaid. I would not agree that
Bhaskar's use of the term has merely polemical force, since I think he is right in identifying
the "implicit" ontology of even the most "empirical" of positions. Yet Bhaskar's use of the
word is surely informal, as the vast majority of fallacies are. There is not much sense in
"naming" this fallacy (eg., "suppressed evidence" or "equivocation") as one could easily locate
informal fallacies on both sides of the realist-idealist debate. Better then to adopt a more

the perspective of the realist who is committed to the irreducible
not made, the "epistemic fallacy" (and its linguistic counterpart)
than any other thing, the attempt to reduce all ontological notions to some aspect

neutral term: reduction.
reality of a

signals,

of

world

more

human

From

we have

experience, our language or our minds.

of reductive epistemics, assuming that epistemics
specifically

human ways

I

is

refer to his fallacies as instances, therefore,

taken broadly enough to include

all

our

of thinking about or experiencing the world. Replacing "epistemic (or

with reductive epistemics has the added advantage of not implying that
alternatives to realism necessarily contain infelicities of logic or reason in an absolute, or
formal sense.
linguistic) fallacy"
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2.3.1

Descartes and Psychology

There

is

a bias against speculation in

modern epistemology and

metaphysics, and that bias follows from the popularity of various
forms of

Our modern

intuitionism.

prejudices

would have us favor an

— a method concerning the procedures and
for making and asserting judgments — which
not preoccupied with

epistemological

method

criteria

is

ontological or psychological assumptions about the
faculties of the

domain

of application or

mind, respectively, presupposed by the method. Such things

are often considered both highly speculative and fairly irrelevant to the

making and

testing of (true or meaningful) statements.

Rule IV of Descartes' Rules For the Direction of the Mind

modern

reflects this

bias:

Rule IV: There
Notice that

is

need of a method

for finding

makes no reference

this concise rule

out the truth.^^

to either the psychological or

the ontological presuppositions of Descartes' method.

often suppose,
faculties of

first,

is this

that entertaining notions about the structures

mind necessary

undermine the

Why

for

making and

testing

and

judgments threatens

of

method seems

to allow.

We

say that an over-

emphasis on the reciprocity of method and the psychology designed
a

to

apply

form of "psychologism."
Second,

that

to

"neutral" access to truth or meaningfulness that Descartes'

more spartan understanding

it is

We

so?

method

we might

is strictly

ontological domain.

be "functionalists"

separable from

Are

its

either of these

Dcscartes:1927:48.
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in epistemology,

realization in

two positions

and suppose

any particular mind or
ciefensible?

Are we

capable, that

is,

of describing our

mind using

the character of the

which

it

I:

fail to

The end

presupposing nothing

domain

I

and

II.

come before

and

of things

is

plainer

In those

first

sound and

correct

at all

about

relations to

we

if

mention these presuppositions of

of study should be to direct the

the enunciation of
that

or the

a shorter version of Rules

is

Descartes does not

Rule

it,

as

would demur. This

applies? Descartes

above Rule

method

note that the

two

his

rules,

method:

mind towards

judgments on

all

matters

it.’*'^

Only those objects should engage our attention, to the
sure and indubitable knowledge of which our mental powers
seem to be adequate.^^

Rule

II:

In conjunction with the other Rules
rules, Descartes

applications
the

two

2.3. 1.1

it,

it

clear that his

method

is

not

strictly

separable from

and psychological assumptions. Let us now look more

factors of functionalism

undermine the
using

makes

and commentary upon those

and psychologism

essential reciprocity of

and the

objects to

which

it

closely at

that threaten to

method, the character of the mind

applies.

Functionalism

Weissman

defines the functionalist thesis as follows:

Functionalism

is

the doctrine that form has a specifiable,

we may state a method's procedures and
without indicating the kind of system
conditions,
even its truth
or agent whose method it is, or the kinds of entities to which the
"logical" integrity, as

method

applies.

Ibid;38.

Ibid:40.

16 vVcissman:1987a:21.
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its

Deductive inference
rules,

one such example. Considered

is

procedures for thinking or specification of the

making or
deduction)

asserting true judgments,

it

least conditions for

does seem as

separable from any particular

is strictly

as an abstract set of

if

method

a

mind

(like

or ontological

domain:
Suppose

that

some god

historical events

that

we

creates a world by deriving more remote
from preceding ones. His method is the one

when

apply

thinking deductively, but the ontology of

mind is different from our
own. The abstract specification of method, together with the
truths proved by it, will have been blind to these differences.
the result

It is

is

different, as this god's

in this bare, abstract

neutral in regard to

have called the
using

it,

its

is

Does

essential reciprocity of

method so

what the application

method

applications.

of

work

this

we

abstracted from any application; and

(2)

objects to

which

it

applies?

any particular method adds

strictly accidental to the full account.

method was supposed

Our account

of the

to

worldmaking

separable from

conflates the abstract

form of method with

it is

of functionalism produces, in fact,

method "spinning

its

Only

to

Yet as
IV),

activity of

strictly

-

I

we

(1) restrict

assume

that

our account of that

we

recall Descartes'

can see that

this is not

be a means of producing true judgments.

our method becomes

method

undermine what

method, the character of the mind

most spartan characterization of method (Rule
so, for

to

if

and the possible

ourselves to

form that method appears autonomous and

wheels."^®

its

its

Ibid:22.
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in this

applications only as

applications.

The

way:

it

abstract

no judgments, true or otherwise -

Only

lbid:21.

gods misled us

as

we

consider

method

applied.

^

do we take up the question

of the separability (or reciprocity) of method,

and ontology. And when we do,

that reciprocity appears fundamental.

mind

God

produces worlds as humans produce true or meaningful sentences,
those
differences

becoming

which

result

from applying the method of deduction only

fully visible as

we

consider the difference between God’s

mind and

our own, along with the difference between producing worlds and producing
sentences.

Functionalism, or the abstract and

artificial

method, mind and ontology, only makes sense

as

we

division between

chose to ignore these

various applications of method.
2.3. 1.2

Psychologism

What about psychologism? Does
the fundamental reciprocity

I

this

notion succeed in undermining

have been arguing for? Granting that our

method has fundamental psychological presuppositions, do we not thereby
undermine our method's
about the world

—

ability

— as we attempt to produce true statements

to distinguish

between what mind brings

to the

world and

vice versa? Psychologism often does appear to be a form of reductive

epistemics (see note 13 above) that reduces the objects of our knowledge to

some content

or activity of the mind.

Typically, psychologism represents the

systematic confusion of signs with their objects: truth and knowledge become
the "interanimation" of sentences or thoughts, without reference to any

extra-mental content which those sentences or thoughts might signify.^

Commitment

to psychology,

psychologism. Consider the

realist

however,

is

not the

method outlined

psychology assumes that the human mind

Quine:1967.
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is

same

earlier.

as adopting

The

realist

capable of construing thoughts

and words

as signs or representations referring

objects or states of affairs in the world.
for reasons

I

insists that

thought

beyond themselves

Psychologism, on the other hand (and

will not discuss), in turning those representations into realities,

know something

is

of a

unable to "reach beyond

itself" in this realist

it

be that psychologism

method has

is strictly

these assumptions?

psychologistic, others will not.

I

very loose indeed.

irrelevant to the fact that every

think that

Both

is

realist

is

true:

and

some methods

anti-realist

will

methods,

example, presuppose a mind capable of using those methods, and
itself,

way and

mind-independent world. The connection between

psychologism and a method's psychological assumptions

Could

to possible

be

for

by

that,

has no clear implications for the extent to which the object of thought,

or the truth of our sentences, can or cannot refer

beyond thought

to the

world.
Descartes' attempts to avoid psychologism reinforce this conclusion.

Descartes suggests that every clear and distinct idea

world

if

altering or negating

reaches from the
the

mind

—

mind

it

is

creates a contradiction.

necessarily true of the

Every such idea

into the world, as the necessities discovered first in

like those of existence (that

God

exists) or of

— signal necessities in the things themselves
the
of truth; while truth — and here
our

4)

is

tests

.

Clarity

essence (that 2 + 2 =

and distinctness are

realist side of

Descartes

the correspondence of thought with the external, eternal "archetype"

—

is

it

signifies.20

Yet most of our ideas are not necessary truths in the above fashion, but

merely contingent ones. Descartes' idea of wax before the hot

20 Wcissman:1987a:24-5.
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fire, for

instance, exhibits

We

mathematics.

can imagine

changes that the wax

found

of the necessity

little

may

in his ideas of

God

or of

— without contradiction — innumerable

undergo. Indeed, the application of the above

criterion of truth to these contingent claims directs Descartes to invoke

save us from self-deception.

Now

for

an idea to be clear and distinct

only be set unambiguously before the mind’s eye.

God

my

experience of the

part of a dream. In short, Descartes

God's help. Yet

it is

assumptions remain
psychology

is

is

wax

it

is

is

to

need

be required

will

confirm the applicability of each of those contingent ideas, as there
contradiction in supposing that

God

to

no

but an illusion or

saved from psychologism only with

important to note that Descartes' psychological

The mutuality

intact throughout.

not the cause of his succumbing

to,

of

method and

or averting, psychologism.

Descartes' psychology merely lends support to the psychologistic bias already
implicit in his intuitionist method.

Of
assume

course, the

same holds

true for the

method

of hypothesis.

that mind's contents are signs having objects distinct

from them.

These signs are meaningful when construed as representing possible
affairs, like

"green rose" and "red rose." These thoughts are true

(or

consists of the

maps) about

pragmatic

a

mind

(1)

the

This

a

is

formulating meaningful hypotheses

mind-independent world, as well as

tests of these

states of

when

possibilities they signify are instantiated, as only the latter has been.

method which

We

(2)

devising various

hypotheses. The psychological assumptions of

realism are undeniable; yet psychologism plays no role.
2.3.2

Descartes and the

How
method

might

we

Modern Roots

of Intuitionism

characterize Descartes'

method?

We

should say that

requires, in part, a reconstruction of our pre-reflective beliefs.

begin by sorting out from

among our

his

We

relatively obscure beliefs those simple

30

ideas that present themselves most clearly and distinctly.

We

then derive

successively complex ideas from those simples, adding to our store of truths.

But

only half of the story: focusing on the deductive nature of

this is

method

Descartes'

in this

way we

intuitionism of his method.

risk

overlooking the foundational

Consider Descartes' Rule V:

Rule V: Method consists entirely in the order and disposition of
the objects toward which our mental vision must be directed if
we would find out any truth. We shall comply with it exactly if
we reduce involved and obscure propositions step by step to
those that are simpler, and then starting with the intuitive
apprehension of all those that are absolutely simple, attempt to
ascend to the knowledge of all others by precisely similar steps.^^

The non-deductivist foundation

of Descartes'

consider our "intuitive apprehension" of

method emerges

as

we

those "absolutely simple" things

all

as well as our ability to construct the very deductions of

more complex

ideas -

- neither of which could be the result of any kind of deductive reasoning.

We

intuit the simplest things (like

"I

am") along with the certainty of the

more complex

rules for constructing, in deductive fashion,

simples.

method

So

intuition, not deduction, serves as the foundation

of producing

—

all

knowledge

claims.

What

deduction? Deduction, our powers for intuition

mechanism Descartes
organizing

ideas from those

all

outlines in the Rules)

,

is

tell

role

— the very

is left

us (and this

for
is

the formal

the preferred procedure for

those materials already presented to our intuiting, or

"inspecting," minds.

We

might wonder what prompts Descartes

conclusion about the mind's

ability.

Is

to accept this intuitionist

our power for direct inspection of

Descartes:1927:56.
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simple ideas and ourselves

itself

confirmed by

this

method? The answer

appears to be no;

our method rightly explains how our mental vision should be
used. ..I do not see what else is needed to make it complete....
There is besides no question of extending it further in order to

If

show how

these said operations ought to be effected, because
they are the most simple and primary of all. Consequently,
unless our understanding were already able to employ them,

it

could comprehend none of the precepts of that very method, not

even the simplest. 22
Descartes offers no arguments designed to prove that

we do

indeed possess

this constitutive ability to inspect directly the things set before

Could

it

be the case that when

it

comes

to self-inspection

necessary? That appears to be Descartes' view

For

it is

so evident of

itself that

it is I

when he

who

understands, and who desires, that there
anything to explain it.23
It

no argument

is

writes:

doubts,

is

our minds.

who

no reason here

to

add

follows from the very act of reflection (on any content) that

I

have

unmediated, direct knowledge of myself existing as a thinking being. This

knowledge

will serve as the secure foundation for

knowledge. Anyone

who

sets

about reflecting on

have already dispensed with any means

for

all

this

my

other claims to

power

doubting that

it

not to say, however, that this act of self-acquaintance which

simple and without distinct elements.

Weissman

of ours, will

obtains. That
is

the cogito

is

a

form of

"seeing:"

22 Ibid;49-50.
23 IbidrlOl.

2^^

Weissman:1987a:31.
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is

identifies three

distinguishable yet inseparable aspects of Cartesian intuition. 24 First

assumption that knowing

is

we know

is

the

as the "mind's eye

sees. "25

Second, Descartes assumes that something must be given to be seen,

to serve as the content or object

that

I

am

given as

on which

I

might

my

immediately aware of myself and
reflect

I

on any content or

two

therefore, will involve these

and some

object or content

knowing, nothing
It is

is

better

on which

here that intuitionism

intuitionist ideal

powers

object whatsoever.

things: a

known

reflect.

to

it

mind

may

Third

for inspecting the

Any

act of cognition,

fully acquainted

Yet

it

mind than mind

an impossible

first sets for itself

that the

these conditions for intuition
for

such conditions are most

is

itself

itself.

presupposes a mind fully acquainted with

would seem

with

In the Cartesian act of

reflect.

most plausible method

task.

The

and able

itself

specify and confirm the mental structures and faculties which
possible.

the view

is

make

to

intuition

for discovering

(pace Kant) a form of inference, not intuition,

likely not inspectable

.

What might one such

condition for intuition be? Consider again what Descartes writes in Rule V:

Rule V: Method consists entirely in the order and disposition of
the objects towards which our mental vision must be directed if
we are to find out any truth.26
This passage suggests that our "mental vision" will give us access to

everything presented to mind. So that some truths might result,

important too that our power of inspection be able to distinguish
in sophisticated ways: for example, to distinguish simple ideas

complex ones, and

to

mark

from the more obscure and

off that

which presents

itself clearly

it is

this content

from more

and

distinctly

inarticulate contents of unreflective thought

experience.

25 ibid:31.
2^ Dcscartcs:1927;56.
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and

How might we
mind cannot do
in the

that

account for

—

all

form of the products

that
of

this

very power of inspection? Inspecting

confronts

it

what

"effects of
It

is

is

the evidence of

The

its activity.

to specify the psychological conditions for

he claims that mind

is

fact is that

own powers

its

Descartes never

tries

producing these products. Rather,

only capable of reflecting on and discovering the

done, to

it

or within

not their causes. "27

it,

follows that intuitionists are forced to choose inference over

intuition in specifying the conditions for intuition.

And

in so doing, they

underline the inadequate nature of intuitionism's unique mix of intuitionist

method and psychological assumptions.
that inspecting

mind does

in fact

I

suppose that

it is

reasonable to say

have the powers and structures that make

such inspection possible. To the extent that intuitionists recognize the need
to specify

task that

and confirm those

it

essential conditions for intuition,

lacks the resources to accomplish.

consequence of adopting the

intuitionist

We

method,

it

sets itself a

state this as the first
at least in its

major

Cartesian

form;

Consequence #1 Intuitionism is unable to specify the least
ontological and psychological conditions for the possibility
:

of

intuition.

Later

we

shall see that this limitation holds true for

versions of the intuitionist method.

Descartes'

conditions for the possibility of intuition will

problem

become

many

other

of specifying the

their

problem

too, as

they
...hide, disguise,

or ignore

which make the process
presuppositions of their

all

the paraphernalia

and assumptions

They are slow to tell us about the
method, including mind's self-

go.

27 ibid;38.
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and

sufficiency

its

structure,

creating self-consciousness.

acknowledged, the

power and freedom

as a selfthese assumptions are

When

intuitionist activities claimed for

mind seem

a pretense.28
2.3.3

A

Method and Theory

Conflict of

We

want

to ask

now

in

what manner, and

to

what

extent,

knowledge,

on Descartes' view, can reach beyond our inspecting minds. There
stake in these questions for Descartes'

we

way

of thinking, for

is

much

two reasons.

at

First

reason for rejecting psychologism: our ideas must refer

recall Descartes'

beyond themselves

in order to

certainly

were

make any

sense of our knowledge:

very ideas only as
thinking and not refer them to any other
thing, they could scarcely provide any matter for error.^9
...for

modes

particular

Second, there

is

of

I

to consider these

my

his notion of a transcendent

God who works

to

guarantee that our clear and distinct ideas do have extra-mental referents.

Two

considerations are important here.

count as an idea:

all

ideas, as the

mind and

inspectable.

cannot be

made

own

First is the limitation

form of thoughts, must be present

to produce, the idea of

God

Since every
presuppositions,
Descartes'

God.

theory

It

to the

follows that Descartes, on his

His method, in other words,

meaningless.

method contains psychological and

we might suppose

method

that

is

that

in conflict

it is

ontological

the implicit ontology of

with his more explicit metaphysical

— including his concept of God, and, most generally, our place

material world. The result

is

that Descartes

Weissman:1989b:78.

Quoted

shall

Second, those "most simple" ideas do not include, and

account, cannot have an idea of God.

renders talk of

on what

in Weissman:1987a:24.
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is

committed

to

in the

opposed claims

about

which

more

On

reality.
is

the one side, his intuitionist

explicit metaphysical theory tries to

We
way

of

minimum

fallibly,

now and

Method's

first

task

is

to

ways

that his

method and

allow us to conceive and confirm,

everything that our ontology affirms. Likewise, ontology
to things that are

undecidable by our method,

method bars him from having any idea

necessary reciprocity of method and ontology
persist with ontological claims that

method

acknowledge ontological commitments

Having

in

consider what the preceding suggests in

conditions for adequately combining

should not contain references
as Descartes'

speak of the world

allow.

should step back

ontological theory.

however

limits the real to that

prefigured in our clear and distinct ideas; while on the other, his

method would not

the

method

identified this conflict of

might one go about solving

might consider pressing

it?

of

when we

We

God.

ignore the

follow Descartes and

forbids or, alternatively,

fail

implicit in our chosen method.

method and theory

in Descartes,

There are two main approaches.

for the absolute priority of either

For example, our claim might be that method

is

always

First,

method

prior,

and

for asserting, a priori, the priority of either

how

we

or theory.
that

Descartes should therefore adopt an atheistic stance. But, in general,

no good reason

to

method

I

can see

or theory.

Indeed, the relations that hold between the two seem to be more or less

symmetrical:

Method has

priority in the respect that

hence, the claims

method having

it

limits the content

— of theories formulated within

a severe empiricist

God

or eternal

Maturana along these lines in the next chapter. These
Ruben's attention in his Marx and Materialism (1977).
criticize
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as a

meaning requirement

prohibits the formulation of claims about

I

it,

—

issues are also the focus of

possibilities.

The order

of authority

reversed, however, when
which are true or false, and
theories with their explicit claims about the world which direct
action
e.g., as our notion of cause has regulative force in

we emphasize

that

it is

is

theories

—

ordinary practice and experimental science. Where method is
only instrumental to formulating theories, we may want to
enrich method so that it may serve for expressing and testing
them.

Second, might

we

find a solution in the "facts" of either sensory

experience or considered reason? Never mind the dispute between theory

and method, we might

means searching

say, but look to the "things themselves,"

whether

the empirical data or consulting rational intuition.

common emphasis on

the idea that

we may

that

Yet this

inspect something directly,

without the distractions of method or previously accepted theories, belies the

common ground

of empiricist

and

rationalist solutions alike.

Both would

have us evade the dispute between our method and ontology by looking

to a

realm of uncontaminated, exhaustively inspectable and dispute-resolving
facts.

This

is

of course, the intuitionist method, with

ontological assumptions intact, circling back

on

implicit

all its

itself in

empiricist or

rationalist guise.

Intuitionism's emphasis

on "the

facts" is inseparable

knew

that everything real be inspectable.^^ But

we

consequence of adopting the

method, and

resolve Descartes' problem.

meaningful thought

is

simples) so Descartes

idea that

God

that

is

intuitionist

As
it is

already

it

from

this to

its

demand

be a

does nothing

to

a least condition for having a true or
a "simple" (or the complex constructed from

barred from having any idea of God, including the

exists.

Weissman:1987a:45.

Wcissman:1989a:63.
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Descartes' methodological rigor forces us to take responsibility for

specifying the

domain

of things existing:

Where

"I am, I exist," is the elemental expression of our
knowledge, mind knows itself by catching its reflection in some
other content known, as I know something of myself in
thinking or perceiving any other thing.... [M]ind's contents
are.. .its determining qualifications. Everything else, i.e.,
everything whose existence and character are independent of
mind, is dismissed as unthinkable.^^

Nothing can be
pre-exists

real

not exhaustively inspectable in this way; "nothing

The second consequence

distinction.

its

method

intuitionist

if it is

is

more general than

Consequence #2 Intuitionism
:

nothing can be real

if

the

of adopting the

first:

biased against speculation:
it is not exhaustively

is

the idea of

inspectable.

How

might the

The method
intuitionist

the world:

respond

to Descartes'

theory-method

conflict?

of hypothesis rejects as an excessive concession to the skeptic the

assumption that everything

demand

the

realist

for verification,

all

we

real

must be

inspectable.

Relaxing

say that there can be no unmediated access to

our knowledge claims will be probabilistic.

We

are in effect

"separated" from that world by a tissue of natural and conventional signs.

We

shall

never have the certainty that the immediacy of intuitionism

promises; but then, from our naturalistic perspective, too

remains inaccessible to that other position.

33 Ibid;70.
3^^

Maturana:1988a:45.
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much

of reality

t

2.4

Between Content and Form
Intuitionism often exhibits one of two emphases: content or form.

Philosophers

may

dwell on either one, considering

it

the touchstone for

understanding while regarding the alternative as derivative, possibly having
its intelligibility

projected onto

intuitionist of content in

serve as the source for

and

Hume

is

the clearest

supposing that sense data

all

that

ordinary language ("form"):
"force

it.

all

is intelligible,

example of an

(or "content")

should

including the distinctions of

the "perceptions of the

mind" reduce

to the

most

vivacity" of our impressions.^^ Indeed, sensory data, or

broadly, experience, usually serves as the original content for intuition, while

ordinary language^^ serves as the form. Where intuitionists of content turn
their attention

intuitionists of

manner

toward everything inspectable within, or given
form attend

to differentiations within

to,

experience,

phenomena

or the

of their organization.

We

find

more

intuitionists of

form than content (James and

Hume

are

notable exceptions), as philosophers are likely to imagine that content serves
as a

mere provocation

to reflection:

for intelligibility within

our conceptual systems are to be the basis

an otherwise "unthinkable" void, substratum, or

flow of experience. Maturana's understanding of explanation as a
reformulation of the "praxis of living" of an observer

is

a case in point.

Hume:1969:74-5.

emphasis among ordinary language philosophers. There are
language "contains
those, like Austin and Gadamer, who suppose that our unrefined ordinary
also
see
1970:130;
(Austin:
remarking"
worth
all the distinctions men have found
concepts, see
of
system"
"constructional
his
with
Gadamer:1975, 1976). Others, like Carnap
and serve as
experience
clarify
to
best
order
in
improvement
ordinary language as needing some
There

the

is

ground

this difference in

for all that is intelligible (See Carnap:1967).
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2.4.1

Maturana’s Praxis of Living
Maturana's writings often begin with a

beings operate as observers, that
This

is

our universal,

is,

we make

fitting observation:

"distinctions in language."^^

"a priori experiential situation:"38

everything that happens, everything that

is, all

inarticulate,

is

prior to

all

We

do,

are to imagine that the

our comments or reflections on

immediate experience of surprise

we

everything

occur within our "praxis of

living (or the experience of living) in language."39

flow of experience

we human

is

it,

as our

prior to any eventual

explanation or understanding of that experience:
Indeed, whatever happens to us, happens to us as an experience
that we live as coming from nowhere. We do not usually
realize that because we normally collapse the experience upon
the explanation of the experience in the explanation of the
experience. This, for example, happens when, while driving a
car, another vehicle that we had not seen in the rear-view
mirror overtakes us. When this occurs we are surprised, and we
usually say immediately to ourselves or to others, as a manner
of justification of our surprise, that the other vehicle was in the
blind spot of the rear viewing system of the car, or that it was
coming very fast. In our experience, however, we live the
overtaking car as appearing from nowhere.
This

is

meant

to

be true of

all

experience.

Maturana proposes

that the

flow of experience, or the happening of living of the observer in language,
just

"happens out of nowhere."

We

note these three consequences.

explanation or description of experience
experience

itself.

That follows whether

is

Maturana:1988a:5.

Maturana:1988b:27.
Maturana:1988a:5.
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any

"operationally secondary" to the

we were

Maturana:1988b:26; 1988a:5.

First,

to

suggest that

we

are a

complex of properties
each

existing in space-time or ideas in the

put forward as a "comment,

is

original experience

which gave

mind

of God:

reflection, or reformulation’’^! of that

rise to these various explanations.

Second,

explanations or descriptions do not replace or constitute the experiences they

supposedly explain or

describe,'^^ as a scientific explanation for the

of a mirage does not replace that experience,

whose

appearance

experiential character

often endures, despite the explanation. Third, the secondary nature of our

comments and

reflections

on the experience

of the observer render those

explanations "strictly unnecessary" for experience.^^

Do

these remarks about the priority of the observer’s experiential

situation suggest that

Maturana

is

an intuitionist of content? No, experience

can not serve as the original content for Maturana as

it

does for Hume,

finds in the sensory given ("impressions") the content for every idea.
different for Maturana,

observer

—

is

where experience

more an incitement

It is

— or the praxis of living of the

to reflection

and explanation and

a

necessary condition for the "possibility" of there being any observations
all.'^'i

Experience

is

not intelligible in

itself;

observer finds him- or herself as the source of all reality
through his or her operations of distinction that her or she

performs in the praxis of

living.'^^

Maturana:1988a:6.

Maturana:1988b:27; 1988a:6.

Maturana:1988b:27.

Ibid:27.

Ibid:31.
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at

rather, every intelligible difference

awaits the operations of distinction performed by an observer:
...the

who

Uninterpreted content nearly disappears
nowhere"), as
distinction)

all

used

of

its intelligibility

to think

just

"happens out of

derives from the forms (operations of

Maturana

it.

(it

clearly

is

an

We

intuitionist of form.

save for the next chapter a detailed consideration of Maturana’s "ontology of
the observer."
2.4.2 Intuitionism of

Content

Intuitionists of content are caught

naive,

Why

mute enjoyment

up

in a dialectical cycle

of content ("experience")

and

its

between the

accurate description.

does that occur? These intuitionists assume that the

partial, selective

nature of description inevitably generates a picture of reality that
to the detail of experience.
distorts,

The

is

selectivity of description mediates,

our appreciation of content in three ways.

First,

unfaithful

hence

the qualitative range

of our vocabulary of descriptive terms (like color terms, for example)

inadequate in comparison with the observable differences of color
world.

Second, our limited

abilities for interpreting

sentences limits the possible complexity
descriptions, as

we

is

often

in the

even well-formed

— and hence accuracy — of our

are incapable of understanding a sentence containing a

verb modified by dozens of adverbs. Third, our descriptions
the differentiations within experience, as there

may

may

exaggerate

not be anything in the

content that corresponds to the discrete linguistic units of our descriptions.'^^

We

must add

to the selectivity of description

feature of that activity: our descriptions

may

one further distorting

contain "some a priori bias or

structure determining the kinds of data to be selected, and the principles for

46 Weissman:1987a;58-9.
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organizing our claims about them.'"^^

it is

here that

Wittgenstein that the limits of our language
that the

language used

in describing the

anticipation of the kinds of things that
selectivity, these a priori biases

mean

world

is

we suppose

the limits of our world;

a specification or

may be found

there.

undermine intuitionism

us closer to intuitionism of form as

it

with

Together with

of content

and move

strives to describe accurately (and in

this a priori fashion) the content of experience.

2.4.3 Intuitionism of

There

is

Form

a second possible

emphasis within intuitionism

prioritizes the forms, relations, or rules for differentiating

that

and ordering the

content given to experience. The priority of form arises in either of these two

ways: form

is

discovered within the content or used legislatively in projecting

form onto content.

In the first case, the

forms are intrinsic to content, and the

mind achieves understanding by discovering
relations or rules within experience.

the organizing or differentiating

In the latter case, the forms, either

learned or innate, are used projectively or legislatively to supply the
differentiations or orders with

which

to think or perceive

an otherwise

undifferentiated content. Plato and Descartes are paradigmatic:

They believed that we have luminous apprehension of Forms or
concepts, and that these are used projectively as we impose or
discover differentiation and order within sensory data. Ordinary
language analysis is their modern counterpart. For what could
be more familiar than the question, "What could we say of
that?" where the saying introduces words that are used to
differentiate and understand the matter at issue.'^®

Ibid:58.

Weissman:1987a:60.
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Language
intelligible or

disappears, as

We

is

to exhibit the

forms which make the world thinkable,

knowable. In every case, uninterpreted content nearly
all

do recognize

of

its intelligibility

this last

comment

derives from the forms used to think

to

be a most controversial one, especially

in the context of the realist-idealist debate.

of form steals

all

of the integrity that

it.

may be

Why

suppose that the imposition

there before our act of

interpretation?
2.4. 3.1

Gadamer
Let us consider Gadamer's use of language as a tool with which

to

make

texts,

tool,

we

are

"interpretations" of pre-existing states of affairs or objects, be they

works

of art, or nature.

however, since "on

it

We note from

depends the

the start that

fact that

man

it is

a special sort of

has a world

at all";49

Language and the world are mutually sustaining and
reciprocally related: Not only is the world "world" only insofar
as it comes into language, but language, too, has its real being
only in the fact that the world

is

The

Gadamer's use of the word world

equivocal.

first

thing to notice

What

is

is

that

represented within

is

the relationship between our views of the world, the

resources of our language, and "the world"
of view, pre-judgments

itself?

and "horizons" serve

understanding: form dictates, in

Gadamer

it.^^

this

way

We

recall that one's point

as the pre-condition of

at least, to content.

all

Just the same,

sees the very particularity of our understanding as a positive

to raising the philosophical

awareness of the

Gadamer:! 975:401.
Ibid:401.

See also section 3.6 and 4.5 below.
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human

sciences.

our

Our

means

"legitimate prejudices" are neither remnants of an unenlightened mentality

nor barriers to objectivity:

kind of sensitivity involves neither neutrality in the
matter of the object nor the extinction of one's self, but the
conscious assimilation of one's own fore-meanings and
...this

The important thing

prejudices.

to

is

be aware of one's

own

bias

so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be
able to assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings.^^

As Thomas McCarthy

explains, the interpreter does not approach his or

her subject as an "ideally neutral observer with a direct access to the given";
rather, people carry with
practices, concepts

them

certain "horizons of expectation"

and norms —

Gadamer's novel point

is

—

beliefs

that are all part of their "life-world. "^3

that "legitimate" prejudices naturally result

the juxtaposition of familiar

and

and

"alien" traditions.

from

This process

...not only lets those prejudices that are of a particular and
limited nature die away, but causes those that bring about

genuine understanding

How

does

a process

this

to

emerge

come about? Gadamer

clearly as such.54

believes that the dialectic of experience,

which adequately explains the apparent openness of "experienced"

individuals
...has its

own

openness

Our openness
-

to

fulfillment not in definitive knowledge, but in that

to experience that

new

is

encouraged by experience

possibilities is a function of

a conflict in horizons

— which prompts

Gadamer:1975:238.

McCarthy:1978:172.

Gadamer:1975:266.
55 Ibid:319.
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itself.^^

our awareness of the other

us to find the "question" of the text

-

that

it

presents to successive generations of interpreters. The dialectic of

question and answer makes understanding appear as a reciprocal relationship
of the

same kind

as a dialogue.

It is

necessary to

make

the text "speak to us"

as another person would.

But

how

does Gadamer overcome the extreme

of the fact that every dialogical process

—

"prejudices"

key, he

is

our

total

language as the universal
a tool

which

medium

of

assists

human

in

which we expect from the

text?

The

language dependence .^^ Gadamer regards

medium

of

human

understanding, and not simply

communication. Indeed, language becomes the very
existence which discloses our "world"

circumscribing and uniting

game

— as a process founded in subjective

related to the answers

tells us, is in

relativistic implications

(to

the space

use Gadamer's metaphor) the participants of a

which they gamble with

Gadamer's worldmaking

--

is

their prejudices.

a social affair: acts of interpretation are not

"self-founding" but presuppose our immersion in tradition which

concretely in our absolute dependence on language.57

It is

is

given

a central notion of

philosophical hermeneutics that the dialogical character of understanding
the basis of the self-transcending nature of language

As David Tinge

—

its

changing horizons.

writes:

from the new,
but a particular starting point from which understanding
advances, so to know a language is to be open to participation in
a dialogue with others that transforms and broadens the
horizons from which we start.^^

Just as prejudices are not a prison that isolates us

Ibid:402.

Ibid:402.

Gadamer:1976:xxxi.
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is

There

no room here

is

for the perfect exclusivity of perspectives that

relativism demands. All possible worlds are, by necessity, linguistically

constituted worlds.
...every

It

And

such world, as linguistically constituted, is always open,
to every possible insight and hence for every expansion

of

itself,

of

its

own

world-picture, and accordingly available to others.^^

follows that views of the world are not relative, unrelated pictures of

no archimedean point from which we can

different realities, for there exists

distinguish between "our" linguistic world and "the" world.

attempting to relativize "the" world
linguistically

with

all

--

the

schematized experience.

whole

He

is

to

Gadamer

which we

is

not

refer all of

our

instead equating "the" world

these particular views of the world:

phenomenologically, the 'thing-in-itself is. ..nothing
other than the continuity with which the shades of the various
perspectives of the perception of objects pass into one another
...seen

The
to

"thing-in-itself" constitutes a

understand from within

another language.

It is

itself

continuum

the

view

in this sense,

our experience of the world

is

we

which

of perspectives

of the

world that

is

is

"able

presented in

are told, that the linguisticality of

able to transcend

all relativity

and comprehend

all"things-in-themselves:"

view of the world the existence of the world-in-itself is
implied. It is the whole to which the linguistically schematised
experience is referred. The variety of these views of the world
does not involve any relativisation of the 'world.' Rather, what

In every

Gadamer:1975:406.

lbid:406.

Ibid:403.
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the world

is is

not different from the views in which

it

presents

itself.^2

Gadamer's debt

to

Kant

is clear:

language

the

is

absolute, as the 18th century notion that everyone's

becomes the notion

that everyone's language

fashion, the world itself

world

— that which

is

new

mind

transcendental

is

the same.

same

the

In intuitionist

"implied" in every view of the

is

— stands before us as a never completed manifold, awaiting

its

"concretion" in relation to the understanding:^^
...that

which

mind

as

because

it

is

subjective because of having been created

thinks the given

we

is

by

nevertheless called objective

cannot help but think of

it

as standing apart

from

us.^'^

The only

difference

is

the contemporary emphasis

on the

creative

power

of

language:

The
is

way

light that causes everything to

emerge

in

manifest and comprehensible in

itself is

the light of the

such a

that

it

word.^5

Language

is,

apparently, "a very special miner's lamp, lighting the

before us, creating the articulations in our path."^^
to this:

Does

that

which emerges

clearly

it

Our question now comes

have a sense or character of

prior to the act of interpretation? There are times

does: "Neither jurist nor theologian regards the

62 Ibid:406.

62 Ibid:430.
6^ Weissman:1987a:72.

62 Gadamer:1975:440.

66 Weissman:1977:219.
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way

when Gadamer
work

its

own,

writes as

of application as

if

making

And

free with the text."67

"the linguistic

not a barrier that prevents knowledge of being in
that the

world can

Gadamer

we

will

is

in

exist

without

no position

to

man and

world

in

— for the

No

itself....

perhaps will do

latter are the

live

is

one questions
But clearly

so.’’^®

defend such a world: hermeneutics

be incapable of knowing a world apart from our

interpretations

which we

tells

many views

us that
or

very source of the world's

intelligibility.
2. 4. 3. 2

Goodman
Searching for one other instance of intuitionist form dictating to

content

we

recall

Nelson Goodman's onion metaphor:

various versions of the world as

"none of them

world

is."^^

tells

the

way

we

peel an onion

the world

is,

down

Ways

of

first

subtract off the

to its

but each of them

Returning to the metaphor of our

following example from Goodman's

we

tells

chapter,

let

empty
us a

.

one point that there are always "equally good maps of the same

maps proves

way

tells

rejected the picture theory of language

Gadamer:1975:297.

Ibid:405-6.

Goodman:1972;31.

Ibid:15.

Ibid:31.
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us

at

territory."70

elusive:

on the ground that the
structure of a description does not conform to the structure of
the world. But I then concluded that there is no such thing as
the structure of the world for anything to conform or fail to
conform to.^^

I

the

us consider the

Worldmaking He

Yet that central point of reference for differing

core:

Gadamer and Goodman have

we

can

know

is

the one

made

interpretations: "what the

presents

itself."^^

this

intelligible to

world

is is

Nature, having no form in

We

(or "territory") that

territory

we
it

was designed

I.

for the

map

a

to

What seemed

those

at first to

Gadamcr:1975:406.
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be

of describing a

nature or existence on those

metaphor

that has lost

has value independently of the

to represent.

it

an

way now from

many ways

its

Goodman's hands,

are to suppose that a

reduced

are a long

does not depend for

descriptions, has become, in
sense, as

itself, is

described at the start of chapter

merely a pragmatic means of accounting

world

us by our sense-making

not different from the views in which

unthinkable, hence unknowable, void.

maps and plans

thought in common; the only world

its

CHAPTER

MATURANA AND

3

INTUITION:

THE ONTOLOGY OF THE OBSERVER
3.1

Introduction
In this chapter

I

offer a hypothetical realist perspective

Humberto Maturana.^

of

I

on the

theories

will argue that the anti-realist core of Maturana's

"ontology of the observer" arises from an idealistic over-emphasis on the

power

of

human

thought or activity to create, circumscribe or otherwise

determine the domain of the

some

to

real: in intuitionist fashion, all of

being reduces

aspect of ourselves, as the conditions for knowledge are to be the

conditions for existence.

It is

in fact ironic that

explicit ontological dimension.

therefore,

is

to

A

Maturana's doctrine has an

major concern of the present chapter,

demonstrate the inadequate

— in

fact contradictory

— nature

of Maturana's particular conception of ontology.

We

shall see that

dependent, even

Maturana's conception of reality

solipsistic notion,

whose

is

a purely subject-

initial plausibility arises

from an

unfortunate and subtle equivocation on the independence of the objects of
the world from our theories or descriptions.

^

Many

of Maturana's

theorists of the

science

Kuhn

"irrealist"

recall

from our

arguments mirror those put forward by some of the most

modern

analytic/linguistic tradition, including the "radical

(1962) Feyerabend (1975)

Nelson

We

Goodman

and Hanson

(1958),

initial

sketch

influential

philosophers of

Richard Rorty (1979,1981), the

(1978), as well as the "internal realist" Hilary

Putnam

(1978, 1981,

Maturana's early
1989). In fact, in discussing the "puzzle" of perception, Goodman
that the
conclusion
the
for
neurophysiological studies of vision as offering some evidence
visual system [has] fun making a world to suit itself" (Goodman:1978:73n-79).
cites
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3

of the

two dimensions

of realism (section 1.3), that to assert the essential

independence of the object from thought

have a determinate
thought or

is

to say that the object can exist

(or determinable) nature

activity. 2

It

independently of

merely have their existence imply the existence of

We

should remark that a painting or a

raw materials from which they
Something

sense.

is

a

human

follows from this conception of essential

independence, that mind-dependent objects need not

hammer

chair, for

are made), are clearly

mind-

exist "in the

human

mind," but

activity or thought.

example (but not the

mind-dependent

or cultural objects (including the state, the economy, science,

Does

that

for their existence

make

all

social

and so on)

art,

and nature on purposeful human

activity.

realism irrelevant to the social world? Certainly not, for

these (social) things are materialized
essentially

in this

or chair in virtue of being used in a certain

fashion, or being so designed to be used. This holds true, in fact, for

which depend

and

in,

and dependent on,

that

which

all

is

mind-independent, namely: the natural world. In other words,

the essential independence goes one way: nature

mind, but mind (and

all its

products)

is

is

essentially

independent of

not essentially independent of

nature.
I

dimension
reality

assume

will

that the successful defense of this decisive

of realism requires that

dualism outlined

continue to

in chapter

reject all inferences

2 In chapter V,

I

will present

I.

like the

scheme-

In arguing for realism, then,

from the truism

and defend the notion

by their being
Sec also Wcissman:1989b:Ch5; 1977.
possible, characterized

we adopt something

independence

(1) all
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questions of the form

that the real consists of the actual

relatively determinate

^ Ruben:1977:74; sec also Devitt;1984:14-15.

we must

and

and

the

determinable, respectively.

"what
"cut

there?" are necessarily asked within a description or theory, to

is

up

the world into objects"

when we

to resist all equivocation

known

from the knower.

3.2

objects

we

chose a certain scheme of

representations, description or theory of the worldd That

must continue

(2)

on the

essential

is just to

say that

we

independence of

The Epistemological Contradiction
Before

I

set

out in any detail the particulars of Maturana’s system,

should explain the charge of inadequacy
ontological dimension.

The problem

I

have already directed towards

I

its

from the following

arises

epistemological contradiction (EC) which results from Maturana's attempt to

remain

faithful to the intuitionist

method while

specifying, in abductive

inferential fashion, the nature of the living;

The Epistemological Contradiction (EC)
Maturana's constructivist intuitionism includes an antirealist epistemology that insists on the futility of any and all
1.

reality claims.

Maturana also embraces an ontological theory called structure
determinism which contains, like all such theories, a reality

2.

claim.

To deny

the possibility of

all "reality

claims"

is

to

adopt a constructivist

version of intuitionism that rejects as meaningless any and
claims about the

way

the world "really

is"

^ Putnam:1981:49-53. Rorty follows Putnam's lead

all

ontological

independent of the knower's

when he argues from

(1)

we never encounter

..as making worlds
reality "accept under a given description" to (2) we should "see ourselves.
"perception
version;
Maturana's
is
here
And
(Rorty;1981:xxxix).
rather than finding them"
of one
specification
the
rather
as
but
reality,
external
an
not be viewed as a grasping of

should
(Maturana:1980a:xv).

intend
most recent publication Maturana describes his ontological task as follows:
primary
ontologically
are
phenomena,
biological
show that the observer and observing, as
(Maturana;1988a:4).
with respect to the object and the physical domain of existence"
"1

^ In his
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to

formative or constructive power. ^ The constructivist impulse guarantees that

our ontology will be a psycho-centric one, animated by the general idea that
"the

known

is

always a by-product

[or creation] of the

knower:"^

The transition from naive acquaintance.. .to the constructivist
making of the given marks a fundamental change in the
Before we looked at the given or
looked for certain things within it. Now, we are to determine, as
an act of thought and will, that the given is to be organized in
the ways determined by our interests and values....
Constructivism is the intuitionist passion carried to its limit;
knowledge is guaranteed when the gap between knower and

orientation of our intentions.

known
Yet

we

is

eliminated finally. ...8

are constrained in this way: having adopted an anti-realist (or

constructivist) epistemology

we

cannot, without contradiction,

ontological claims about entities or events as they

ways
the

of speaking

mark

(section 2.3) that these

the

^

As

domain

first

to

may be independent

and acting (including perceiving)

of ontological claims in the

more common

which our method

noted in note 24 of chapter

I

common

make any

— what

sense.^

I

We

of our

consider to be

have noted

ontological claims are a specification of

applies.

The

realist interpretation of

words

above, the following are the basic principles of radical

knowledge is not passively received either through the senses or by way of
communication; (b) knowledge is actively built up by the cognizing subject; (c) the function of
cognition is adaptive (in the biological sense of the term); and (d) cognition serves the subject's

constructivism:

(a)

organization of the experiential world, not the discovery of an objective reality (von
Glasersfeld:1988a:2). Clearly, it is (d) alone that seems to contradict the sort of realism

I

am

defending.
^ Held and Pols:1985a:513-4.

^

Weissman:1987a:180.

words: "The contradiction consists in making, on the one hand, reality
perfectly general
claims about (in this case) the nature of human cognition/observation
it is exorcised
claims about how human cognition/ observation functions, no matter where or how
do
principle
in
and, on the other hand, insisting that this function is such that it can never
^ In Held's

and

Pols'

—

—

anything but create

its

own

"reality"

(Held and Pols:1987:466).
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thoughts

snd.

a.s

natural and convontional signs of thoir objocts, for Gxanrplo,

commits us not simply
actualities
activity.

whose

We

to those signs,

but to a world of possibilities and

existence and nature

assume

that the

essentially

is

independent of that

world contains both human

artifacts

constructed from nature and myriad natural plants and creatures, including,
of course,
is

humans. The

a biological

specification of the nature of cognition

phenomenon

of the sort

— whether

Maturana describes or something

it

else

— includes a theory of the real differentiations and orders present in that part
of the

world consisting of the organisms and minds capable of performing

cognitive acts. In short,

making

explicit claims

(2)

of (EC)

about

how

above suggests that Maturana

is

in fact

things are independent of (any particular)

knower.
3.2.1

Epistemological Inconsistency

There

is this

other consideration.

I

take (EC) to signal, in D.H. Ruben's

phrase, an instance of strong epistemological inconsistency.^^
strongly epistemologically inconsistent
(b)

if (a)

Two

claims are

they are logically consistent and

the truth of one implies that there can be no possible evidence for

believing that the other

true.

is

Maturana

is

committed

epistemological inconsistency in believing both

from the truth of

(1),

there can be

true (or even meaningful).

determinism

is

true, that

and

no possible evidence

Alternatively,

is, if it

(1)

if

to strong

(2)

of (EC) to be true:

for believing that (2)

Maturana's theory of structure

correctly identifies

some

structure,

regularities, or relations that hold for all those things that fall within

l^Sce Rubcn:1977:23.
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its

is

domain, then Maturana has identified

exempt from the
3.2.2

A

relativistic strictures set

down

one

reality claim

for all of us in

might anticipate the following

Maturana could

reasoning.
that neither

nor

(1)

some way,

is

(1).

(2)

sort of objection to this line of

claim, in keeping with his pragmatic outlook,

are in any meaningful sense true, but merely "useful"

possibly in

making sense

of our experience.

While

I

grant to Maturana the luxury of doing purely conceptual analysis,

seems

which

Possible Objection

We

in

at least this

to

me

that this flight

from truth

the apparent conflict between the

two

to

will not
it still

pragmatics does nothing to solve

claims.

If

one

(the

first,

say,

which

concerns the lack of any meaningful access to a reality outside of the mind)

used

in a

way

that helps us sort out our experiences, then

the pragmatic reading, that our experience

us" (rather than

is

such that

it

is

should follow, on

this tool

"works

for

"is true").

This assumption about our experience could prove useful, for example,
in explaining
in vats" or,

our apparent inability

more

to

we

decide whether

generally, to distinguish perceptually

On

"reality" (see section 3.5 below).

second, ontological claim (that

we

are simply "brains

between

illusions

the other hand, to whatever extent the

are structure determined entities) proves

useful as an hypothesis, the clarification that results from applying the

claim to our experiences

say that our experience
first

claim to

it.

possibility that

is

is lost.

like

In that case,

we

It

no longer makes

we supposed

we

could in

are brains in vats

experience; namely, that

we

and

it

was

first

sense, in other words, to

as a result of applying the

fact distinguish

and another,

between the

better interpretation of our

are in fact structured the

way Maturana's
would seem

ontological doctrine of structure determinism says

we

are.

and

(2),

read as a "pragmatic"

the epistemological inconsistency between
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(1)

It

that

conflict,

suggests that the usefulness of one claim depends on the very

uselessness of the other.
It

would seem implausible

limits placed

on

maintain that Maturana

to

his ontological theory

constructivist epistemology.

Rather,

by the
will

I

is

unaware

of

explicit anti-realism of

argue that he believes his

particular ontology to be uniquely capable of attaching to that epistemology

without contradiction.

dependent" or

it

entails,

seems somehow

and Maturana

(at

ontological claims for that doctrine

The

for this role

to

(2)

of (EC) above.

(or theory of

to a

which our knowledge-claims might apply. One side

implicit

domain

in

of objects to

of that mutuality

is

well

anti-realists);

namely, that ontology

is

in the sense that "the

evidence for [ontology

is

recognized by Maturana (and other

what our epistemology, our theory
However, the idea

on the

knowledge) must be

mutual support with one's ontological commitment

is.

relativistic

times explicitly) offers general

force of uncovering this confusion of course rests

determined by our method

a "subject-

have escaped the very

— hence

assumption that one's epistemology

just

is

gut tge universal applicability (and

"relativistic" ontology.^^

truth) of the doctrine
strictures

The obvious candidate

of

method and evidence,

that our ontology conditions

Maturana:1978:60.

^^Gibson:1989;4.

Ibid:5.
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us

it

our epistemology, as no

theorizing can take place in an "ontological vacuum,"^^

See Dell:1985:4-5; Held and Pols:1987;457.

tells

is

not as well

recognized (or even accepted) and will be a point of focus for

my

criticisms of

Maturanad^
Furthermore,

I

shall

argue that Maturana's

"relativistic" or subject-

dependent ontology both exemplifies the reduction of being

knowing and

to

serves temporarily to render invisible the epistemological contradiction

mentioned above. To

anticipate: the idea that

a-description only makes sense
the description of x exists

explain one

way

in

.

when

The use

something exists-relative-to-

taken as a metaphorical
of the imposition

way

metaphor helps

which Maturana's doctrine seem successfully

with some of the familiar world.

Yet seen for what

of saying:

it is,

this

to "leave us

metaphor says

Held and Pols (1987) suggest that some of the defenders of Maturana's doctrine (as outlined
by Dell:1982; 1985; 1987) are subliminally aware of this contradiction and so take
evasive action whenever it threatens to emerge clearly. That action consists in "making a
metaphysical/ontological claim when that is necessary for establishing one part of the
philosophical doctrine which is being defended, and then depriving that claim of seriousness
whenever it begins to become manifest that persistence in the claim will lead to contradiction"
(Held and Pols:1987:456). Devitt's analysis of the "radical" philosophers of science (Kuhn and
Feyerabend) yields a similar description of those philosophers as "ontologically coy"
(Devitt:1984), a concept 1 will discuss below (section 4.2.1). I do not deny these essentially
psychological claims but attempt to account for the "evasive action" and ontological "coyness"
alike as necessary counterparts of the intuitionist method.
at least

See Devitt:1984:140.

Ibid:140. Devitt attributes a similar position to

Kuhn and Feyerabend.

In order to

the "realist rhetoric" of the these philosophers of science, Devitt suggests that it
is necessary to attribute to them the doctrine he calls "weak" (or fig-leaf) realism (p. 138). Yet
we should note that Devitt's doctrine of weak or fig-leaf realism signals the use of that term in

accommodate

only a rhetorical sense. According to that doctrine what exists and has a nature independently
of our conceptions is only an ineffable, unknowable thing-in-itself. "Weak realists" then are
not committed to the independent existence of the objects of our everyday world or even of
science
these things are all "mind dependent" in the sense that their nature and existence
depends, roughly, on the ways in which we think about them. Therefore, despite their

—

apparent willingness to talk about a noumenal realm of things-in-themselves, I shall consider
them simply idealists. We shall see that the same can be said for Maturana in those rare
occasions where he refers to the necessary ontological commitment to a "substratum" that is
entailed by his epistemology (section 4.4 below). According to such doctrines commitment is
only to the independent existence of Kantian things-in-themselves. The everyday world of
common-sense and scientific objects exists only relative-to-theory. We are left with nothing
but a world that

is,

in Rorty's

words, "well

lost" (Rorty:1981).
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nothing

at all

describing

it.

about a world that

To

the extent that

is

independent of our various ways of

Maturana recognizes the metaphorical nature

of his "relativistic ontology" the need for evasive action presses to the
fore.

This

is

precisely the reason behind Maturana's implicit adoption (in

contradiction to his stated anti— realist epistemology) of a non— radically
relative ontology.
to

be "interested"

It is

of

no consequence

in a "metaphysical

Maturana

that

independent

explicitly claims not

reality"^^ for

it is

a corollary

of our analysis of the problems associated with the intuitionist method, that

the "lack of sufficient interest [in ontological matters]

is

not sufficient to

prevent one from making a reality claim.

My
detail

task for the remainder of this chapter will be to consider in

Maturana's constitutive ontology of the observer in order to defend

attribution of (EC) to that doctrine.

I

resolving this particular tension:

(i)

two

epistemology to account

for his

ontology of "structure determinism."

that, despite all

possibilities for

(ii)

would

entail

apparent access

Failing to achieve

to

modifying

workings of

(i)

that

doctrine might consistently be viewed as a form of radical skepticism or

Obviously, a "solution" along the lines of

solipsism.

(ii)

merely rids

epistemology and his

Maturana

of the contradiction

(implicit)

ontology while leaving his particular doctrine with nothing

recommend

it

between

— nothing, that

is,

his stated

to those (including

Dcll:1987:462.

Held and

my

Maturana’s doctrine might be

reinterpreted in the appropriately realist way. This
his anti-realist

conclude

will tentatively

the explicit claims to the contrary, there are only

his

some

Pols:! 987:466.
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Maturana)

who

to

explicitly reject

that Cartesian

game which

such doctrines. In

doubt carried "too

looses

all

this

far"

regard

follow Russell^^ in supposing

I

reduces philosophy

seriousness. That

is

to a

mere

technical

partly because such doubt, once

admitted in any particular domain of our knowledge, inevitably undermines

knowledge claims almost everywhere.^t The most one
argues,

is

theory remains a victim of (EC). Moreover,

purposes of

3.3

with, as Russell

a very mysterious "solipsism of the moment."22

Outside of finding a solution along the

lines of

is left

this

for

(ii),

paper that one

Maturana

may be

it

lines of

(i)

or

(ii)

does not matter

Maturana's
for the

inclined to accept a solution along the

clearly rejects both

(i)

and

(ii).

Maturana's Ontology of the Observer

Maturana

is

probably best

known

author (with Lettvin, McCulloch and
Tells the Frog's Brain."

to the scientific non-specialist as a co-

Pitts) of the

paper "What the Frog's Eye

Since the publication of that essay, his research has

centered on the task of specifying the nature of the living in the form of a
systematic, theoretical biology. In the introduction to his early Biology of

Cognition (originally published
solutions to
the

two seemingly

phenomena

in 1970)

he describes that task as finding

distinct questions:

of cognition

namely,

and perception? and

(2)

(1)

What

What

is

takes place in

the

organization of the living?23 His eventual and somewhat surprising

conclusion

is

that cognition

and the operation

20 Russcll:1948;180.
2^ Sec Dcvitt:1984:51.

22 Ibid:181.

22 Maturana:1980a:xiii-xv.
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of the living system are in fact

identical ph6non"i6na.^^

knowing

All

knowing

is

doing," or nioro accuratGly.

all

"operating effectively in the domain of existence" brought forth

is

by the observer.^s
3.3.1

Structure Determinism

On

the basis of his early neuro-physiological studies of color vision,

Maturana came

view the nervous system of an observer

to

— meaning

neuronal network

closed to

all

as a closed,

"information" from the external

environment. Let us briefly trace Maturana's reasons for adopting that
conclusion.
It

follows from the biological nature of perception that one "can never

say in absolute terms "^^ what constitutes an input to our nervous system,
since each of

its states,

serving as an "input," can modify the system as an

interacting unit:

This has two aspects: one refers to the functional organization of
the nerve cells which, with their responses, discriminate

between

different states of relative activity impinging upon
them; the other refers to the ability of the nervous system, as a
neuronal organization, to discriminate between its own states as
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Ibid:xvii.

Dell (1985) suggests that Maturana's equating of cognition with living "precisely

parallels [Gregory] Bateson's equating of

mind

with. ..the world of living systems" (p.

5).

Dell

argues that Maturana's ontology of the observer supplies the necessary ontological counterpart
Bateson's cybernetic epistemology (which contained only an "implicit" ontology) (p. 1).
Although Dell finds Bateson's non-ontological cybernetics (which clearly is an instance of the
to

reductive epistcmics) "tautological and a
"relativistic"

ontology

is

bit mystical" (p. 5),

he

fails to

see that Maturana's

similarly inadequate.

Maturana and Varela;1988:29-30.
Maturana:1980a:38; emphasis added. Maturana is saying something unremarkable here: our
percepts are not infallible guides to the structure of the external world, as I can mistake a
distant airplane for a bird in flight. Is there anything about the mediated nature of perception
that bars us from construing our percepts as natural signs representing something distinct from
themselves? Only that we will have to admit the fallible nature of all our knowledge-claims.
It is

at this point that the

intuitionists, is intent

upon

methods

and intuition diverge, for Maturana,
the gap between knower and known.

of hypothesis

closing tight
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like all

these are distinguished and specified by the further states of
activity that they generate. From this capacity of the nervous

system to interact discriminately with its own states in a
continuous process of self-transformation, regardless of how
these states are generated, behavior emerges as a continuum of
self-referred functional transformation. ^7

This "operational closure" of the nervous system

is

said to "enrich" a

notion of living organisms as radically autonomous beings by showing that

every process of cognition

nervous system. ^8 vVe

all

necessarily b ased

in the operations of a closed

of a closed

nervous system, directly

changes within living systems are determined by

organization and structure. That

determined

on the operations

shall see that the self-referential nature of cognition

and perception, founded
implies that

is

is to

their

own

say, living systems are structure

.

Maturana's doctrine of structure determinism

is

a generalized version

of his theory of autopoietic organization applied to non-living as well as
living entities. 30

He

coined the term autopoiesis to capture the autonomy

implied by the notion of self-referring and structurally determined systems. 3^
Here, then,

Autopoiesis

Maturana's answer to the second question

is

is

both necessary and sufficient

listed above:

to characterize the organization

of the living.

27 Ibid:38.
2^ Maturana and Varela:1988:165-6.

provide a further treatment of structure determinism as
discussion there of the ontology of intuitionism.
29 In section 4.2

I

will

it

relates to the

20 See Dell;1985.
the term "autopoiesis" in his 1972 essay "Autopoiesis: The
circular
Organization of the Living." Prior to that essay he relied on the expressions
phenomenon.
organization" and "self-referential systems" to make reference to the same

2^

Maturana introduced
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[I]t is

the circularity of

its

organization that makes a living

system a unit of interactions, and it is this circularity that it must
maintain in order to remain a living system and to retain its
identity through different interactions.^^

These interactions
thinking. "33
is

Maturana

a "strictly subject

is

in turn "generate language, description

claiming no less than

this:

and

the process of cognition

dependent creative process."34 Paul Dell comments on the

significance of Maturana's "seemingly modest" characterization of the

organization of the living:
the organization of a living system is circular, then that
organization is a closed organization
not thermodynamically
closed, but organizationally closed. The significance of
organizational closure is that it directly implies autonomy....
...if

—

Each living system has its own autonomous individuality
because the nature of its structure fully specifies how the system
will behave under any and all interactions.... Because
interactions with the environment cannot specify how an
organizationally closed living system will behave, it therefore
must be the case that such systems do not have inputs (and
outputs)!35
In other words, living systems

receive any information at

all

.

qua closed autopoietic systems cannot

Living systems like

humans

cybernetician W.R. Ashby's words, "information tight:"

it is

are, in the

the structure of

— and not any characteristic of the information "received
will "behave" or respond
from the environment" — that determines how
the living system

it

"under any and

all

interactions":36

Maturana;1980a:9.

Ibid:v.

34 lbid:49.
33 Dc11:1985:6.

36

ibid:6.
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For every living system its particular case of self-referring
circular organization specifies a closed domain of interactions
that

is

3.3.2 Structure
It is

cognitive domain, and no interaction
not prescribed by this organization.^^

is its

which

rough

possible for

it

Determinism and Cognition

not simply the behavior or actions of an living system that are so

internally determined but
in

is

detail, is

what one can know, or

believe, as well.

Here

then,

Maturana's justification for adopting his anti-realist

epistemology. The cognitive domain of a living system, given

its

self-

referring circular organization, places absolute limits on the possible
interactions (including cognition

and perception) available

to that system:

...accordingly, for every living system the process of cognition
consists in the creation of a field of behavior through its actual

conduct in its closed domain of interactions, and not in the
apprehension or the description of an independent universe.^®
3.3.3

A

Realist

An
the

more

Response

adequate assessment of

this anti-realist

conclusion must

come

we

detailed account of Maturana's system provided below. Yet

might consider the outlines of

a realist response at this

most general

after

level.

Let us assume that Maturana equivocates on the notion of an "independent
universe."

One could

either interpret this last quotation as either (1)

the plausible claim that

we

are incapable of

knowing

or describing an

"independent universe" of Kantian things-in-themselves; or

(2)

suggesting,

pace Putnam, that the independent universe that the metaphysical
purports to

know and

the possible

"domain

describe requires a "God's eye view" which
of interactions" available to

Maturana:1980a:49.
38 ibid:49.
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making

humans.

(1),

realist

lies

outside

we have

said.

poses no threat to the kind of realism

world "worth fighting
actually holds.

independence,

for."

this

that

we

in the

we

any

(or

a description or

all

is

this

a

medium

for

medium upon

apprehension of some aspect

"independent universe")?

It

could not, assuming

information external to our nervous system

that the theory of structure

Maturana

writes: "living

and material interchange. "39 Does

depend represent
world

Maturana

are to exist.

even though they depend on

entities,

are indeed closed to

way

to

time in terms of our independence from an observer-

their concrete existence

of the external

and therefore

Yet Maturana continues to equivocate on the notion of

systems are autonomous

all

to defend,

probably closer to the view that Maturana

(2) is

generated "medium" in which

which we

we hope

determinism requires.

often very explicit about

subject-dependent nature of our

He

this.

insists

on the necessarily

scientific claims, including, of course, all

attempts to describe or explain the relations that hold between an entity and
its

medium. ‘^0

supporting

jj-ig

specific scientific explanations

— and the only statements that are

"subject dependent, valid only in the
the... observer exists

or

and operates.

knowing any aspect

of a

domain

The idea

world external

he

in his

is

interested in

view

scientific

of interactions in
that

we

— are

which

are capable of describing

to the observer

on which "we

Maturana:1978:36; emphasis added.

Ibid:28-9.

such statements are only valid in
that seemingly allows
qualification
observer,
a
relation to the situation facing the standard
However, it is
observer.
the
characterizing
not
so
him to escape the solipsistic implications of
I suppose,
from,
observer
standard
of
a
(that
clear from his epistemology that such a distinction
lbid:29. See also Section 4.3 below.

a particular observer like himself)

particular observer.

So he

is

He

in fact claims that

dependent on the cognitive operations of a
with the isolated observer and his or her operations of

entirely

is still left

distinction.
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depend"42
is

is

obviously rendered impossible. Indeed, the very question, "what

the object of knowledge?"

is

for

Maturana

a meaningless one:

There is no object of knowledge. To know is to be able
adequately in an individual or cooperative situation.43

An
to the

"adequate" operation

is

one that

is

to operate

directly or indirectly subservient

maintenance of a person's living organization or autopoiesis. These

operations serve as the only final source of reference for truth and rationality,

while the self-referential nature of persons makes
reference necessarily "relative" in a very strong

order to

draw out

all

(i.e.,

these radically idealist elements,

such frames of

solipsistic) sense.'^^ In

let

us

now

take a closer

look at the type of operations Maturana assigns to living systems.
3.4

Cognitive Distinctions and Existence

Consider the following dictum: "Everything said
Is this

own

mere truism? On

the contrary,

I

said

by someone.

suggest that Maturana has coined his

intuitionist version of the cogito that serves, like the a priori truth of

think,
is

a

is

I

exist," as the

unqualified foundation for his every other claim. This

apparent in Maturana's treatment of "unities."

(distinguishability

"I

His claim

is

from a background and, hence, from other

"sole necessary condition for existence in

any given domain.

that "unity"
unities)

is

the

Unities are

those entities which result from the performance of our mosf'basic cognitive

Maturana:1978:36.

lbid:53.

Ibid:57.

Maturana and Varcla:1988:27; Maturana:1980a:xxii;
Maturana:1980a:96.
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1988a:12.

operation

the operation of distinction.

By means

of this operation,

and

acting as "observers,"47
...we specify a unity as an entity distinct from a background,
characterize both unity and background with the properties with
which this operation endows them, and specify their
separability. A unity thus specified is a simple unity that defines
through its properties the space in which it exists and the

phenomenal domain which
with other

it

may

generate in

its

interactions

unities.

follows from Maturana's constructivism that this most basic

It

cognitive act, ciistinguishing a unity from

defining

its

domain

its

background (and thereby

of interactions or "medium"), supplies

that either the entity or

its

medium

all

of the "reality"

can possess;

A
A

universe comes into being when a space is severed into two.
unity is defined. The description, invention and
manipulation of unities is at the base of all scientific inquiry.'^^

We

recall that

systems depend on a

add

to

our

the relation

comes

initial

Maturana

medium

also maintains, quite reasonably, that "living

for their concrete existence."^^

can

now

sketch of the realist response to Maturana's equivocation on

between an observer and

to this:

We

How

his or her

medium. Our question

could an autonomous living

— both determine the nature of

its

relation with

human
its

being

— a "subject"

environment

(or

An observer, for Maturana, is any being operating in language. In the case of humans,
language (or the act of "languaging) is a situation we "find ourselves in," rather than see
ourselves growing into it (1988a:12). We are already observers in language when we begin to
reflect on our universal situation as language-users and the linguisticality of observing. It
follows that "whatever takes place in the praxis of living of the observer, takes place as
distinctions in language through languaging" (lbid:12). See also section 2.4.1 above.
Ibid;xix.

Maturana and Varela;! 980:73.
Maturana:1978:36.
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medium) and have

its

medium? Maturana

"concrete existence" determined by that

suggests that "medium"

However,

interactions.

since

all

is

domains of

equivalent to "domain of

interaction are defined

the specification of a unity by an observer ("a universe

when

a space

medium

is

comes

upon

into being

severed into two") the very nature and existence of that

entirely

is

same

dependent upon the operations of distinction performed

by the observer. Maturana cannot have

it

distinctions of the observer "create" the

medium

or those operations are dependent in

both ways: either the operations of

which he or she

in

some way on

will live,

the prior existence of that

medium.
While Maturana does invoke
"characterization" of a unity

where the former

that unity,

in

it]

of

them

in a

between the

and the knowledge available

metadomain

latter consists in a

common

"handling [description,

of descriptions with respect to the

which he characterizes them," he readily admits

not negate their

to the observer of

consists in a "pointing to" the properties or

organization of the unity and the
take

a distinction

I

domain

that this distinction does

character as cognitive entities"belong[ing] to the

descriptive domain. "52 These remarks suggest that the

medium

is

and can be

nothing but a cognitive entity, and that Maturana's description of the

medium

determining concrete existence

that the reader thinks that he or she
real

world)

way

of underlining the

is

is still

merely a misleading
in possession of

(to the extent

something of the

mind-dependent nature of

all reality.55

Maturana:1980a:xxi.
CO
lbid:xxiii.

Held and Pols (1987) reserve the phrase "Pickwickian" ontology for Maturana's "uncommon"
Dell
use of that word. They suggest, rightly, that Maturana (as well as Bateson (1972) and
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clear that Maturana's

It is

observer"54

is

is

said

by an

not meant merely to underline the obvious
and quite

unobjectionable fact that

world

dictum "everything said

all

of our descriptions, theories,

and claims about the

that result in the specification of a unity are
cognitive distinctions.

Maturana wants
entailed

to

make

the stronger claim (that

by the language- or concept-dependent

that the existence

and nature of every unity

is

is

neither obvious nor

status of our descriptions^S)

entirely

dependent on the

operation of distinction performed by the observer. Here Maturana
signals
his rejection of the

independence dimension of traditional

realist claims

along with any ontological commitments beyond those of his psycho-centric
intuitionism.

Maturana

the distinctions

On

is

quite clear about this: "the entity characterized [by

made by an

observer]

the assumption that

we

in a

must simply represent

"metadomain

a cognitive entity .^^

are constitutively unable to specify the

independence dimension of realism,
entities

is

realist talk

"distinctions

of descriptions" in

about mind-independent

upon

distinctions"

which

result

which the cognitive statements about

those entities are made.57 Entities are, therefore nothing but cognitive
entities,

but once characterized

between the characterization of "structure determinism" as an ontology in the
of that term and an ontology in the Pickwickian sense, or what 1 have been
as a subject-dependent or "relativistic" ontology (Held and Pols:1987:457).

(1985)) switches

common meaning
referring to

Maturana:1980a:xxii.

As Rorty (1979) rightly notes, there is 'no inference from "one cannot give a theoryindependent description of a thing" to "there can be no theory-independent things'" (p.
But see note 4 above.

Maturana:! 980a:xxiii; emphasis added.

Ibidixxiii.

69

279).

characterization is also subject to cognitive distinctions
valid in the metadomain in which they are made by treating the
characterization as an independent entity subject to contextual
descriptions.^^
...the

While

talk of

metadomains

is

everyday world

that entities of our

confusing, one thing

(or of science^^) exist

is clear:

and have

the notion
a

determinate nature independently of the cognitive powers (operations of
distinction) of the

mind

that mental activity

for

is,

Maturana, a priori

which confers upon the

false, since

entities of the

it is

precisely

world both

their

existence and nature:

Thus, [the observer] both creates (invents) relations and
generates (specifies) the world (domain of interactions) in which
he lives by continuously expanding his cognitive domain
through recursive descriptions and representations of his
interactions.... From this it follows that reality as a universe of
independent entities about which we can talk is, necessarily, a
fiction of the purely descriptive domain, and that we should in
fact apply the notion of reality to this very domain of
descriptions in which we, the describing system, interact with
our descriptions as if with independent entities.^^

As
form.

I

noted above (section

2.4.1),

Maturana

His act of making "recursive descriptions"

constituting

power

mind

of the

—

is

clearly

mind. So also must be the "raw material"
that

is

worked up

Ibid:xxiii;

in this fashion

and

is

clearly

—

an

intuitionist of

like Kant's object-

something that

(in this case,

is

internal to the

our very descriptions)

that constitutes that

which Maturana

emphasis added.

independent
shall see in the following chapter (4.3), Maturana explicitly rejects the
life (See
everyday
of
those
well
as
entities
as
scientific
so-called
of
existence

As we

Maturana:! 988a:45).

emphasis on the "reality" of
Knowledge, Maturana and
the descriptive domain, in the beginning pages of their The Tree of
if he or she "has a direct
reader
the
by
understood
only
be
can
Varela claim that their position
Maturana:1980a:51-2.

It is

experience that goes beyond

telling to note that despite all this

all

mere description"

70

(p. 16).

enjoins us to "apply the notion of reality to"
(in contrast to the fictional
reality of

mind and

independent

entities").^^ All that really exists,

the ever expanding

domain

on

this

view,

is

the

of descriptions that constitute a

world created and sustained by the observer.

How

do we make

a world? We do it. ..by using a conceptual
schematize sensory data. That system is a complex of
thinkable forms, so that projecting its differences and relations
onto the data makes them thinkable too. Mind, now having this
experience arrayed before it, inspects a "world" that mind has

system

to

itself created. ^2

Ironically,

Maturana himself notes

that "only one's interior

life exists" is

foundationalist insistence

upon

that the price paid for

supposing

solipsism.63 Yet Maturana's

"theorizing from scratch"^^ presents a picture

of isolated individuals locked within their minds, with only the Cartesian

dictum "everything said

is

said by

help them sorts things out.
out?

While Maturana

is

someone "

What kinds

(or,

of things

more
is

accurately, myself ) to

Maturana able

to sort

apparently willing to assume that certain theoretical

See also Ruben:1977:Chl, where he argues that Kant's commitment ("independence claim")
"pre-conceptualized intuitions" that are essentially independent of the
synthesizing operations of the mind is strongly epistemologically inconsistent with Kant's
to the existence of

"interpretation claim" that

any judgement or claims

to

knowledge necessarily presuppose

activity of interpretive thought. This instance of strong epistemological inconsistency
that arises within the

phenomenal realm and

inconsistency to be found in talking of

phenomena. Yet

is

is

the

one

not to be confused with the parallel

noumena while holding

the pre-conceptualized intuitions of the

that all knowledge is of
phenomenal realm are as unknowable

as things-in-themselves: they stand in no relation whatsoever to the synthesis of the

understanding.

Weissman:1989b:74.

Maturana and Varela:1988;134.
This

is

Devitt's phrase (Devitt:1984:194).

Maturana would presumably agree with Putnam's

characterization of metaphysical realism as relying on a "magical theory of reference"
(Putnam:181:47). The reason for that should be clear: in starting from a prison-house conception
of language, both see the realist as attempting to "speak the unspeakable."

71

and operational

mind (namely,

constraints on

knowledge

are immediately accessible to the

"we should apply the notion

that

descriptions"), those constraints clearly prevent

mind-independent
interior

any and

reality and, therefore, to that

which

all

is

domain

of

reference to a

other than "one's

life."

Maturana
theories

of reality to a

is

clearly guilty of equivocation

and constructing the world

between constructing

There can be no question that

.

we

construct our theories of the world, and talk that accompanies that activity

about "cutting up" and "imposing on" experience makes good sense.^^ But
this is quite different

from saying

construct the world.

It is

between these two

that

we

important, therefore, that

sorts of activity, the

and

use signs to represent possible states of

We

we

we

clearly distinguish

one performed as

certain things (like linguistic conventions

we

construct reality or that

we

create or fashion

social contracts), the other as

affairs in the external

world:

can decide what to search for within the world; but then

by creating
present there. We do

are not also free to decide,
truth, all that

is

signify, but not that anything

is

red.

rules for
stipulate

We

we

meaning and
what red shall

have obscured

this

by emphasizing the activities best expressing our
autonomy, as novelists create fantasy worlds and legislators
write the laws creating social order. These examples are
distractions from the task of formulating and testing hypotheses
about those things whose existence and character are
independent of thought and language.^^
difference

Part of the reason for this

is

that perception

is

selective

we

.

Mundle suggests the following ways
can select what we see, touch, hear,

which that selectivity can manifest
by controlling our movements; (b) that we can select which perceptible properties of objects,
or which qualities of sense-data, we discriminate, by controlling our attention; (c) that the
sensory apparatus with which we are endowed is selective in the sense that it discloses only
some of the things around us (e.g. not bacteria) and only some of their properties (not e.g. their
in

itself: "(a)

that

etc.,

reflectance of ultra-violet waves)" (Mundle:1971:91-92).

66 vVeissman:1989b:71.

72

We

must recognize

the metaphorical nature of

language imposing on the world. This

which claims

[this]

be uncovering

very important

is

...it

to

is

all

talk of the

mind

or

a point crucial for our analysis

ontological commitments:

tacit

appeal of the imposition view that
literally. For then we still seem to have

to the

metaphor be taken

the world.

Taking that metaphor

mind

literally

means supposing

that the operations of the

or language are such that they create or produce the objects of the

world;

Without language and outside language there are no objects. ..we
human beings are objects in a domain of objects that we bring
forth and operate upon in language.. ..68
In

what sense does Maturana

matter that he replaces the

and

realist's

(possibly) electrons with

distinctions?

Is

reduction of

all

"seem to have the world"? Does

still

ontological

commitment

it

to cities, trees

phenomenal (meta-) domains or

experiential

there anything in his system that speaks against this
reality to the

answer these questions

ambit of inspecting mind?

in the context of

I

will

now

attempt

Maturana's treatment of perceptual

illusions.
3.5

Maturana's Skepticism
Getting their start from a consideration of

illusions,

Maturana and Varela note

that

some common perceptual

what we often take

as simple

apprehension of something (such as color) "has the indelible mark of our

Dcvitt:1984:140.

Maturana:1988a:38.

73

to

own

Commenting on two common

structure."69

visual illusions, they note

that these simple experiments "...[do] not
reveal an isolated situation that

could be called

(as is often the case)

marginal or

illusory."70

they claim, for "any other perceptual modality."7i

We

All this

is

valid,

naively class daily

experiences like these as illusions or hallucinations and not
as perceptions
...claiming that they

do not

constitute the capture of an independent

reality. "72

In other words, relying

with the idea that

scientific

on

a version of Cartesian skepticism

and faced

experiments can be used to demonstrate that the

senses (most notably vision73) can be fooled, Maturana, in reductio ad

69

Maturana and Varela:1988:22. Here is Maturana's most recent example: "If one looks at the
two shadows of an object that simultaneously partially intercepts the paths of two different
lights, one white and one red, and if one has trichromatic vision, then one sees that the area of
the shadow from the white light that receives red light looks red, and that the area of the
shadow from the red light that receives white light looks blue-green" (Maturana:1988a:9).
The illusion is unavoidable: our experience of the illusion is unchanged by the knowledge that
the area of the

white light

shadow from

the red light "should look white or gray" because

it

receives only

(lbid:9).

Maturana and Varela:1988:21.
Ibid:21.

Maturana:1988a:10.
73

common emphasis on

this particular perceptual modality in
docs not use the word) assign special
significance to observability, which in turn is uncritically conflated with sight (Devitt:
1984:130). Van Fraassen (1980), for example, claims that a theory is "empirically adequate" if
and only if it correctly describes what is "observable" (pp. 4-12). Theories may otherwise "save
the phenomena" but cannot be said to describe and independent reality (Gicre:1987:224). We
should remain "agnostic" about that reality (Devitt:1984:126-128). Van Fraassen seems to
think that the conclusion of empirical adequacy is somehow better supported than the

Devitt suggests a reason for the

discussions of illusions.

It is

that intuitionists (he

that the former does not go beyond that which is directly
belief" as one that follows from an object x
define
"observational
observable. (We can
triggering a human's sense organs in a way that leads her to judge, for example, that x is F.
this belief follows without inferring it from some other belief, then we can say that she
scientific realist's

Van

If

Giere points out on the logic of "satisficing" that the "logically weaker"
Fraassen's constructive empiricism do not necessarily add up to a more "adequate"

observed that x
claims of

on the grounds

is F.)

74

absurdum

fashion, uses that idea to then

an "objective" (mind-independent)
that talks about

do away with science

reality.

Clearly

much

as the study of

of the literature

brains in vats" and other rather fanciful reactions
to the

skeptical challenge contained in Descartes' First Meditation
gets their start

from

this

seemingly

scientifically consistent

no possible evidential or experiential
illusion.

distinction

that admits of

between perception and

That the evidences of our senses "underdetermines" our views of

what there
leads

view of perception

many

alternatively, that theory "overdetermines" the evidence)

is" (or,

to suggest that this scientific

underdetermination)
of cognition.

is

view of perception

consistent with radically

In particular

many

(that

opposed views

critics of a realist

admits of
of the nature

theory of perception infer

that
[t]he

mere

fact that a person, as a result of a perceptual

experience, comes to believe that a certain object is in front of
him does not establish that it is in front of him. It is compatible
with our theory of perception that he should come to this belief
and yet there be no such object in front of him. It is compatible

with that theory that he should come

to beliefs

about the

external world as a result of perceptual experiences

be no such world

Does

it

now

at

and yet there

all.^"^

follow that scientific knowledge has in a

way

given

rise to

skepticism? That seems to be Quine's view:

explanation:

"If

we

assign equal value to the truth of both empiricist and realist hypotheses,

more probable, would have greater expected value.... But of
course the realist would assign greater scientific value to true realistic hypotheses, which
could give them greater expected value. So a realistic satisficer need not even be in the position
of settling for second best" (Giere:! 987:225). Even more to the point, our beliefs about observable
entities (non-inferential beliefs in the sense noted above) may be just as fallible as many of our
the empiricist hypothesis, being

inferential beliefs

about unobservables: "The [non-inferential, observational] belief is not
It is, like all our beliefs, a result of human

'given' to the sensory input" (Devitt:1984:132).

processing and interpretation.

Devitt:! 984:50.

That

is

just to

say that realists take fallibilism (not skepticism) seriously:
to show, for example, that we

one could be wrong about almost anything. Arguments designed
just

could not be "brains in vats" will

fail

for this reason.

75

Doubt proiupts the theory of knowledge, yes; but knowledge,
also, was that which prompted the doubt. Skepticism is an
offshoot of science. The basis for skepticism is that awareness of
illusion, the discovery that we must not always believe our eyes.
Skepticism battens on mirages, on seemingly bent sticks in
water, on rainbows, after-images, double images, dreams. But in
what sense are these illusions? In the sense that they seem to be
material objects which they in fact are not. Illusions are
illusions relative to a prior acceptance of

which

to contrast them....

similarly parasitic

This

upon

genuine bodies with

[Ejxamples of mirages. ..and the
positive science,

however

rest are

primitive.^5

not to accuse the skeptic, however, of begging the question:

is

He

is

quite within his rights in assuming science in order to

refute science; this

if

carried out,

would be

argument by reductio ad absurdum.

I

am

a straightforward

only making the point

that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.^^

Quine concludes on
science, that science

own

defense.

is

the basis of his claim that skepticism presupposes

therefore justified in using scientific

argue by reductio that so-called

scientist's ability to

shown

it

in

its

Barry Stroud (1984) has criticized Quine on just this point.

Stroud suggests that Quine's admission that the skeptic
to

knowledge

to be, as

use that

scientific

(scientific)

knowledge

knowledge

"within his rights"

is false,

undercuts the

after the reductio

Quine indeed admits, "vulnerable

showing. "77 Quine's reaction

is

to illusion

on

has

its

own

to this challenge is to claim that the skeptic

is

"overreacting. "78

Quine:l 975:67-8.

Ibid:68.

Quoted

in Gibson:! 989:4.

Devitt

makes

the

same point with regard

to the type of "Realism"

need not make any knowledge or
assumptions that the
(belief) claims. He asks the Realist to justify his position and uses
justifications fail.... The
Realist seems in no position to deny to show that these attempted
itself shows
argument therefore, is something of a reductio of Realism: the Realist perspective
more
skeptic
the
Realism to be unjustified" (Devitt:1984:48-9). But Devitt may be giving up to

he hopes

to

defend (but not against the

skeptic): "...the skeptic

76

Stroud has interpreted
position

This

is

is

moments). 80

As

I

how

what Quine had

comparison with some other views79

mind

in

(at least in his

more

realist

rather that the skeptic's mistake lies in the failure
to

It is

epistemology and ontology reciprocally contain one another.

have noted, the skeptic does recognize one direction of the
containment;

namely, the extent

to

which epistemology contains ontology. The skeptic

well aware that our theories of

determine what our
look

charge as meaning that the skeptical

relatively "unconfirmed" in

clearly not

appreciate

this

like.

What

method and evidence

scientific claims

is

(our epistemology)

about the world (our ontology) might

the skeptic overlooks

is

the extent to which ontology

contains epistemology:

The skeptic may indeed use a portion of science to bring doubt to
bear upon science, but only by presupposing the truth of other
portions of science.... Skepticism. ..presupposes some further
ontology: "we might reasonably doubt our theory of nature even
in its broadest outlines. But our doubts would still be
immanent, and of a piece with the scientific endeavor" [Quine].
Never can
ontological commitments be doubted
simultaneously; one would be "overreacting" if one thought

^

otherwise.8i

than

is

necessary.

1

cannot argue the point here, but see Tom Vinci's (1986) review of Stroud's
that the reductio can not successfully be used against science as a whole.

book where he argues
Gibson:1989;4.

This also appears to be Russman's view, when he refers to skepticism about the
external world as a "massively strong conclusion drawn from an insipidly weak premise" [eg.,
lbid:4.

that

we might

be dreaming] (1987:36).

See Weissman:1987a:283-287 for an analysis of Quine's intuitionism.

Gibson:1989:5.

77

In short, as

I

havG already suggested, episten'iology does not occur

ontological vacuum.'

chapter

II

This

is

consistent with the

view expressed

an

in

in

above, that every philosophical method has both ontological and

psychological assumptions.

That

is

an important point

for

our analysis which

claims to be uncovering a reality (ontological) claim in Maturana's theory of
structure determinism.
his efforts as resting

on

version of science does

Maturana would apparently accept
scientific

presuppositions

away with

this description of

— but with a difference:

his

the "objects" of knowledge:

[Our] explanation of cognitive phenomena. ..is based on the
tradition of science and is valid insofar as it satisfies scientific
criteria. It is singular within that tradition, however, in that it
brings forth a basic conceptual change; cognition does not

concern objects, for cognition

The argument from

illusion,

knowledge, often begins from a

world

—

this

anti-realist

much Maturana

is

effective action. ...®3

and

in general the skeptical challenge to

(indeed physicalistic®'^) view of the

scientific

(and other skeptics)

epistemology compels him

to

"cognition does not concern objects." Put

is

adopt the

somewhat

that highlights his initial (and paradoxically realist)

Maturana's claim appears

to

be that the

undermines the common-sense

likely to accept.

idealist conclusion that

differently,

and

in a

commitments,

scientific realist

realist one.

Yet his

As Devitt

viewpoint

writes.

common

sense that seems most threatened by
science is that concerned with the secondary qualities, especially
that concerned with colors.... The problem is that physics seems

The area

of

not to countenance them:. ..the world of physics

ibid:5.

Maturana and Varela:1988:244.
See Vinci:1986:scction V.

78

is

a colorless.

way

soundlGss, odorlGss, and tastGlGSs world
So it is only from tliG
physicalist standpoint that science threatens the common-sense
view of the secondary qualities. Further it is only from the
scientific realist standpoint that science threatens common
sense.®^

Let us put aside for the

moment

called "secondary qualities" of objects

this

problem of accounting

and ask whether Maturana supplies any

reasons for adopting his radically idealist view of
entities.

the

We

he does

shall see that

word "world"

(3.6)

not.

sense or scientific

will first consider his curious use of

I

and then take up

common

in

more

detail the

underdetermination of our theories by that world
3.6

for the so-

problem of the

(3.7).

On Worldmaking
making

Shortly after

mark on any perceptual

recommendation

the

certainty"

Maturana

that

we

"put a question

writes:

connection between action and experience, this
between a particular way of being and how the
world appears to us, tells us that every act of knowing brings
forth a world .... [Ejverything said is said by someone. Every
reflection brings forth a world.
...this

inseparability

That the world

(call

it

"meaning-1") underdetermines our theories of

the world (which are in part determined

and mode

of "reflection")

is

by our"particular way[s]

of being"

considered sufficient reason to have the

latter

theories replace the former, at least in the sense that they too merit the

characterization "world"

(call

it

"meaning-2").

Clearly, however, this

wishes to defend the common-sense
view of objects and their secondary qualities to adopt a pragmatic perspective on a portion of
physics. From this perspective some of the posits of that science receive a purely instrumental
interpretation: electrons, muons and curved space-time are simply instruments for dealing with
Dcvitt:1984:69.

It is

of course

the observable world. But this
qualities of objects

is left

open

to the realist

is just to

show

who

that the

common-sense view

untouched by the theories of physics.

Maturana:1988a:10-26.

79

of the secondary

complex characterization of Maturana’s use
the fact that the

word merely

of the

word "world" has changed

its

underlines

referent:

[world (meaning-1)] signified nature, including us
humans as we are located within it. Now, "world" [meaning-21
refers only to the experience created when sensory data are
differentiated and organized by the system used for thinking
them.
Before,

it

Assume world (meaning-2) broadly
then

is left

of the world (meaning-1)?

refers to

our experience. What

Maturana does invoke the specter

an amorphous "substratum" the expectation of which
for "epistemological reasons."^®

existence of the substratum

is

It is

is

of

needed, he claims,

important that he does not claim that the

an epistemological necessity. Indeed, he cannot

say that, since he also maintains that "nothing [including the substratum,

presumably] pre-exists
If I

distinction [by an observer]. "89

have interpreted him

substratum
to

its

.

The reason

aright,

for that

is

we merely

as follows.

Maturana, involve the specification of

"generate the

phenomenon

the observer. "90

to

be explained

is

there

were

"mechanism"
in the

itself.

that

domain

It is

is

to say that

Maturana

is

a

able to

of experiences. ..of

this

mechanism

is

important to note that

are remaining within the realm of observer-dependent distinctions.

That

not claiming to be describing the nature of anything

Wcissman:1989a:514.
Maturana:! 988a:47; sec Section

4.4

below.

Ibid:45.

9^^

if

All scientific claims, according

Furthermore, the generative nature of

"constitutive" to the scientific explanation

we

a

operate as

lbid:45.

80

external to the scientific explanation

itself (as in Peirce's

Hanson's retroduction,^^ or Devitt's inference
although he does refer to

We

this as

use of abduction,9i

to the best explanation's),

an "ontological condition" of science.

are not to suppose that this seemingly abductive inference posits

real structure capable of causing the experience in question.

—

the urge"

in science as well as "everyday life"

a substratum

independent of the observer

in

—

Yet

we do

we

attempt to talk about, "language," or

we

substratum

"lose"

"feel

to "ask for the existence of

which everything [including

operation of the above generative mechanism] takes place."^^ But
as

some

make any

the

soon

just as

sense of the notion of a

it;

Through language we remain

in language,

and we

lose the

substratum as soon as we attempt to language it. We need the
substratum for epistemological reasons, but in the substratum
there is nothing (no-thing) because things belong to language.
In other words, nothing exists in the substratum.^^

Maturana now
explaining

how we

faces the formidable

it

would seem more accurate
to lose.

We

"it"

(remember;

what Maturana says

for epistemological reasons" or that

substratum)

would seem impossible)

achieve sufficient grasp of

thing" or property) even to say

"need

(it

to say that

we

"it

of

never even had

Hanson:1958:90.

Devitt:1988:144-6.

Maturana:1988a;45.

Ibid:46.
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"it"

"no-

namely, that

permits what

are rightly suspicious of this

Pierce:1965.

"it;"

"it" is

task of

it

this

we

permits."

It

"world" (the

which can have no

properties so long as

we suppose

that

having properties

condition for the existence of anything

We

can step back

is

a necessary

at all.

now and make

the following claim.

All this rather

mystical talk of the substratum follows directly from Maturana's unique

combination of three

errors:

he

appreciate the condition of

(1) fails to

independence of the world from our descriptions and theories
adopts a linguistic variant of reductive epistemics^^
belong [exclusively]

language;" and

to

(CI);^^ (2)

assuming

that "things

adopts a relativized-to-a-language

(3)

ontology in order to accommodate his explicitly idealist epistemology.

moment

Let us assume for the

that

Maturana

What

ineffable realm of things-in-themselves.

is

entitled to speak of an

then could

we

conclude

about the constraining properties of that non-existent, unspecifiable realm?
All that

we

could say

this fashion the

why we

is

"we are constrained and

that

that's that."^®

notion of constraint has no explanatory value at
consider

an

idle addition to idealism.

that

is

this

point that realists, in holding to

it

my

It is

Used

all.

in

And

worth repeating

condition of independence

(Cl),

at

need

not (indeed should not) argue for the independent existence of a world of

things-in-themselves forever beyond our ken.

abundantly clear that he

Now

is

Maturana could maintain

1 .2

has

made

it

not "interested" in that world either.

brought forth by reflection are

96 See section

And Maturana

just

that these

worlds (meaning-2) that are

not the world (meaning-1) alluded to a

above.

See note 12 of chapter

II

above.

98- Devitt:1984:192. Note the similarity between Devitt's conclusion and what Maturana ends
version of this unspecifiable realm): "all
in saying ("languaging") about the "substratum" (his
we can say is that it permits what it permits..." (Maturana:1988a:47).

82

page

earlier.

It is

perfectly legitimate to use the

more) distinct ways, so long as
implied.

So Maturana

is

it is

clear at

word "world"

any point which meaning

is

anti-realist claim that there

But given Maturana's

"does," he

is

not

left

with two "worlds"

common world

— one

of natural things that the realist

sees as the cause, or ontological grounding, of our experience,

(meaning-2) which results from a particular
are, for

is

can be no talk of "things" existing independently

(meaning-1) referring to that

There

(or

"brought forth" (worlds (meaning-2)) in

"someone's" reflections on the world (meaning-l).99

what the observer

two

completely within his rights to use the word

"world" to refer to that which

of

in

Maturana, only these

latter,

way

and another

of "being" or "reflecting."

"subject-dependent" realitiesd^o

Without observers nothing can be said, nothing can be
explained, nothing can be claimed. ..in fact, without observers
nothing

exists,

because existence

is

specified in the operation of

distinction of the observer.
In other words, existence, as something that

operation of the observer,"
as observers, confer

is

just

upon those

carving up our experience.

than the observer for that matter
is

entirely

"specified in the

another attribute of entities that we, acting

"things" that

That

is

ferrets

and

we

create in the process of

trees

— or even people other

— come to exist and have certain properties

dependent on the "subject-dependent," human

distinctions:

Maturana:1988a:33.

Maturana:1978:62.

Maturana:1988a;46-7.
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activity of

making

The operation

of distinction that brings forth

and

unity, also brings forth
It

should be clear

his tacit ontological

He

Devitt's sense.

at this

not in

its

and specifies a
domain of existence..

point that Maturana, taken literally and with

commitments

is

specifies

aside,

is

not even a "weak"

anyway committed

to, that is,

realist, in

the independent

existence of unknowable, unspecifiable things-in-themselves.

metaphysical

iciealist.

The world he can claim

have saved

to

He

is

simply a

nothing other

is

than the world (meaning-2) of Putnam's solution to the referential gap

between our theories and the world (meaning-1)
(metaphorical) situation where "the

mind and

exist

mind-independent

reality

to

we

Neither should

we suppose

"cut up" the

where

objects or things

As

I

we make

that this construction of objects

themselves the creation of that

make up

the

is

do not

the world

world into objects by our descriptive

conceptually uncontaminated experiential inputs

The Role

jointly

an unqualified rejection

independently of our thinking or making. Rather,

determinate as

3.7

world

the

That solution amounts

the world.

of the very idea of a

mind and

that consists in the

activity.

from

— for those inputs are

activity.

of the Observer

briefly indicated above, science only threatens to

common-sense view

of objects

when

taken realistically and physicalistically

(an anti-realist or non-physicalist view of science
irrelevant to the

common-sense

could possibly conclude

is

view).

that our

And

common

ibid:16.

Putnam:! 987:1; see also section

4.2.1. 1

undermine our

below.
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would seem

to

be

so taken, the most that

sense view of objects

is

we
error-

ridden,"^04 or that

know" about

we

"cannot

these objectsd^s

know some

We

we

think

we

are certainly not entitled to the idealist

conclusion that these objects do not

To

of the things that

exist:

we need the further premise
any common-sense physical object must have secondary
qualities. But there seems to be no good reason for anyone who,
on scientific grounds, is anti-objectivist to adopt this essentialist
premise. Rather, he should view a common-sense physical
object as a system of unobservable particles that is wrongly
thought to have secondary qualities.
get the anti-realist conclusion

that

If

we were

to

adopt such a

fallibilistic

and

realist position,

what might we

conclude from Maturana’s treatment of illusions? Maturana's
that our experiences of illusions

own

claim

is

— as experiences that "we can not deny,"

how

our experience is moored to our structure in a
binding way. We do not see the "space" of the world; we live
our field of vision. We do not see the "colors" of the world; we
live our chromatic space.^^^
...show

Two comments
experience
to

is

moored

maintain that

that

we

are in order.
to

First,

our structure in a binding way"?

limit

ways

our power

It

that "our

would be absurd

could experience, or come to know, anything in a

was not somehow dependent on our

at least three

who would doubt

in

"structure."

way

Specifically, there are

which our structure (including our language) might

for representing things external to us:

We

might lack the inferential or perceptual powers for
learning about them....; (2) Our imaginations might be too feeble
(1)

Dcvitt:1984:69.

Vinci:1986:571.

lbid;69.

Maturana and Varcla:1988;21-3.
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for extrapolating

from the information we do have; [and]
(3) We
have a limited vocabulary of words and grammatical
forms for
representing thingsd^^

Maturana's objection

to this realist interpretation of

Putnam's unreasonable suggestion that realism,
involves a
all,

commitment

to judging,

in

our situation evokes

speaking the unspeakable,

without dependence on any concepts

whether our theories are true of realityd^^
Second, and following up our analysis in section

What
last

at

the

is

passage?

though

world

that nature

"living" in

it)

world (meaning-1)

may

which

is

we may now

which Maturana and Varela make reference

to

a

Is it

3.6,

that exists

and has

ask:

in this

a nature (even

not be captured by our colorful and spatial ways of

independent of our particular "ways of seeing?"

Clearly, the idea that objects lack secondary qualities like color does not entail

the

more

radical thesis that these objects

common-sense view

of

them could be

do not

false.

exist,

but merely that our

Indeed, this "scientific

realist"

perspective seems perfectly in line with Maturana's and Varela's views on
the matter

when

they say

Doubtless. ..we are experiencing a world. But
more closely how we get to know this world,

when we examine

we

invariably find

that we cannot separate our history of actions — biological and
social — from how
world appears
this

Somewhat

surprisingly, they maintain

indeed experiencing a world.
implies our experiencing a
after all,

to us.^^^

have said

that

we

And

it

common

it

to

be "doubtless"that

seems, moreover, that

this

we

are

passage

world (meaning-1), since they could,

are experiencing our worlds (meaning-2).

108 vVcissman:1989b:159.

Putnam:1981:130.

Maturana and Varela:1988:23.
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The

only qualification appears to be that in judging
the adequacy of our
conceptions of the world (meaning-1)
effects of the observer

observed.

and

his or her

(We may be "imposing"

our knowledge, for example.) This
relationship between

we must

take into account the possible

methods of observation on what

the secondary qualities
is

certainly not

an

on the

is

objects of

uncommon view

of the

knowers and known. Realistically-minded

philosophers and scientists have long argued that

it is

not contradictory to

maintain both that observational results can be theory-neutral and that
there
can be no data without concepts.!

Indeed Maturana could simply be read as

saying that our knowledge of the world

open

is

colored by our concepts and hence

to error:

Our

incapacity to experientially distinguish between what we
socially call illusion, hallucination, or perception, is constitutive
in us as living systems. The recognition of this circumstance

should lead us to put a question mark on any perceptual
certainty .!!^

Or

as Richard Bernstein writes about

what he

refers to as the

"new

fallibilism:"

we

focus on the history of our understanding of science during
the past hundred years, from Peirce to Popper, or on the

If

development

of epistemology during this period,

we

discover
that thinkers who disagree on almost everything else agree that
there are no nontrivial knowledge claims that are immune from
criticism. !!3
It is

important to note that

we

could

still

assume

at this point that

it is

a

fully-structured, yet observer-independent world that, in Maturana’s words.

See, for example, Kordig:1971:ix; Scheffler:1982:Ch2.

119

Maturana:1988a:10; emphasis added.

Bernstein:1983:12.
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we

are "experiencing"

and "getting

to

know." There

is

nothing, in other

words,

to

human

experience as "the effect of our interactions with a world whose

prevent us from interpreting Maturana as making reference

existence and character are independent of the

On

it.

is

we

observed, Maturana simply suggests that

our daily tendency to
it

talk about

the basis of this recognition of the role of the observer in

determining what

though

ways we think and

to

treat

put aside

our experience with the seal of certainty, "as

reflected an absolute world.

It

seems reasonable

to expect a

high

degree of indeterminacy of reference between our theories of the world and
the world

itself:

where our every

access to the world

percepts and words construed as signs,

wrong about

anything. In

more

it

attempts to refer

The

to objects

fact that

examples of

in other

analytical terms,

illusion

words,

and

is

which

—

many

we

often

instances

do impose

what we wish

could be

not the objects that

objects

we

are referring

we
to.

our

their properties.

is

a

we

in the speculative nature of

a

— as the familiar

form of Cartesian doubt that

truth of the underdetermination of our theories

case that

it is

our senses sometimes deceive us

show

mediated by thoughts,

surely follows that

are referring to that are indeterminate, but

The indeterminacy,

is

view

of the

by the world.

reflects the
It is

surely the

world on the world, perceiving

or expect to see. Yet objectivity

is

in

perfectly

consistent with selectivity of focus, as our theories direct our observational
attention toward

some

objects

and away from

^14 Weissman:1989a:515.

Maturana and Varcla:1988:25.
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others, for the simple reason

that "there are always infinitely

could ever pay attention

To sum

more

things available to perception than

to."^^^

up: Maturana, read as a scientific

doubt the veracity of the

common

it,

an overreaction.

If

he

is

realist,

may

be

in a position to

sense view of secondary qualities of objects,

but not the very existence of those objects

have

we

— that would be, as Quine’s would

a scientific anti-realist then his conclusions

have no direct bearing on the common sense view. Either way, Maturana's
analysis of illusions lends

no support

to his constructivist elimination of the

"external" (observer-independent) world.

world creates insolvable problems
of course, that
fact

for

Maturana's doctrine.

Maturana presents us with

apply the notion of

reality to this

argues for subject-dependent or

Ironically, the elimination of that
It is

undeniable,

a linguistic "reality" ("we should in

very domain of descriptions"^^^) and

"relativistic"^^^ realities in place of the

traditional notions of "objective reality" or the "really real":

domain of reality, and all
domains of reality are equally valid domains of existence
brought forth by an observer as domains of coherent consensual
Every domain of existence

is

a

actions that specify

is

in them.^^^

Is it

all

that

a subject-dependent ontology or linguistic reality that underlies

the constitutive inability of the observer to talk about a world of things that
exist

"independently of what he or she does?"^^^

Russman:1987:62.

Maturana:1988a:51-2.

Dell:1985:10.

Maturana:1988a:48-9.
120 ibid:50.
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One would guess

that

it

had

to be,

and Maturana

dependent nature

is

often quite explicit about the necessarily subject-

of the real: "since living systems are self-referential

systems, any final frame of reference
truth

is,

necessarily, relative.. ..[A]ll ultimate

contingent to personal experience."’i2i

is

Let us admit that Maturana's entire neuro-biological project rests on
this contrary

impulse: he needs to present the doctrine of structure

determinism as a claim about the way the world really
just

is

and not

structured,

according to that particular observer's opinion. Held and Pols^^^ offer an

extensive

list

of the equivocation on the part of Dell

and Maturana between

ontological claims in the Pickwickian (subject-dependent) sense and reality

claims in the

"common" sense which purport

the world "really

is"

something about the way

independently of the observer. ^23 That formulation of

Maturana's system which claims for

common

to say

it

the status of a reality claim in the

sense throws Maturana into a blatant contradiction. In adopting an

anti-realist

and

constructivist epistemology that asserts the absolute

"equal validity" of

all

observations, Maturana

is

in

no position

reality claim that purports to describe the organization

to

make

and features

— including our place and structure in the middle of — that we
it

I

suspect that this confusion has

which follow

directly

from

its

and

of a
all

source in these three things,

his intuitionism: (1)

a

world

share.
all

of

Maturana's reduction of

reality to the small circle of distinctions "brought forth"

by the observer;

(2)

the characteristic refusal of an intuitionist of form to consider the ontological

^21 Ibid:57.

^22 Held and Pols:1985a; 1985b; 1987.

Held and Pols:1987;458.
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presuppositions of that method; and

dangers of that
I

"solipsistic abyss"

shall close this chapter with

(3) his

pre-theoretic desire to escape the

toward which

two examples

his intuitionism propels him.

of this ontological tension that

plagues Maturana's system.

The following passage from

Dell indicates the

manner

avoided only by "taking a key term [ontology]

contradiction

is

and opposed

senses:"^24

which the

in
in

two

distinct

[1] What is important to understand here is that perception is
not and can never be objective
and yet, all observations have
equal validity.... None of these observations are objective, but [2]

—

of

them

by the structure of
the observer in conjunction with what that observer's
interaction with the medium allows. [3] For these reasons,

all

Maturana
legitimate
[1] is

are valid in that they are specified

insists that all realities

which we bring

a statement of Maturana’s acceptance of an anti-realist epistemology

founded on the experiential indistinguishability
[2]

suggests that there

in other

[2]

we

that

and

is

a

way

words, contains an

the nature of
that

forth are

.

human

that

we

explicit

illusion.

[1].

cognition and observation contained in the doctrine
[3]

wrongly concludes from

[1]

and

our views of the world, including that of structure determinism

"realities."

The

merely subject-

contradiction, once again, consists in putting

forward such a general claim about the functioning of human cognition

124 ibid:459.
125

[2],

and quite general ontological claim about

in contradiction to the implied universality of [2], are

dependent

and

are that determines the truth of

are structure-determined entities.
all

of perception

Dc 11:1985:16; numbers

in brackets

mine.
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as

that in

[2]

and

same time maintaining

at the

that that functioning can only

result in the creation of subject-dependent realities.

The same equivocation
directly

is

contained in the following passage taken

from Maturana and Varela.

common

claim in the

It

clearly begins

with an ontological

sense and ends with a somewhat vague reference to the

subject-dependent nature of the "world" (meaning-2) that

So

it

would seem

that Maturana,

force of his claim to

by the end

is

available to us.

of the passage, has undercut the

have identified something about the way we are that

not dependent on what

we

"create with others."

I

is

have underlined the two

key phrases that evoke a quite general ontological claim and a

relativistic one,

respectively:

the uniqueness of being human lies exclusively in a social
structural coupling that occurs through languaging, generating
...

human social dynamics. ..and (b)
human dynamics that entails a reflection
enabling us to see that as human beings [there is still a trace of a
reality claim in that last phrase] we have only the world which
we create with others
the regularities proper to the

(a)

the recursive social

.

Maturana
strictures

Dell

it

lays

clearly

down

and Maturana,

exempts

own

his

reality claims they

characterize the

common denominator

"knowing

is

this results

from the

fact that

— have "not been able to operate

whatever reasons

without making

follows:

And

for the rest of us.

for

doctrine from the relativistic

have

failed to notice."^^^

of

all

We

might

such idealist positions as

making, where using an interpretation

to create a

This sounds very close to one of

thinkable experience makes a world.

Maturana and Varela:1988:246.
^27 Held and Pols:1987:468.
128 vVcissman:1989a:517.
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Maturana's more frequently used expressions:

knowing

himself notes,

is

to

is

is

knowing and

direct result of this line of thinking, as

certainly important,

and

Maturana

forth with others.

signals the potential for

world

that

we

He

in fact claims that

build with others.

our world

same

sort of equivocation

on the nature

of the

of traditional realist claims as that outlined above.

is

a

is

prone

to

independence dimension
But more to the point,

given his anti-realist epistemology and commitment

Maturana

is

Yet talk about the "social

construction of reality" or the "linguisticality" of our experience
the

all

be asserting the social or cultural-dependent nature of our views

or constructions of "our" world.
"linguistic

doing

"we have only the world we bring

that

The word "we" here
Maturana

a

doing. "^29

is

"all

to intuitionism,

not entitled to assert the independent existence of any of the

possible objects of knowledge, including "others,"^^^ for certainly

necessary condition for being one of those "others" that

I

am

it is

a

not reducible to

the cognitive distinctions of Maturana.

Let us focus, therefore, on the claim that "nothing exists" apart from
this linguistic

world that we bring

Maturana unwittingly subscribes

to

principle of idealism:" that "[bjeing

comes

as

no

surprise, then,

forth with others. In

what has been
is

making

this claim,

called the "cardinal

dependent on the knowing of

when Maturana

Maturana and Varela:1988:27.
Ibid:248.

131 Ibid:235.

133 Maturana:1978:60.
133 Brown;1988:145.

93

suggests that

"human

it."^^^

It

existence

is

cognitivG GxistGRCG,
are cognitive

weapons

or, niorG spGcifically,

entities....

That

is

are cognitive entities

thG

atom and

would seem

hydrogen bomb

To the extent

their reality."i34
it

thG

that

such

to follow that all of us

who

think about them are, as Maturana claims, directly responsible for "bring[ing

them]
that

forth. "^35

we

take

This clearly adds up to

more

more than

responsibility for our actions.

statements such as "[ejvery thing

is

cognitive"

the principled suggestion

For

when we

conjoin

and "everything

is

human

responsibility" with the subject-dependent nature of every possible "world,"

the responsibility for such things could only be individual

and

Yet

total.^36

the suggestion that "we" take responsibility for such things sounds plausible

only

when we

forth

by each

forget the subject-dependent nature of the "reality" brought

of Maturana's

Let us concede that

world-spinning observers. ^37

much

of this talk about "world-making"

embarrassment, and that effective action

is

possible only as our

is

an

maps and

plans succeed in accurately modeling some of the instrumental relations
obtaining in nature.
true,

Structure determinism shares with

my

realism,

it is

an instrumental, pragmatic expression. Yet Maturana's constructivist

pragmatism

is

not a theory of things and relations used

(like a

map

or tool) in

our dealings with an extra-linguistic or extra-mental world. Rather,
constructivist pragmatics sees language or thought as the mind's principal

instruments in creating a thinkable experience. In

this

way "mind"

creates a

134 Maturana;1988a:51; 1988b:80.

135 Maturana:1988a:51.

136 ibid;51. See MacKinnon (1987) for a treatment of
Maturana's thought.
13^ Maturana:1978:60.
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this

"blame the victim" nature of

thinkable because coherent experience which
interests

and needs. This worldmaking

is

capable of satisfying our

activity holds out clear

moral

consequences: those worlds will be designed to satisfy our interests and
values. ^38

Given structure determinism's

values become purely individual.
plants,

non-human animals and

subjectivist turn these interests

What has become
other people?

and

of the real world of

Here

is

Maturana’s response.

Since

language no thing exists. ..the real is nothing but an
argument we use in our human co-existence whenever we
want to compel another human being, without using force, to do
something we want.^^^
...outside

This anthropocentric denial of

all

things extra-linguistic, while

serving, intuitively, as a reductio of Maturana's doctrine to the average
reader, doubles as an artificial yet unbridgeable gap between

humans and

the

natural world of which they are a part. Intuitionism seems least plausible as
it

fails to

account for

accommodate

to a

this

world

one popular
that

we have

intuition:

in

See Weissman:1987a:8-9.

Maturana:1988b:80.
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we

often live or die as

no sense made.

we

2

CHAPTER

ONTOLOGY AND

4

DJTUITION:

THE INSPECTABLE GIVEN

4.1

Introduction

Every philosophical method has ontological and psychological
assumptions.

a truism that

It is

theory of those objects, just as

all

"all

talk of

philosophy, explicitly or

surreptitiously... deposits, projects or
tells

us very

little

about what

about our chosen method as

which

it

applies.

to

is

we

In these next

our knowledge of objects requires a

presupposes a

count as

real.

specify the

two chapters

Yet

domain
I

tacitly,

That in

reality.

we

honestly or

can discover

of things

and

itself

much

relations to

consider the ontologies of

intuitionism and hypothetical realism, respectively.
4.2 Skepticism

We

and the Given

have seen

might forever elude

fear that reality

We may

that the intuitionist

be

lost in a

method

is

a reaction to the skeptical

us:

world we cannot know. These

intuitionists

respond by demanding that mind secure its position within a
"world," first by creating its own intelligibilities in language or
culture, then by using them to create a thinkable experience.

Our

access to reality

is

then guaranteed, for reality

product.

^

^

Bhaskar:1989:13.

Wcissman:1989b:3-4.
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is

mind's

own

Mind becomes
"given"

—

in its

That certainty

measure of

the

all

things as

two basic forms discussed below

is

judgments regarding the

its

— are

and

infallible

certain.

secured as the intuitionist appropriation of the given creates

a "privileged relationship

between subject and

Having

object.

rejected the

mediating signs of representative realism as merely speculative, the knower
is

to restrict his or her attention to the representations themselves, turning

those "representations into

realities":'^

window

Rather than being an open

onto the world, they are a
These
signs, whether natural or conventional, have displaced the
world to which they were to give access. For it is only these
representations, not the world, that mind inspects and knows.^

barrier to the direct inspection of the things represented.

In this chapter

method.

I

suppose

I

consider in detail the ontology of the intuitionist

that every instance of that ontology

senses, an ontology of the given

everything

ways:

(1)

real,

.

^

its

in

one of two

Specifically, intuitionism requires that

everything that could be said to

presentable in

is,

exist,

be given in one of two

entirety to inspecting mind; or (2) presented for

inspection; with the difference being that the latter
alternative in supposing that the

mind

first

is

the

more

radical

creates or constructs,

and then

regards, the given.

Few
more

intuitionists,

even among those

radical view, are apt to focus our attention

method. At

tacitly

on

support

this

second,

this aspect of their

best, they present their theory as ontologically neutral with

2 Bhaskar:1989:28.
^

who

Wcissman;! 987a: too.

5 lbid:99.

^ Sec Wcissman:1987a:Ch3; 1989b:Ch7.
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respect to the metaphysical issues that separate realists from idealists,
as the
constructivists Carnap,

von Glasersfeld and Quine,

like the logical positivists

before them,7 strain to avoid an outright dismissal of the existence of a mind-

independent "ontic world"8 of "external

them

access to

things,"^

all

the while denying us

(see section 4.2 below). Others, less politic, regard the

independence claims of

realists as either

"outdated" and "banal,"^o or

concerning a world of ineffable properties and things better
analysis.^ ^

we

Still

Kuhn and Feyerabend

others,

consider them "weak realists"^^

themselves from
"mind's
I

This

is

own

along with

its

would

prefer that

effectively distanced

implication that the given, or reality,

is

product."

shall spell out

and defend the new

role of the given in section 4.5.1.

particularly important in light of the widespread, yet erroneous, belief

that philosophers
in the

(2)

who have

for instance,

off lost to

no longer

paragraph previous

called them,

rely

on

that notion.

But

first,

why

suggest, as

to this one, that certain intuitionists, as

remain unaware of

their

own

ontological

I

do

we have

commitments?

I

have

Ayer, for example, claims not to be denying the reality of an observer-independent world.
He presents the choice of phenomenalist sense-datum language over a material-thing language
as a pragmatic, non-factual one. "What is the reality that constrains us, and prevents us from
^ A.

J.

saying absolutely anything?
are tested.
of

It is

them Ayer

is

It is

the realm of 'empirical

in these facts alone that

we must

not talking of language; he

is

which

all

statements

find Ayer's [anti-realist] ontology. In talking

doing metaphysics, despite the disclaimers

(Devitt:1984:56).

®

facts'. ..against

von Glasersfeld:1989a:7.

9 Quine:1981;Chl.

Rorty:1985:354.

Rorty:1981:3-18.

Devitt:1984:15.
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said that idealisms

and anti-realisms

—they follow

professes (section 2.2)
intuitionist

method.

phenomenon
drawing on

I

would

like to

of every sort are not only positions one

just as surely

amplify in the following section

from the ontology

of distancing one's theory

intuitionist theories

from adopting the

it

this

contains,

covered already and extending Devitt's

notion of "ontological coyness.
4.2.1

On

Ontological Coyness

How

might one "distance" one's theory from the more radical version

of intuitionism noted above?
either divert attention

theory.

That can be achieved in one of two ways:

from or ignore the ontological commitments of our

Maturana does both

as

he attempts

functioning of cognition and perception in
his anti-realist epistemology.

the last chapter

we

Specifically

to describe a priori the

human

— and

observers on the basis of

this

was

the conclusion of

— he ignores his implicit commitment to discourse-

independent features of observers and
distracting "relativistic" ontology

their

meant

to

medium

while taking up a

account for those real features of

our world.
4. 2.1.1

Internal Realism

Ignoring one's ontological commitment to

independent features of the world

is

real,

discourse- or scheme-

compatible with an emphasis on the

metaphorical "imposition view" discussed above (section
literal

rendition of that view seems to "leave us

ibid:Ch9.
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some

3.2.2),

where

of the familiar

a

world. "14 The importance of that metaphor
intuitionist

should be

to the "ontologically coy"

clear;

Thus Berkeley did not deny the very existence

of the

common-

sense physical world, but claimed that it could be reduced to
something mental. And the phenomenalists liked to give the
impression that they were saving that world. This conservatism

was good
refutation

even, like

Putnam

abandon it and the anti-realist can expect
by the kicked stone and the incredulous stare. He may
Hume, have difficulty believing what he says.^^

tactics:

tells

us in his most recent book that he rejects any "copy"

theory of knowledge and truth

(i.e.,

metaphysical realism together with

correspondence

truth), as well as the idealism that

mind makes up

the world" subject to various external constraints.^^

would have

it

that "the

Rejecting both positions as "alienated," he favors the following:
If

one must use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be
the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the

this:

world.

How

might

we unpack

this

knowledge and being?

I

metaphor and assess

will turn

We

cut

up

more

promise as a theory of

once more to Putnam’s defense of

"internal realism," supplying in brackets
relate his defense to the

its

my own comments

designed to

radical sense of givenness noted above:

when we introduce one sign or
Since objects and the signs are

the world into objects

another [the imposition view].

scheme of description [we literally impose
this order on the "world"], it is possible to say what matches
what" [representations have become the realities to which our

alike internal to the

Ibid:140.

lbid;221.

^^Putnam:1987:l.

Ibid:!.
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sentences refer;

we

have, in intuitionist fashion, closed the gap

between knower and knownld^

Putnam suggests
world (what

I

that internal realism

and the

activity of cutting

have called the imposition view) provides

dichotomies.

In place of the

a "reality without

we

find a

continuum of properties

relatively objective (eg., "being a region of space

contains at least one hydrogen atom") to those relatively subjective

"being very amusing").

Our common

identifiable point along this

continuum

intuition
at

which

is

that there

subjectivity

objectivity begins, as the objective reality of our very

But that

relative notion.

is

the

mind-independent and determinate

complexes of properties^o of the world

ranked from those

up

precisely the

one move

is

(eg.,

must be some
ends and

hands and

that

which

feet

is

no

ruled out by

Putnam's internal realism. Putnam recognizes the serious implications of
his effort to

My

do away with dichotomous

thinking:

rejection of these dichotomies will trouble

many, and

it

Without the constraint of trying to "save" the

should.
appearances", philosophy becomes a game in which anyone can
say just about anything.22
and, as a rule does

—

—

This pinpoints the very disturbing aspect of his book, which one reviewer
recognizes:
...[this

negative effort] to bring

down

the object/ subject

complement, a positive differentiation
between acceptable and unacceptable assertions about.. .the many
bifurcation. ..needs

its

Putnam:1982:52.

Ibid:32.

See chapter

V

below.

Putnam:1987:27.
22 lbid:28.
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faces of realism, failing

which anything indeed does go. One
suspects this effort will return us closer to the dichotomous
world from which Putnam counsels

We

flight.^^

have suggested that the imposition view

is

simply a metaphor,

possibly having application to experience, and certainly not a means by which

we

"cut up" or otherwise construct the "relatively objective" features of a

world

we have

when

the conclusions of this latter doctrine hardly resemble a "God's eye

We

view. "24

not made. The imposition view

as a critique of realism

have already noted the equivocation on the meaning of the

independence of the world from our theories

and leads

fails

that undergirds

to the fallacious identification of all talk

about the features of an

object with the very existence of that object's features (section

distinction in mind,

leads

him

what

there

up

cut

world.

world

on

a

we

can restate and then

such statements

reject

1.4).

With

Putnam's inference

that

to call realism "incoherent" as follows: since (1) the question
is

can only be asked within a scheme of descriptions, then

the world into objects
(1) is

a truism:

when we chose

no one

deny

will

in a conceptual or linguistic

scheme

of representations. 25

a

that to

scheme of descriptions

this

about

(2)

we

of the

convey the structure of the

format makes our judgments "parasitic"
(2)

amounts

to idealism

and follows from a

mistaken reading of that truism that places an "absurd requirement" on
realism; namely, that
all,

we

can judge, without dependence on any concepts

whether our theories are true

of the world.25

23 Hobart;1989:191.
2^ Putnani;1981:84.

25 Salinas:1989;114.

2*^

Or

that

wc

can

justify sentences

by looking

at the

world nonlinguistically

(Russman:1987:16); see also Devitt;1894; 195n3; Salinas:1989;114.
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at

Putnam confuses two very
arguing

While he sees

distinct things.

realists

without the assistance of concepts or experience,

for their position

they are in fact attempting something altogether different from that magical
feat.

Specifically, realists

suppose that

we

theories are true of reality, the nature of

and experience

of

which

to leaves us with, at best, a

is

as

are experiencing that world.

we

choose one response

that consists in giving

philosophy of "as

up

Objects

is

to

is

do

is

can assert about

sometimes seems

our statements

belief

match between our representations
is

unable

to

"underwrite or

no object of knowledge;"^^ and

it

seems

to the "as

that the

if"

independent of our experiences. Other positions

supremely rational

variety.

(that

if

we

Realists,

there
are

is

all

a

on

this

world

brains in

vats or are simply dreaming, for example) are equally compatible with
It

if"

ideal fictions"^^

knowledge or

interpretation, merely assert that our experiences are as

evidence available to the senses.

"as

but viable procedures.

'correct pictures'

to limit

we

become "convenient

the search for a

In light of these skeptical worries

thing to

it

to the skeptical challenge to

knowledge;"28 "there

"knowledge. ..is not

if"; all

that

(mental or linguistic) and the world. Philosophy

debunk claims

independent of our concepts

informed by a Cartesian skepticism that

our sensory experience of an external world

we

is

it.

In contrast, internal realism

seems

are able to judge whether our

all

follows that realism in the traditional

von Glasersfeld:1989a:5.
28 Rorty;1979:3.
2^ Maturana:1980a;53.

2^ von Glascrsfcld:1989a:6.
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the

sense, since

it is

unjustified in

unable

its

commitment

According

things.

often get their start

supporting
all

to give reasons for rejecting these other positions,

to

to a structured

is

world of mind-independent

our best theories of science (from which skeptical doubts

— see section

realistic theories

3.5 above) there

can be no evidence

about the world over, say, the theory that

we

are

brains in vats.

We

must maintain

practical) truth of the

that the skeptical

doubt

reflects the (scientific

underdetermination of our theories by the world: "We

could be wrong about anything.

However, we

recall that the

mutuality of our method and ontology does not require that

psychologism (section

and

2. 3. 1.2),

as

determined by our epistemology

we might were we

to

necessary

we

fall

victim to

have our metaphysics

in the fashion of internal realism.

One

reading of Putnam's imposition view suggests that our failure to "cut up the

world" would leave the world without

objects, properties or relations.

What,

then, could be said to exist according to Putnam's "internal" theory, other

than the contents of our minds? All that

we

are

left

with are our

"conceptually contaminated experiences and the theories they lead

Unable

to account for

any discourse-independent features of the world,

Putnam's original metaphor reduces
he had hoped
4. 2. 1.2

to."^^

to avoid,

to a version of the "alienated" idealism

where the mind simply makes up the world.

Empirical Realism

Even

critics of internal

realism can

employ

the imposition view to

divert attention from the idealistic implications of their theory.

Dcvitt:1984:52.

32 Ibid:192.
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Consider Ian

Hacking, for example,

who

rejects

Putnam's idea that

"objects

independently of conceptual schemes," while accepting that

world up into objects when

we

representation. 33 Those objects,

do not

we do

exist

cut the

introduce one or anther scheme of

we

are to imagine, are distinct from our

representations, creating a scheme-reality dualism something like the one

suggested
"runs a

we

adopt

number

in section 1.4 above.

Hacking contends

that

I

Putnam

of distinct theses together" in his critique of metaphysical

realism which have no logical bearing on one another;

The

fact that

not in

we

cut

up

imply that

itself

the world into various. ..categories, does
all

such categories are mind-dependent.34

Yet in the end Hacking wants to combine a metaphysical realist
perspective about "natural kinds" with a "revolutionary transcendental

nominalism" inherited from Kuhn.35 These two positions are hardly
compatible, as the following passages indicate.

First,

we have

Hacking's

straightforwardly realist support for the notion of scheme-independent
"natural kinds":

The world simply does have horses and grass in it, no matter
what we think, and any conceptual scheme will acknowledge
that.36

We

suppose

that

Hacking thereby acknowledges

things having a character and existence that

is

"cutting up" or otherwise engaging the world.

Hacking:1983;94-5.

Ibid:95.

35 Kuhn:1962.

3^ Hacking:1983:110; emphasis added.
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his

commitment

to these

independent of our ways of
This

is

metaphysical realism.

By the very next paragraph, however. Hacking's commitment

to a

scheme-

neutral world of horses and grass has been completely erased, and an

"empirical realism" put in

We

its

place:

can hardly avoid approaching nature with our present

We

are in fact empirical realists: we think as
are using natural kinds, real principles of sorting.37

categories....

This
first

if

we

the Kantian strain in Hacking's transcendental nominalism that

is

saw

in

Gadamer's use

we

of language (section 2.4.3. 1):

The world stands before us
which is subjective because

completed manifold; that
of having been created by mind as it
thinks the given is nevertheless called objective because we
cannot help but think of it as standing apart from

We

as a never

are to suppose that our conceptual schemes are at best regulative

principles that need not be true of anything in the world
Similarly, our ideas of natural kinds represent

thought sees
long as

it

its

own shadow,

in the

we

one more instance where

world

persist in talking "as

(like

cautious position that there can be no

Hacking's empirical realism, no

So

less

if"

there are

mind-

horses and grass), adopting the more
"right...

representation of the world.

than Putnam's internal realism,

form of constructivist intuitionism.

Ibid:110; eniphasis added.

38 vVeissman:1987a:72.

Weissman:1989b;61.

Hacking:1983:l

inquiry.

as "forms are projected onto sense data."^^

serves our purposes,

independent things

beyond

10.
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is

a

Radical Constructivism

4. 2. 1.3

It

has become fashionable in the

latter part of this

century

among

philosophers and other social theorists to talk about the "social construction
of reality".4i

Social constructivists rightly criticize the idea that

merely passive agents of perception and

reflection, rejecting

humans

are

outdated

epistemological stories about "iconic representations" of reality and "the

mind

as the mirror of nature."

What

they

fail to realize,

however,

is

that

realism with regard to the external world need not, indeed should not, rest

upon them.
Epistemologically, the constructivist perspective represents the

following

shift:

The

shift

from knowledge-as-representation

to

knowledge-as-

construction of reality implies an epistemological shift from the
search after the "right method" for telling the true (really real)

from the

false (the apparently real) in

what we observe,

to the

analysis of the operations allowing the observer to distinguish

what he

own

or she distinguishes

and therefore

to organize his or her

experience.‘^2

This shift represents a change of ground from the discovery of that which our

experience

is

about

to "the

environment

as

we

perceive

it is

our invention.

Ernst von Glasersfeld characterizes this paradigm as "radical" in that

it

avoids

resorting to a belief in a world existing independently of the "observer" (a

world

"in-itself").

his distinction

von

Glasersfeld's debt to the skeptics

between radical and

trivial

Berger and Luckmann:1966.

Chiari

von

and Nuzzo:1988:92.

Foerster:1984:42.
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is

constructivism:

clear as

we

survey

...those

who

do not

explicitly give

merely speak of the construction of knowledge, but
up the notion that our conceptual
constructions can or should in some way represent an
independent, "objective" reality, are still caught in the
traditional theory of

knowledge

skeptics' arguments.

From an

therefore, their constructivism

that

defenseless against the
epistemological point of view,
is

is trivial ."^^

In their reaction to the skeptical challenge radical constructivists are

inclined to adopt, like the empirical realist Hacking, a pragmatic, "as

if"

epistemology; one that maintains that knowledge as a representation of the
differentiations

and orders of an observer-independent,

must be replaced by knowledge

as that

which

relation to the "experiential world" of the

Whatever the

is

in

knowing

"external"

some sense

world

"viable" in

subject:'^^

subject perceives or conceives will necessarily be

ways and means of perceiving and
conceiving
and there is no way ever to compare these results
with what there was in the first place."^^
the result of the subject's

—

von Glasersfeld defines the mental constructions

that result as

"conceptual structures that epistemic agents, given the range of present

experience within their tradition of thought and language, consider viable.

We

can note this ambiguity in the very formulation of radical

constructivism; are these cognitive structures viable as they succeed in

making sense
"experiential

of "the

world

as the

knowing

it,"48

or the

world of the knowing subject?" In other words, does the

von Glasersfeld:1989a:6-7.
von Glascrsfeld:1984a:22.
von Glascrsfcld:1988a:3-4.
47

subject experiences

lbid:7.

48 ibid:5.
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conceptual system, by projecting form onto sensory data, create everything

determinate within experience; or does
a

world ("what there was

independent of the ways

it

formulate and

whose

in the first place")

we

think and talk about

test

hypotheses about

existence and character are

it?

This question can receive no straightforward answer, as

von

Maturana

Glasersfeld, like

(section 3.6),

is

committed

distinct "worlds;" the

one an observer-independent,

remains indifferent

our various ways of describing

to

of."^^

commitment

to

First,

we have

and the other a

these remarks concerning

an observer-independent,

two

world" that

subject-dependent, "experiential world," as the "only one the

can conceive

clear that

to (at least)

"real

it;

it is

human knower

von

Glasersfeld's

"real world":

Radical constructivism. ..does not deny an ontological "reality" - it merely denies the human experiencer the possibility of
acquiring a "true" representation of it.... [and] holds that no such
reality can be known. ...The human subject may meet that world
only where a way of acting or a way of thinking fails to attain the
desired goal

— but in any such failure there

deciding whether the lack of success

is

due

is

to

no way

of

an insufficiency of

the chosen approach or to an independent ontological obstacle.^^

These remarks

recall

autonomous descriptions

Maturana's notion that our apparently

of the

world are somehow constrained by an

observer-independent noumenal world, or substratum, which

is

devoid of properties. Yet our commitment

independence

(Cl) (section 1.4) suggests to us that this

content

— said only

addition to idealism.

to "permit

to the condition of

entirely

realm of neutral, unsynthesized

whatever

it

permits"

—

is

but an idle

Refusing, moreover, to admit the reality of "bare.

Ibid:7-8.

Ibid;8-22.
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faceless existence" that such a concept requires,

we

prefer to equate existence

with the existence of a property or complex of properties.^^
Indeed, von Glasersfeld claims to have independently reached
of the

same conclusions

And we add

as Maturana.52

constructivism's equivocation on the

word

many

that radical

"reality" parallels

Maturana's

enigmatic use of the word "world." This brings us to the second type of world
to

which von Glasersfeld

'experiential reality'
reality is apparently

is

apparently committed.

intend what

I

reduced

we

He

ordinarily call

writes; "by

'reality.'"^^

to that "malleable material

processed by multiple conceptual frameworks.

waiting to be

seems

It

Glasersfeld shares with the radical philosophers of science,

Feyerabend, a kind of

"realist rhetoric."^^

constructive activity of the

with

reality,

that

all

is

mind alone

We are to

Ordinary

that

von

Kuhn and

suppose that the

creates a thinkable

and familiar

extra-mental placed in a noumenal realm forever

beyond our ken:

am in agreement with Maturana when he says: ...an observer
has no operational basis to make any statements or claims about
objects, entities or relations as if they existed independently of

I

what he

or she does.... Concepts. ..have

no

iconic or

representational connection with anything that might "exist"
outside the cognizing system; and the raw material out of which

Weissmanil 977:86-9.

von Glasersfeld:1989b.

von Glascrsfeld:1984b:8.
54 Salinas:1989:lll.
55 Devitt:1984:137-8.
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concepts are composed or coordinated cannot be
any such connection either.^^

Here we find von Glasersfeld
of the so-called short
reality except

under

argument

to idealism: since

we

constructing worlds rather than finding them.
If

the world of the realist

it

must be completely unspecified and

is

to

have

falling victim to a constructivist version

chosen description/'57

a

known

a "world outside

we

"never encounter

should see ourselves as

The argument goes

all

as follows.

schemes," then, by definition,

So the "raw material"

unspecifiable.

out of which our concepts are composed or coordinated must be an

unconceptualized given. However, since nothing

at all is

given to rational

awareness, including the "connection" between our concepts and "anything
that

might

'exist"

outside the cognizing system," von Glasersfeld has no basis

for saying that this

function he assigns
It

raw material

either "exists" or can fulfill the constraining

it.

follows that von Glasersfeld, like Maturana,

committed only

to the

is

theoretically

subject-dependent "experiential world" of the

individual observer:

From

the constructivist point of view, to observe

attention

on

the focusing of attention involves categorizing

on

means

a specific part of one's experiential field.

to focus

Usually

what one focuses

as a item of a particular kind, a property, a relation, a thing, a

process,

etc....

But once

it is

understood that

all this

discriminating, categorizing, and establishing of relationships
takes place within the observer's experiential field, it becomes
clear that

no

as such, that

result of these operations can pertain to the
is,

the world as

it

might

the observer's activities.

von Glasersfeld: 1989b:8.
Rorty:1981:xxxix.

58 von Glasersfeld:1988a:22-3.

Ill

exist objectively

world

without

This, once again, rests

on the subtle equivocation on the independence

dimension of realism, von Glasersfeld mistakenly supposes

commenting on the independence

of the

divine capacity to say what the world

is

that

world from our theories
like theory

rests

on the

We

independently.

recognize the need to sustain a viable scheme-reality dualism for

just this

reason: the anti-realist argument of von Glasersfeld and others

supportable

we

only as

persist in thinking of the "world outside

schemes" as

all

And

necessarily an undifferentiated, ineffable substratum.

is

that

characterization of the world rests on confusing the theory-dependence of

discourse with the theory-dependence of the world

To

think otherwise

is

to

suppose

inaccessible to the stories

we

tell,

that the

itself.

world must be
must be

that content

uninterpreted and uninterpretable by concepts. This
assumption, in turn, is the outcome of the conflation. ..of the
epistemic nature of our judgments on what there is (their bond
to theory) with the dependence of what there is on the mental,
with theory per se.^^

How
neutral

does

on the

commitment

all

of this reflect

on von

Glasersfeld's attempt to remain

We

issues dividing realists from idealists?

to

an observer-independent "ontological

have seen

reality"

is

that his

not

genuine, despite his frequent claims to the contrary.^^ His intuitionism
plainest as he supposes that everything
differentiations

thinking

it.

we

can

know

receives

its

and organization from the conceptual system used

With an

material or data,

all

ineffable

I-know-not-what

to

is

for

generate the raw

of the intelligibility credited to any possible experience (or

"experiential world"), originates within the

Salinas:1989:113.

von Glasersfeld:! 988a:8; 1989a:7
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conceptual structures employed.

as

we

attempt to "attain the goals

we happen

to

have chosen.

This

pragmatic element, shared by Putnam, Maturana and von Glasersfeld,

perhaps the most confusing aspect of modern

intuitionist

is

thought and

deserves separate comment.
4.2.2 Intuitionism

and Pragmatism

Contemporary philosophers are apt

to call

themselves pragmatists,

the while supposing that doctrine to be in conflict with realism.
the opposition of these

two

theories

is

I

all

suggest that

an academic aberration, one having

its

source in the intuitionist bias against speculation outlined above, along with
the requirement that everything real be presented or presentable for

inspection.

The

intuitionist appropriations of

theories of things

and

relations

used

(like

pragmatism are

not, therefore,

our maps and plans of chapter

our dealings with an observer-independent world, as a

in

I)

test of the truth of

our

often error-ridden hypotheses about that world.
Instead, these intuitionists turn to value-satisfying

Goodmanesque "world-making"
threat of a

when he
which

world

that

the

them; and
line

exist

Rorty

is

paradigmatic

can be no non-human, extra-linguistic factors to

to these

world-makers

world

elusive.

themselves against the

answer. This reflects more than the unchecked authority and

importance afforded
role as

would forever remain

insists that there

we must

activities to secure

and

modern

that idealism

philosophers, as

it is

precisely in our

and pragmatism converge: the

objects of

and have a determinate nature because we have thought

we have done

with our values.

that because

It is

enough

it

that

made

we

von Glascrsfeld:1998a:6.
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for a coherent experience in

think of the world "as

if" it

were

independent of us

for

its

character

and

existence, so long as that satisfies our

and needs;

interests

Knowing

is making, where using an interpretation to create a
thinkable experience makes a world. Still more dangerously,
this pragmatism may encourage a tacit contempt for those
people who cannot think themselves out of one world, and into

a better

one merely by changing

their interpretations.

Richard

Rorty's "conversation of the West" has that possibility within

The dialogue he recommends

too

it.

much

the social patter of
need not be right or wrong, because
is

those leisured people who
their social positions are well-defended against the
relevance or the threat of error.^^
I

is

have

for

suspect that the "experiential world" of the radical constructivist

like the

—

demand

—

subject-dependent reality brought forth by Maturana's lone observer
This

a solipsistic one.

difficulty avoiding.

is

a conclusion that even

Specifically,

von Glasersfeld can

he recognizes as "problematic" the task

of avoiding solipsism while accounting for other

human

beings in terms of

the dictates of his theory that declares the "subject's idea of the world [to be]

the subject's

own

construction. "^3

idea of the world should

come

to

jj-

j^ot

obvious, he says,

"how such an

incorporate the notion of others in the

sense of other cognizing organisms

who may

construct their

own

idea of the

world.
I

suggest that the source of von Glasersfeld's troubles

his equivocation

on the word world, together with

is

to

be found

in

his failure to appreciate

the condition of independence (Cl) of the world from our constructs or
theories.

Otherwise,

it is

hardly problematic that anyone's "idea of the world"

Wcissman:1989a:517.

von Glasersfeld:1989b:8.
Ibid:8.
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should contain a notion of others. In contrast, realism's rejection of the
imposition view has this other
status of

phenomenal

it

"upgrades other people from the

objects constituted

existences presupposed

von Glasersfeld

effect:

my

by

is

right,

by

is

however, when he

insists that the realist is

But what he

fails to see, in

that radical constructivism fails in this regard as well.

Glasersfeld seems to imply that the skeptic
into the

consciousness. ..to individual

consciousness of them."^^

ultimately unable to "answer" the skeptic.

view,

my

same

is

"any good," must be about the

"real

At times von

unanswerable and has

"trap" as the realist in thinking that

world.

knowledge,

my

fallen

in order to be

Other times, however, he

suggests that his theory avoids these difficulties by invoking the notion of
"fit"

between concepts and

The implication
sets a

is

reality in place of the

not that the skeptic’s question

more

traditional "match.

unanswerable because

is

standard for knowledge that knowledge, in general,
Rather, the suggestion

satisfying.

is

that achieving

some

correspondence between a thought or sentence and a

is

it

incapable of

sort of

state of affairs

is

rendered beside the point (along with the skeptic's concerns) once the world
is

reduced

to

myriad "experiential worlds":

an experiential world that
consists of experiences and makes no claims whatsoever about
"truth" in the sense of correspondence with an ontological
reality.... The world which we experience is, and must be as it is,
...the

world that

is

constructed

is

because we have put it together that way.... The constraints of
our world, with which our enterprises collide, we never get to
see.

What we

experience, cognize, and

Russman:1987:147.

von Glasersfeld:1988a:4.
von Glasersfcld:1989a:6
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come

to

know,

is

necessarily built

up

of our

explained in no other

way

own

building blocks and con be
than in terms of our ways and means

of building.68

This

is

von

answer

Glasersfeld's

more speculative and precarious than
self-sufficient
to

worldmaker?

I

to the skeptic.

Could there be

the one affirming that each of us

suggested earlier that worldmaking

put the best face on the terrors of skepticism: but that

these worldmakers have

constructivism

—

far

become

a claim

skeptics.

On

from being an answer

is

is

is

a

one way

just to say that

this account, radical

to skepticism

— merely

reiterates

the skeptical challenge and obscures the undesirable consequences of adopting
that

view behind the

4.2.3

A

veil of "experiential reality."

Possible Objection

Let us briefly take

up

a possible first objection to the

introduced the intuitionist ontology of the given.

way I have

Is all this

talk of

"mind"

creating or inspecting the given merely an outdated, Cartesian mentalism?

Do we
the

not misrepresent the position of these philosophers as

contemporary reinterpretation of experience and mental

belonging essentially to the social domain?^^
the intuitionist ontology, that difference

difference between individual

and

is

I

overlook

activity as

suggest that in the context of

only superficial.

collective

we

It

reduces to the

world-making:

Mind's product is socialized, though we have not altered the
Cartesian view that nothing is better known to mind than mind
and its works.... We are asked to believe that reality depends for
its character and existence on our ways of thinking or talking
about it....^0

von

Glasersfeld:! 987:204-1 2.

Wittgenstein:1953; Dewey:1965.

Wcissman:1989b:70.
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We
belief.

might find worldmaking

Still,

we have

of

any

sort to

be a project that tortures

yet to be driven to name-calling in order to reject that

project, in the absence of compelling reasons for dismantling the naturalistic

alternative.

Where might we

find those reasons?

A

good place

to start

is

with the theory of perception:

Why

does intuitionism survive?

Because perception is our
Perception encourages
the security we feel at having things we can see or touch.
Inspection is reassuring in this same, almost palpable way.^^

insistent

The

paradigm

for understanding.

realist often considers

we might

perceptual data as evidence for things about which

speculate, as a scratch at the door

long-lost pet.

may be

construed as a sign of a

That same data can be claimed for the given in intuitionism,

while the two methods differ only as they defer to or attempt,

fallibly

and

hypothetically, to exceed that data.
4.3 Structural

Coupling as a Condition of Existence

Maturana

last

its

clearly

one example of an

who

intuitionist

His claim that the world

structure-determined

corollary the doctrine of "structural coupling.

vVe recall from the

to observation.

chapter that every structure determined system (or composite unity)

exists in a

"medium." This manner of existence implies a structural

complementarity between every system and

its

medium, where every

interaction (operation of a composite unity's properties)

and

attaches great

is

importance
has as

is

its

medium

that conserves the organization^^ of the

between

a

system

system signals an

Ibid:217.

See for example, Dell:1985:12; Maturana:1988a:38; 1985:63.
In the case of living organisms,

Maturana equates

with conservation of adaptation.
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this

conservation of structural coupling

instance of structural coupling.

Structural coupling, therefore,

is

a condition

of existence for every system:

The very

existence of a structure determined system, then,
and the conservation of its

entails its structural coupling

structural coupling through

changes of

all its

state.74

Living systems, in particular, will exist only so long as their interactions
trigger in

the
to

them

medium

to

structural changes congruent with the structural changes of

which they

are coupled; otherwise structural coupling

an end, and the living system ceases

change

to exist, as a

human who

fails to

his or her behavior in response to environmental changes

Two

questions present themselves:

(1)

comes

may

die.

Recalling the "operational

closure" of our organization according to structure determinism (section

we wonder how

this necessary-for-survival

"ontogenic structural

drift" as

Maturana

calls

information flow between the organism and

3.3),

conservation of adaptation (or
it)

its

occurs in the absence of any

medium.

Is

Maturana

lapsing into a realist theory of perception, complete with nested, stable

systems negotiating their
individual level,

own

how

nervous system

way through an environment?

Does Maturana

intuitionism?

now answer

(1)

(2)

these

is this.

and the

any

justifications of his

in the order presented.

the question directed specifically at

Maturana’s very method precludes the kind of discoveries

he claims to have made. In particular,
existence"

offer

two questions

The short answer, focusing on

Maturana,

about the nature of

in order to receive information
drift?)

will

more

does Maturana bypass the operational closure of his

ontogenic structural
I

(Or, at a

it

bars

all

talk of "conditions of

"necessity" of structural coupling.

Maturana:1985:64.
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Indeed, given the

opGrational cIosutg of his riGrvous systGm,

something as basic

to his

theory as

how

this: "living

could he

know even

systems do not have input

and outputs. "?75 These questions animated our discussion

in chapter

III

of

the epistemological contradiction (EC) plaguing structure determinism.

need only
realist

restate the conclusion reached

above here: In adopting an anti-

epistemology that asserts the absolute and "equal validity" of

observation, Maturana

is

in

no position

to describe the organization

and structure
There

is

to

and features

middle of

in the

it

I

make

of a

— that we

a reality claim that purports

world

all

all

— including our place

share.

a longer answer, however, that takes into account Maturana’s

intuitionist treatment of perception

do, that perception

is

.

Do we

err in supposing, as

we

normally

one manner of our causal (and therefore potentially

instructive) interaction with a

world

perceivings, hence requiring that

we

that

is

grasp,

mostly indifferent toward our

however

fallibly,

features of that world in order to sustain ourselves there?

some

of the

As Maturana

himself notes:

ontogenic structural drift takes place with
conservation of adaptation, an observer that sees this
conservation in terms of an operational congruence between a
...while the

living system

and

its

environment may describe

this operational

congruence in terms of perceptual interactions, as if the living
system were grasping the features of the environment and using
them in computing its following changes of state.^^

We

naturally

assume

that perception serves as

one manner of

"grasping" of those features, in the form of natural signs,^^ which permit an

Maturana:1980a:51.

lbid:64.

See Weissman, especially 1989b; and chapter

V
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below.

organism

adequate conduct" or effective action with respect

to "generate

to its

environment.^^ Our well-tested maps help to secure us in the world. Yet

once

we

their

environment,

accept the notion of living beings as systems structurally coupled to

we

can no longer consider perception as a means of

Why

capturing the features of an "external world."

Again, there

Our

is

a short

and

a

more lengthy answer.

solution,

it

does have the

.

Whatever

effect of

else

removing

organism exhibits purposeful behavior

we might

all

First the short one.

achieve effective action. This
first

dilemma

part of a

is

the result as

thrust

medium

to

how

which the observer must

will live, or those operations are

the prior existence of that

for

Maturana's neuro-biological studies led him

We

phenomenon

in

in

some way on

supposing that perception cannot

represent the capture of an independent world.

perception.

dependent

medium

medium.

Maturana has one other reason

validity in the biological

to prioritize

his theory: either the

operations of distinctions of the observer "create" ex nihilo the

which he or she

an

environment: there

Maturana chooses

upon him by

is

think of that

mystery about

in relation to its

no observer-independent world with respect

the

so?

analysis in section 3.4 led us to believe that Maturana's

nothing but a cognitive entity

is

is this

domain

As we saw

in section 3.5,

to question the operational

of the distinction

between

suggested there that Maturana overreacts to

illusion

and

this

in questioning the "ontological validity" of the notion of

objectivity in the

explanation of perception.

Maturana:1985:64.

Maturana:1988a;10.
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yVe

now

locate Maturana's

mistake in

problematic inference which he endorses;

this

If

we

accept the

biologically based "experiential indistinguishability of perception

then

illusion/'

follows that "existence

it

is

and

dependent on the biology of the

observer. "80 Ironically, Maturana also notes the one conclusion that does
follow:

"we should put

naturalism

judgments,

tells

is

a question

mark on any perceptual

us that every factual claim,

down

speculative and hypothetical.

are natural creatures, then

humans know

is

any more

we have no

If

to

and including perceptual

humans, qua knowing

reason to suppose that the

infallible that the

way

Our

certainty.

they

manage

subjects,

way
do anything

to

else.82

This naturalistic conclusion, unlike the previous inference, does not
overstate the force of Maturana's argument.

Indeed, shorn of that

overreaction to the overdetermination of evidence by theory, Maturana's

theory begins to resemble a

fallibilistic

realism.

But that route

barred as Maturana's constructivist intuitionism of form, with

demand

is

effectively

its

that nothing shall be admitted as true or meaningful that

presentable in

more doubtful

its

entirety to mind, forces

inference.

We

him

implicit
is

not

to accept the validity of that

see the influence of his intuitionism in this

other passage:

brought forth by the observer in
his or her praxis of living as a primary experiential condition,
...everything that takes place

and. ..any explanation

is

is

secondary.83

lbid:10.

Ibid:10.

Millikan:1984:298.

Ibid:ll.
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(2)

We

have

now

a brief statement of Maturana's justification of his

intuitionism: everything significant for reality has

its

source in the "world" of

cognitive distinctions brought forth by an observer in his or her praxis of
living.

Explanation, this implies,

is

errantly speculative as

specify the generating condition or ground for the
4.3.1 Speculation:

it

attempts to

phenomenon

at issue.

Descriptive Generalization vs. Abductive Inference

Maturana's preference for that which
reflects his intuitionist bias in favor of that

is

"brought forth" by the observer

which seems secure and

infallible

(the "descriptive domain"), over speculative claims about the underlying

mechanisms which may serve

more than

the reasonable

to explain

demand

that our claims about the

— as they must be when our only access
natural and conventional signs.

our experience. Yet

to that

Rejecting

all

world

is

this represents

world be

in the

mediated access

testable

form of

to the world,

Maturana's preference for description marks the skeptical creation of a
"experiential world" to replace the one that threatens to elude him.
object of philosophic reflection

becomes experience, or

The

"the praxis of living"

of the observer.®"^ Everything else, the self included, arises as

we

"operate in

language" in a vain attempt to explain that experience:^^

and reality exist in language as
explanations of the happening of living of the observer.®^

Self, self-consciousness,

All of reality

is

reducible

to,

because dependent for

its

very existence and

nature on, the "praxis of living" or experience of the observer:

Maturana:1988a:50; sec also section

2.4.1

above.

Ibid:49.

Ibid:49.
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first

...nothing exists outside the distinctions of the observer....
Nature, the world, society, science, religion.. .indeed all things,

are cognitive entities, explanations of the praxis of living of the
observer. ...87

This recalls Whitehead's preference for generalized description over

explanation as his principal instrument in speculating about the world's
features.88

Whitehead supposes, along with Descartes,

experiencing" serves as the primary
It

follows that speculation

more primary ground

is

datum

that "subjective

for all metaphysical speculation.

irresponsible only as

it

attempts to identify a

or condition for that experience.

Whitehead's

reformulation of Descartes' principle in terms of "actual occasions"
restricts responsible

still

metaphysical speculation to the descriptive analysis of

subjectivity:
'actual entities

— also termed 'actual occasions' — are the

real things of

which the world

behind actual

entities to find

is

made

up. There

anything more

facts are, all alike, actual entities;

is

real....

and these actual

final

no going
The final

entities are

drops of experience, complex and interdependent.®^

There

is

an alternative to Whitehead's view, however.

prefer to see both procedures of inquiry
fallible

and hypothetical

for reasons

We

might

— generalization and abduction — as

having to do with induction and the

principle of sufficient reason, respectively:^^

We may

and then generalize from our
descriptions; or we may characterize some thing, and then argue
from that description to conditions for, including the
describe matters of

act,

lbid:51.

Whitehead;1978.

Quoted

in

Weissman:1989b:93.

Abductive inference rest on the latter principle as it requires that any state of
has conditions to which we may infer when explaining either its existence or character.

lbid:95.
affairs
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constituents of, the thing described. Each of the two steps in both
procedures is hypothetical; i.e., we describe then generalize or
describe then infer..

There

is

one complication.

When

observability

is

instantiation (or test of truth) of the possibilities signified

we

measure of

by our hypotheses,

are apt to confuse the sensory effects in us with the actual properties

observed.
is

the

Yet

different

we need

from

does not reduce

its

only remind ourselves that most perceptual evidence

conditions or causes, as the shape of a perceived object

to the

sensory differences

it

makes

in us.

It

follows that

description and explanation can serve to answer the "what" and "why"

questions
4.3.2

we

often put to our experience of the world.

The Epistemological Contradiction Revisited

As

a philosopher

and neurobiologist, Maturana

is

clearly concerned

with both sorts of questions. The pervasive "operations of distinction" are a

form of description; and Maturana considers
to explain" things.^^
(as

to

Maturana's account of

(a

observer-independent conditions or causes of

to description in the following

"operationist.''^"^

the very "intention of science

Yet his intuitionism effects a reduction of explanation

an abductive inference

phenomena)

it

way.

"scientific statements''^^

shows him

to

be an

Operationists require that each meaningful theoretical term

term purporting

to refer to

an unobservable

defined operationally in terms of observables.

entity, condition or cause)

An

explanation of a theoretical

lbid;96.

Maturana;1988a:6.

See Maturana:1978:28-30; 1988a:5-9; Maturana and Varela;1988:28.

See Devitt:! 984:117-8.
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be

term will specify the result of operations on observable
application of the theoretical term.

The

result

entities that justify the

a reduction of theoretical

is

terms to observational ones; the former are merely shorthand

complex phrase consisting
entities.

inferences

— are simply "useful

Unobservables

— the frequent objects of abductive

fictions."

descriptions of operations) of the form

replace explanations

How

does one begin to translate

you do

all

and science

—

if

When we
it

not metaphysics

unobserved or even unobservable

conditioning nature.

x,

you

will observe y"

of the theoretical

world-related provocations to reflection,

that practice
to

"if

Subjunctive conditionals

.

science into subjunctive conditionals?
first

more

solely of observational terms purporting to refer to

observable

(

for a

commitments

discussed above

seemed reasonable

to

those

suppose

— commonly infer abductively

states of affairs obtaining in

Maturana's operationism

(2.2)

is

explicit as

and

he specifies the

criteria of validation of scientific explanations (the "scientific

method"):

The specification of the phenomenon to be explained
through the stipulation of the operations that a standard
observer must perform in.. .order to be.. .a witness of it in his or
her praxis of living [domain of experiences];
(a)

domain of operational coherences of
experiences]
of a standard observer, of a
the [domain of
(b)

the proposition, in the

mechanism, which when allowed to
operate gives rise as a consequence of its operation to the
phenomenon to be explained, to be witnessed by the observer in
his or her [domain of experiences]...;

mechanism,

a generative

the computation, in the domain of
operational coherences of the praxis of living of the standard
(c)

The deduction,

that

is,

observer entailed by the generative mechanism proposed in (b),
of other phenomena that the standard observer should be able to
witness in his or her domain of experiences as a result of the
operation of such operational coherences, and the stipulation of
the operations that he or she should perform in order to do so;
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of

(d) the actual witnessing, in his or

her domain of experiences, of
in (c) by the standard observer who
actually performs in his or her praxis of living the operations

the

phenomena deduced

stipulated also in

Let

me

briefly

(c).^^

summarize these four operations.

observer specifies a procedure of observation

phenomenon

In the

first,

the

that, in turn, specifies the

that he or she will attempt to explain.

In the second, the

observer proposes a "conceptual system"^^ (or generative mechanism) as a

model of the system

that her or she

assumes generates the observed

phenomenon.

In the third, the observer uses the

mechanism

compute

to

proposed generative

a "state or process"^^ as a predicted

phenomenon

to

be observed in the modeled system. Finally, in the fourth operation, the
observer attempts to observe the predicted

phenomenon

as a case in the

modeled system. When these four operational conditions
satisfied,

then the generative mechanism proposed in

explanation of the phenomenon brought forth in

(b)

are conjointly

becomes

a scientific

(a).

This one conclusion seems to follow: science

is

a

domain

of

individually (not socially) accepted statements, validated by that very

procedure required
of those statements.

for specifying the operations necessary for the generation
It

would seem

validation of scientific statements

is

that the generation

and subsequent

an entirely circular and individual

Indeed, Maturana comes close to admitting this to be the case

Maturana:1988a:7.

Maturana:1978:28.

lbid:28.
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when he

affair!

writes:

Science is a closed cognitive domain in which all statements are,
of necessity, subject dependent, valid only in the domain of
interactions in

Maturana's

which the standard observer

exists

and

criteria for the validation of scientific explanations are

superficially similar to the

method

of abduction 99

mechanism

that as a

operation

phenomena

to

capable of generating the

of abduction, that

mechanism

more

is,

independent objective world.

"

we

mechanisms

is

share with Maturana a concern
ability to

in the first place:

...it seems natural to ask for a substratum independent of the
observer as the ultimate medium in which everything takes
place.. ..We need the substratum for epistemological reasons.

I

suggest that subjunctive conditionals are a poor substitute for "why"

questions: specifically, in virtue of

what

is it

the case that

we were to perform such and such operation we would get so
and so observable result? The operationist must leave this,

if

implausibly, as an inexplicable "brute facf'of the world.

lbid:29.

See note 16 of chapter

1

above.

lbid:5.

Maturana:! 988a:45-6.

Devitt:1984:118.
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very

experience and not an

about the status of that substratum which seems to undergird our
specify generative

its

be explained. In the case

Maturana's conclusion

human

explain
Still,

consequence of

often than not, an instrumental

relation obtaining in or conditioning nature.
different: scientific explanations

only

Both assume explanations

are "generative" in that they specify a
is

operates.^®

4.4

The

Ineffable Substratum

Maturana
idealism

I

explicitly rejects as a solipsistic "trap" the

kind of subjective

assign to him.^^^ Only this one question remains: does the notion

of a "necessary" substratum independent of the observer "save"
that abyss?

In this section

suppositions of

modern

I

want

to consider further the (often

him from

only implicit)

linguistic analysis that give rise to this notion of

an

ineffable, yet constraining substratum.

Maturana,

like other intuitionists of form, denies the observer all

contact with an "objective" reality on the basis of the constitutive inability of
the observer to "attend-to-without-altering"^04 something.
the

one possible exception
while

observer.

it

of the substratum, "pre-exists

its

No

distinction

follows that the activity of the observer

may

descriptive, prescriptive or even radically constructive one, rarely

suggested that
the

in Pols' phrase, a "radically creative one."i^^

knower produces

what he
the

it is,

or constructs

what

is

with

thing,

by an

be a

is it

That

known, but only on the

is

to say,

basis of

or she does not produce. Pols refers to that content which serves as

raw material
So

it

for a construction as the "nonpropositional."^07

seems

abandonment

that in the context of intuitionist thought

of the

"myth of the empirically given"^08

Maturana and Varela:1988:133-4.
Pols:1986:23.

Maturana;1988a:45.
106 pols:1986:23; emphasis added.

Ibid:24.

Sellars:1963:126.
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all talk

— with

its

about the

implication that nothing

is

given

mind

to inspecting

—

is

a distortion:

intuitionism requires that everything acknowledged as real should be
inspectable as given, whether presented to

mind

true?

familiar to constructivists

Sellars' essentially

realists alike:

mind

is

Kantian point

is

or created

never altogether passive to the data,

by

Is

it.

when

the

myth

and

everything

inspected will have been classified or ordered by us already.i09 Sellars (unlike
Peirce^ ^0) never denies that something

We

can

few examples

a

list

is,

of the

given for inspection.

finally,

ways

which the nonpropositional

in

may be

given to the knower:

known

via the imposition of (propositional) form;

production of paradigms
pragmatically coped

(1)

it is

with."*^^

This

are

it

new

permits"

bound above

—

their

— the nonpropositional —

all

else to preserve

often

is

what Pols

given to be

(2)

given to stimulate the
of;

sense of the given

from radical idealism.^^2 Yet

empirical stimulus

(3)

nevertheless independent

substratum that "permits what
intuitionists

given for worldmaking;

and

—

meant

like

Maturana's

to "rescue" these

commitment

is

given to be

(4)

to this ineffable,

hardly genuine, since they

refers to as the notion of

"linguistic enclosure":

The items

or entities entertained by rationality

knows. ..are

literally

it

propositional (or linguistic) not just
directed upon a complex of propositions such

rationality entertains

is

when

rationality

(say a

body

when

(before philosophy intervenes)

is

when

and merely propositions. But what

of theory) or

upon

a single proposition, but also

See Weissman:1987a:114.

Peirce:1965;133.

Pols:1986:24.

ibid:24.
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it

supposes

itself to

be

directed,

by way of the

senses,

upon some

"item" or "items". ..or

"world" whose nature or natures, as entertained, are not
propositional.... Alternatively: rational experience is
linguistic.

precisely their acceptance of this notion of enclosure that leads

It is

linguistically-minded intuitionists to say that realism
”break[ing] out of discourse to an arche

beyond

somehow

requires
the

discourse."'*

same

vein, having rejected every realist interpretation of reference as a impossible

word-world

more than

relation,

"social

Rorty suggests that truth and knowledge are nothing

phenomena," or propositions-brought-forward-in-

defense-of-other-propositions."^^^ Since language
a social matter, linguistic enclosure

is

by definition

is,

in the long

run

social enclosure,

at least,

and the

very nature of truth becomes merely the agreement of a community of
language-users. Maturana seems to agree:
Since everything that is said is said by an observer to another
observer, and since objects (entities, things) arise in language,

we

cannot operate with objects (entities, things) as if they existed
outside the distinctions of distinctions that constitute them....
Through language we remain in language, and we lose the
substratum as soon as we attempt to language it.^^^

We may now

identify

more

precisely

why

the substratum just as he attempts to speak of
"ineffable empirical stimulus,"

it.

it is

that

Maturana

According

whenever we attend

"loses"

to the notion of

rationally to "objects" or

on the "myth of the given" with this comment on the
of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short,
awareness
relation of thought and language: "...all
is a linguistic
indeed, all awareness, even of particulars
all awareness of abstract entities
Ibid:25.

Sellars follows

up

his attack

—

—

affair"

(Sellars:1963:160).

Sellars:1963:196.

Quoted

in Pols:1986:25.

Maturana:1988a:44-6.
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"things" of the

world

(the nonpropositional), the rationality of our focus

arrives only at the propositional

Everything else enters only

outcome

of

its

own

constructive activity.

at "sub-rational level:"

The nature

of the insistent presence of the nonpropositional [the
substratum in Maturana's case] in the propositional outcome of
the formative, or constructive, power of our (empirically

engaged) rationality cannot be rationally expressed.

So the structure
nonpropositional

is

(if it

has such) of the nonpropositional qua

not available to the rational observer.

Indeed, although

said to "function as a stimulus to cognitive progress,"”*

it is

nonpropositional substratum remains ineffable in
as just noted,

any structure that

may have on

it

at least

its

own

the

two

senses.

First,

remains outside the

possible scope of our rational awareness and, therefore, our language.

cannot express in language what

is

We

extra-linguistically the case: "without

language and outside language there are no

objects."^

Second, and

this

point follows immediately from the preceding one, the nonpropositional

remains ineffable not only

way

which

in

it

in respect of its character,

but also in respect of the

could serve as a stimulus to rational awareness.

that philosophers

who

are

committed

It

follows

to the notion of linguistic enclosure

should
they wish to speak of reality they must use
the word only in a Pickwickian sense. They should be content
with a propositional "reality," a rationally-formed "reality," a

acknowledge

that

if

l^^Pols:1986:27.

Notable exan’iples include: the "inaccessible raw material of Goodman s
worldmaking," the "paradigm-independent stimuli" of Kuhn, the "substratum of Maturana,
and the "materia prima" of Edmond Wright (see also Pols:1986:27, and Wright:1986:15).
lbid:28.

Maturana:1988a:38.
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linguistic "reality";

and should give up any claim

to reality tout

court, reality without qualificationd^o
4.5

The World
The

of Experience

constructivist response to the skeptical challenge

is

to give

notion of truth as correspondence with an observer-independent

That sort of correspondence relation
there

is

no conceivable way

"presumed

to

is

that

check our knowledge against a world

to

constructivist rejection of realism, therefore,
is

the

reality.

we suppose

ruled out of order as

be lying beyond our experiential

that that doctrine

up

a incoherent

one and

interface."^2i

xhe

radical

mimics Putnam's suggestion

"for

Him

alone"; or that realism

requires "access to a world that does not involve our experiencing

it."^22

Yet radical constructivism, internal and empirical realism, as well as

Maturana's theory of structure determinism,

all

seem

have claimed

to

themselves an alternative "world" or reality that does not seem

knowing

subject to exceed the data.

attention to data that

is

given

.

Intuitionists, that

The "world"

"world of experience." That world

may

is,

that results

for

to require the

restrict their

is

often called the

be a Kantian one deriving from

mind's inspection of a complex of phenomena schematized or conceptualized
at the

moment

of our inspecting

phenomena not

it;

or

it

may be

constituted of an array of

requiring that conceptualization because of being intelligible

Pols:1986:28. Pols suggests that the even the ex-realist

Putnam

is

searching for an

unqualified, rather than merely a Pickwickian or relativized-to-a-language, reality, as he
considers the "extra theoretic ideal" towards which theories (as "successive approximations to
a correct description")

converge

(lbid:28).

von Glasersfeld:1989d:2.
Indeed, von Glasersfeld credits Vico with making explicit the relation
between God's works and the pretensions of realism: "God alone can know the real world,
what
because it was He who created it; the human knower, analogously, could know only
humans have constructed" (von Glasersfeld:1989a:4).
Salinas:1989:2.

132

in themselves, as Plato s
a

Forms are given

We

to nous.

confront the given in

continuum of ways, ranging from passive regard through

active

prescription of form, eventually arriving at the most radically
idealist stance:
construction.

We now

turn to these several

together with their implicit accounts of

suggestion

is

its

of regarding the given,

relative

autonomy. Our

the following: the intuitionist claim that

mind-independent world follows from

knowledge

ways

we

"cannot know" the

that method's reduction of

to the inspection of a given:

Everything that might be known will have to be brought before
our inspecting minds.... But then something must be given, or
there will be nothing at all, meaning nothing to know and
nothing that is.^^^
4.5.1

The Inspectable Given

A

method's ontology specifies the

which the method

applies. ^^4

j

assume

psychological assumptions, too, as

capable of using that method.

I

we

least features of those things to

that every

method

this

will not

add

to

what was

which particular

I

will ignore for the

intuitionist ontologies

may

of content will be different in important
of

form

(2.4.1).

that they

all

differ, as

My

common

^24 ibid:Ch4.
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features of

most part the ways

Hume's

Those differences are undeniable, yet incidental

123 vV0issman:1987a:115.

II

concern for the

ways from Maturana's

identify reality with an inspectable given:

mind

said in chapter

chapter will be to identify some of the

the various intuitionist ontologies.

have

try to specify the features of the

about those psychological assumptions of intuitionism.

remainder of

will

in

intuitionism
intuitionism
to

my

claim

Every

intuitionist supposes that there is something, be it
sensory
data, thought, words, or sentences, which fills the mind
as we
think or perceive the world. No matter that philosophers
differ

in the

words they use

to signify this act,

whether they call it
perceiving, reading, acquaintance, conceiving, or apprehending.
Their point is the same: Some content is presented, inspected,
and seen
hence, known.

—

4. 5. 1.1

The Least Features

How
any given

is it

I

it

The Given

when

and

(b)

a given that has

differentiations

intrinsic character of

mind

no

chapter that the given

intelligible character in

and order are projected onto
its

is

either presented or

These two options mark the distinction

advance of the time

it,

and one

that has

some

own. These are the positions endorsed by the

intuitionists of content like

(or

(a)

manifest, or present to a mind.

prescriptivist intuitionists (or constructivists)

side,

von

Hume,

Glasersfeld,

respectively.

language) creates the things set before

it,

Maturana and

On

and on the

the one
other, they

are merely given to us in

some unexplained way. The common element

both perspectives, and of

all

intelligibility of

that the given

for

as Differentiated

at the start of this

Putnam, and

two requirements

thought or perceived: the given will be

in itself,

presentable to inspecting mind.

between

inspectable? There are

is

may be

and ordered

noted

Every Inspectable Given

that the given

in order that

differentiated
4. 5. 1.1.1

of

of

those middle-way positions that would have the

perceptual data founded only partly on the mind's activity,

is,

necessarily, differentiated

and ordered

if it is

to

is

be the object

of inspection.

Maturana
"unity."

We

is

emblematic as

we

consider in this regard his notion of

recall that the operations of distinction of

125 ibid:159.
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an observer produce

simple or composite "unities" as entities delimited from a background
(section 3.4).

This "sole necessary condition for existence in any given

domain" provides

of the necessary differentiation of the unities that

all

function as Maturana's inspectable givend^s

An

observer may distinguish in the praxis of living two kinds of
simple and composite unities. A simple unity is a unity
brought forth in an operation of distinction that constitutes it as
unities,

a

whole by specifying

of interactions in the

its

properties as a collection of dimensions

medium

in

which

A

distinguished....

it is

composite unity is a unity distinguished as simple unity that
through further operations of distinction is decomposed by the
observer into components that through their composition
would constitute the original simple unity in the domain in

which
4. 5. 1.1. 2

it is

distinguished.

The Given

as

In addition to

Ordered

its

differentiation, a recognizable given will

ordered spatially or temporally so that
spatial relations

single

between

a

all

it

exists

generate in

A

fully

its

and the

its

medium

(for

Every unity

example, a

is,

therefore,

properties the space in

phenomenal domain which

it

may

interactions with other unities.

is

differentiated

and ordered

brought under a coordinating system or
book, that coordinating logic

more

be

comprehensible given requires one further integrating

measure: That which

(or,

its

to

parts are perspicuous, as the

of both.

simple unity that defines through

which

its

Maturanian unity and

page within a book) are constitutive
...a

see

of

have

may be

totality.

in space or time

must be

In the case of Maturana's

the constitutive ability of the observer to

radically, to create) the singular

Maturana;1980a:96.

Maturana:1988a:12.

Maturana:1980a:xix.
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book

as a

composite unity of

many

pages.

The

intuitionist conditions for a differentiated

given guarantee these two things;
available for inspection;

first,

and second,

that there will be

that

all

and ordered

some content

of that content will be

inspectable.

They

are to assure that the given will be visible so that there is
something.. .to be thought or perceived. Equally important, they
are meant to assure that nothing is hidden.’i29

Maturana's intuitionism of form clearly provides
results.

we

First,

marks the

any domain."^30 Maturana has thus

provided for a differentiated and ordered given
its

both of these

recall that the observer's specification of a unity

"sole necessary condition for existence in

observer from

for

— available, moreover,

to the

very inception. Could a portion of the given remain

unavailable because hidden from the observer's view? There can be no such
elusive part, for "without observers nothing

question in another
a given

there

is

After

all,

we

way

whose

to

emphasize

existence

is

exists."’*^^

its realist

bias;

We

"Can

can ask the same
it

happen

independent of the mind inspecting

might

infer

before us that
is

it?"^^^

should not overlook the extra-mental half of Putnam's

metaphor; the mind, together with the world, creates both, he

We

that

it

says.

from the regularity of something's appearance
does exist

when we

are not perceiving

it,

but that

only speculation. The inference might be mistaken.

Intuitionism abhors speculation, preferring that the only reality
to which it lays claim is the one set before it. Esse es percipi, it
says. Nothing can exist if it is not given to thought or

129 vVcissman:1987a:159.

Maturana:1980a:96.

Maturana:1988a:47.
132 vVeissman:1987a;162.
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perception.

This

the idealist core within the intuitionist

is

ontology.^33
I

suppose that

this intuitionism represents the

more abiding emphasis

within Putnam's recent work;^34 one that would place knowledge of an
already differentiated manifold in God's

put in another way.

If

mind

This

alone.

the essential complementarity of

not to be construed as simply a form of solipsism, then
there

is,

at the

very

least, a partially differentiated

source in the

its

mind

mind and world

is

we must suppose

and ordered manifold

world) awaiting the contribution of mind. Otherwise,
credited to the given has

same point can be

all

that
(or

of the reality

that thinks

it;

and the world

is

rendered an unknowable, inaccessible thing-in-itself.
It is

meaningless, in

my

view, to say that something exists or

is real,

while having no possible idea of the properties which might supply
identity.

That

is

dissertation that a

I

have emphasized throughout

this

world populated with such things-in-themselves

is

but an

Such a world can no more form an irreducible part

idle addition to idealism.

of

why

the reason

its

Putnam's well-known metaphor, than the ineffable substratum can save

Maturana from solipsism.

I

suspect, moreover, that this will be the

common

result of every intuitionist attempt to describe the essential reciprocity of the

knower and

the

known.

We

saw

in chapter

method, mind and ontology lends support
(section 2.3. 1.2).

Intuitionists ever since

II

how

to Descartes'

have faced,

similar "reciprocal containment" problem.

lbid:162-3.

See Putnam:1987; 1981.
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the essential reciprocity of

We

to

psychologism

paraphrase Quine, a

should discuss

why

this

happens before taking up,
given

finally, that other least feature of the
intuitionist

— that the given be present in

4. 5. 1.1. 2.1

its

entirety to a mind.

The Reciprocal Containment Problem: Quine

Quine himself often

vacillates

between realism and operationism

as

he

considers the implications of the reciprocal containment of ontological
theory

and method

for his theory of "surface irritations."i35

On

hand (and

the one

focusing on the idea that method determines ontology) he speaks

pragmatically of the physical objects of science as "irreducible posits

comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer."^36 other times
focusing on the reverse containment

— he remains committed

"unregenerate realism" and declares: "For
objects

and not

otherwise. "^37

Maturana,

is

in

Homer's gods; and

Why

I

my

part

consider

it

I

to the

to

do.. .believe in physical

a scientific error to believe

does Quine change his story? Above

committed

— and

all

else he, like

notion of "linguistic enclosure":

What comes

of the association of sentences with sentences
vast verbal structure which, primarily as a whole is

multifariously linked to non-verbal stimulations.

is

a

These links

same sentences are so
turn with one another and with further sentences

attach to separate sentences. ..but the

bound up

in

that the non-verbal attachments themselves

way under

the strain. In an obvious

way

stretch or give

this structure of

a single connected fabric including

interconnected sentences
all sciences, and indeed everything
is

may

world. ^38

Quine:1967:271-2.
^36 Quine;1980:44.

137Quine:1981:44-72.

lbid:12.
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we

ever say about the

Quine wants

to

provide within language for the organization and

may be

existence of everything that

credited to our world.

ch oice of predicates that determines what
will

be said

to exist only

if it

we

It is

only our

will find there, as

something

can be specified by a bound variable connecting

it

to that "vast verbal structure" of language.

Quine has said, is only the value of a bound variable,
though he adds that quantified sentences occur within a network

Existence,

of other sentences so that it is not quantification alone but also
the relation of a quantified sentence to the other sentences of a
theory which secures our right to make the existence claims.

Language
thinkable.

is,

instrument for making the world
the measure as it chooses one or another

in all of this, the

Mind

is

semantical framework.
4. 5. 1.1. 2. 2

The Hermeneutic

Also opposed

to

my

Circle

naturalism

would have human inquiry

that version of hermeneutics that

is

forever trapped in a "circle" of interpretation

—

implying the perfect reciprocity of ones' ontological commitments and
chosen method. In contrast

to the

work

of Dilthey

— who attempts to

incorporate realism into his hermeneutics, or theory of understanding^'^o

some hermeneuticists

call for a

—

recognition of the fundamental

"groundlessness" of our experience. They would suggest, along with Putnam,
that our experience of the

world

is

neither a subjective, nor objective

affair:

not just constructed at our whim, for that would be
to assume that there is a starting point we can choose from:
inside first. [2] It also shows that reality cannot be understood as
[1]... reality is

139 vVeissman:1987a:284-5.
Dilthey relics on an "inner/outer" dichotomy in defining understanding: we call the
process by which we recognize some inner content from signs received by the senses

understanding " (Dilthey:1979;248).
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given and that
for that

would

we

are to perceive

also be to

assume

it and pick it up, as a recipient,
a starting point; outside firstd'i^

Like Dilthey, Varela invokes the concept of interpretation in his

attempt to understand experience, but

this

time from a perspective that

purports to "go beyond" the positions of idealism and realismd42 But does

Considering

[1]

Varela clearly wants to distance himself from any idealism

would have

that

the objects of the world

nature on our minds.

[2] is

depend

may

suffer

assuming

dependent,

we have

unscathed. Varela confuses the fact that

(interpret, explain, observe) in order to obtain

i.e.,

...when

dependent

we

he follows

that

"picture" theory of

from these statements, the kind of realism

the world, with the idea that

its

existence

to

knowledge
been

we must do
any knowledge

what we discover about the world

for

and

an unschematized given

While some version of a naive

is left

something

for their existence

more complex. Let us assume

Sellars in rejecting the positivist notion of

experience.

it?

and nature, on

is

essentially

that activity:

follow the guiding thread of circularity and

its

we may

look at that quandary from a different
perspective: that of participation and interpretation, where the
subject and object are inseparably meshed. This interdependence

natural history,

revealed to the extent that nowhere can I start with a pure
account of either one, and wherever I choose to start is like a
fractal that only reflects back precisely what I do: to describe it. By
this logic, we stand in relation to the world as in a mirror that
does not tell us how the world is: neither does it tell us how it is
not. It reveals that it is possible to be the way we are being, and
to act the way we have acted. It reveals that our experience is

is

viable.

Varela:1984:322;

numbers

in brackets

mine.

^42 Varela:1986:14.

ibid;322.
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of

My
that the

known

criticisms of hermeneutics are not

knowing

meant

process.

"participation

deny the obvious

subject "participates" in the determination of

(a logical necessity), or that interpretation is

knowing

to

and

Where

I

disagree with Varela

He wants

to

move from

in the abrupt

is

is

an integral part of the

interpretation" to the idea that the subject

"inseparably meshed."

what

fact

and

object are

support

of a world view beyond the split between us and
where knowledge and its world are as inseparable as the
inseparability between perception and action.^'^^
...the possibility

it,

Let us concentrate, then, on the injunction to view knowledge and

world as inseparable. In a certain sense,
in previous chapters.
realists

do not

means only

No

we have

already admitted

unconceptualized access to the world
In other words,

try to "speak the unspeakable."

to underline the fact that nature

is

if

this

He goes on

But of course

this is

much

possible:

Varela

— the external world — and our

thoughts about nature mutually interact and effect one another, then
in full agreement.^

its

not

all

that Varela

means

we

are

to assert.

to say:

In this

middle-way view, what we do

is

what we know, and

ours is but one of many possible worlds. It
the world, but the laying down of a world..

is

not a mirroring of

Ibid:14.

As we have noted on many

occasions,

it is

a

common objection

to realism that that position

with an
calls for the (obviously impossible) task of comparing our representations
of theory with
mind^ependence
the
of
unconceptualized reality. That would be the conflation
represents the confusion of the
nature from
independence of nature from mind with the independence of our thoughts about
of the real from
independence
mind. And in Ruben's words, it is not the causal but the essent ial
the

mind-dependence

of reality.

our activity and thoughts that
^46

we

Or

alternatively,

it

are concerned with (Ruben:1977:76).

Varela:1986:14.
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This, again, represents an equivocal use of the

between constructing many possible theories
[construct theories in this case]

The Given
I

and ordered.
exist";

i.e.,

given in

its

we do
or

.

that every intuitionist given

Is it true, in

world ("what

Mind

as Present to a

have argued

of the

alternating

what we know") and constructing

is

creating ("laying down") the world
4.5. 1.2

word world,

is

necessarily differentiated

addition, that the given exists only

entirety to thought or perception?

if it is

That

is

"seen to

the

implication of Maturana's version of esse es percipi "nothing pre-exists
:

distinction. "^'^7

q£ every intuitionist, as they

gyj-

hope

its

to eliminate

every chance of error by limiting reality to those things to which they have

unmediated

Maturana

access.

should in

is

paradigmatic:

apply the notion of reality to this very
which we, the describing system,
interact with our descriptions as if with independent entities.
...we

domain

fact

of descriptions in

von Glasersfeld, too

(despite his misunderstanding of the independence

dimension of realism),
term

is

prepared

to

change the meaning and referent of the

"reality:"

taken seriously [constructivist principles] are incompatiWe
with the traditional notions of knowledge, truth and objectivity,
and they require a radical reconstruction of one's concept of
reality. Instead of an inaccessible realm beyond perception and

If

cognition,
live

it

now becomes

the experiential world

in.'*49

Maturana:1988a:45.

Maturana:1980a:51-2; emphasis added,

von Glasersfeld:1989d:5.
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we

actually

go as minds alternately
it is

reflect

upon

or ignore those "worlds"?

I

suspect that

only as intuitionist philosophers choose to ignore their method's

ontology that such questions seem to go away.
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between knower and known pushed

to its logical extreme; naive

acquaintance (Hume) and prescriptivism (Kant) with regard to the given

move

ineluctably toward the

more complete

regarding or searching within the given

constructivism.

is still

not a

even determine the character of

ability to create or

Kant's prescriptivist intuitionism claims only that

ground

for the existence

all

that

credited with the
is

given to

it,

as

mind organizes and

Now language

unifies the (unschematized) data received.^^z

the necessary

mind

mind

Before, a

and character

or thought are

of every other thing:

mind, individually or corporately, creates the given from materials of

its

own

making. ^53
This Berkeleyian consequence of adopting the intuitionist method has

two consequences. The

first is that

nothing uninspectable can

exist.

We

say

with Braithwaite, for instance, that natural laws have no reality apart from
their applications:

made up of empirical facts with the addition
what we call the laws of nature are
conceptual devices by which we organize our empirical

The world

is

not

of

the laws of nature;

knowledge and predict
Second

the future.i^'^

— and possibly more unsettling —

yet currently uninspected things

and predominantly
of

all

is

fail to exist

atheistic philosophers

the implication that inspectable

as well.

How

will

contemporary

provide for the enduring existence

those things not currently being thought or perceived? Does everything

within our

many

"experiential worlds" or "descriptive domains"

^^2 ibid:179.

Ibid:179.

Braithwaitc:1964:339.
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come and

In chapter

II

we

traced the

modern

roots of this intuitionist result to

Descartes' cogito. In the absence of God’s guarantee, Descartes’
existence, like

the existence of every other thing,

is

conditional

upon

its

being manifest

to

Descartes’ mind;
I

am,

exist, that is certain.

I

how

But

often? Just

when

might possibly be the case if I ceased entirely
should likewise cease altogether to exist.^^^

for

It is all

it

the

more

and Maturana’s

plausible

now

von

to see

all-inclusive "descriptive

I

think;

to think, that

I

Glasersfeld’s "experiential reality"

domain"

as simply

two

solipsistic

"worlds" arising out of these contemporary reformulations of Descartes’
criterion for existence.

Yet these theorists are hardly alone in

every

supposes

intuitionist
...that

it

own

Descartes’ criterion for his

for every existing thing: each of

that

this, as

exists

minds.

It is

because of having

them

it

existence
exists

is

the standard

only as

we know

directly before our inspecting

not surprising, therefore,

when Hume

reduces the

existence of things to the force and vivacity of our impressions,

when Kant identifies existence with the vivacity and
coherence of those "objects" which are visible to the mind which
has made them, or when Quine argues that existence is the
value of a bound variable. Each of these solutions satisfies the
demand that existence be ascribed to only those things which are
constituted by the manner of their appearance before our minds.
But then it also follows that nothing exists unless it is directly
inspectable in this way, where mind’s ability for confirming that
it knows something is a condition for the very existence of the

or

thing known.

To

the extent that

we

allow the conditions for knowledge to subsume

the conditions for existence, the

existence of things. This

is

mind becomes responsible

very

the intuitionist passion for closing the gap

Dcscartes:1955:99.

HI

for the

Weissman:1987a:165.
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CHAPTER

5

THE ONTOLOGY OF HYPOTHESIS:
POSSIBILITY AND ACTUALITY
5.1

Introduction
In the last chapter

we saw how

the intuitionist identification of reality

with the inspectable given has the

effect of

knowledge

mind

to

some

feature of the

reducing every possible object of

that thinks

example, as von Glasersfeld's skeptical rejection of

it.

all

This was the result, for

mediated access

observer-independent world compels him to replace the term
"experiential reality" (section 4.2).

observer-independent world

to

know

In chapter
illusions,

I

Experience

is

is

this

an

with

very

the proper

merely the activity by which

the world.
III,

while discussing Maturana's treatment of perceptual

implied that his anti-realism represents an "overreaction" to the

skeptical challenge.

This

is,

admittedly, a relative notion, yet one that

receives support both from arguments designed to
that challenge (section 3.5), as well as

that the

"reality"

it is

— and not experience — which

object of the theory of knowledge.

we come

Yet realists suppose that

to

world

is

show

the scientific roots of

from our naturalism.

We refuse

exhausted by, or even conditional upon, our experience:

who do say it worry that our knowledge is precarious,
unless we bridge the gap between mind and the world by

Those

form from the world into mind. This is panic
turned grandiose, though the world does not require that we
create it, or even that we make it thinkable, if there is a form
intrinsic to the world.... There may be only these two choices: a
world having an intrinsic but discoverable form of its own; or a
displacing

to say

all

of
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world, better called "experience" which mind creates as
project thinkable form onto sensory datad

While acknowledging
against a thoroughgoing

some

that

of

phenomenology

that the intuitionist description of the

what

I

have said

of experience,^

knowing

I

will not count

persist in saying

process, as carrying us

further than our "experiential world," fails as a substitute for

the world

itself.

Only the

latter takes

we

up the challenge

no

knowledge

of

showing how our

of

thoughts and words might have reference to a world whose character and
existence are independent of the fact that

Experience

is

experience"^

we may

think or talk about

it.

not the object of knowledge, and the constructivist "world of
is

simply a misleading metaphor.

This chapter, which

is

by

far the

most speculative of

all,

concerns the

ontology of our alternative to intuitionism: the method of hypothesis. This
is

a

method

the creation or discovery of a
relies

and

any notion of the object

that categorically rejects

on language

mind

that either attends to

to determine, via

relations of the world.

and communication

We

its

I)

knowledge

own

as

contents or

sort of "imposition," the properties

admit that language

(see chapter

sense notion that language, in

some

its

of

is vital

without having to

reportorial

to

our survival

reject the

and most common

common
use,

represents states of affairs independent of language and thought.

Here
that

is

is

the

first

problem

of our ontology:

independent of language come

^

Weissman:1989a:545.

^

Though am not convinced
I

to

that such a position

does a state of

be represented

would be

See Weissman:1989b;22-4.
^

How

von Glasersfeld:1989d:5.
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in language,

at all plausible, or

affairs

i.e..

even describable.

become

We

the object of knowledge?

begin with

this

modal

interpretation of

Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and truth-d
...the facts in logical space are possibilities; every possibility is
expressible in a state of affairs and in the sentence which
represents that state of affairs; the co-expression of a possibility

in a state of affairs

relation

We

which

is

and

a sentence results in that correspondence

truth.^

say that sentences represent states of affairs by expressing the very

possibilities instantiated in those states of affairs.

and Platonic reading

follows from this modal

of Wittgenstein that both sentences

are expressions of a possibility

which

is

account will differ from Wittgenstein's

assume

It

and

states of affairs

distinguishable from them. Yet
in

two

that possibilities are both separable

essential ways.^ First,

I

and distinguishable from

my

will
their

particular instantiations in language or actual states of affairs. Wittgenstein,
in contrast,

does not allow for the

reality of possibles,

instantiation in sentences or states of affairs;

independent of

While the world

is

their

exhausted by

"the facts in logical space" (1.13), "[njothing in the province of logic can be

merely possible"

(2.0121).^

Rejecting Wittgenstein's restriction on his realism,

be these other, "eternal"

more determinate

(or logical) possibilities

expressions.

And

which

we assume

exist apart

there to

from

their

second, our reformulation of

Wittgenstein's facts in logical space as properties existing as possibilities

allows us to reject as empirically unfounded the isomorphism implied by the

^

Wittgenstein:1971.

^ Wcissman:1977:57-8.

lbid:55-6.

^ Wittgenstein;1963.
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idea that a sentence represents a state of affairs by "picturing"

maps

of the

world generally are no mere likenesses of the

it,

just as

our

terrain they

represent.
5.2 Wittgenstein

on Material

Possibility

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's picture theory suggests a

modal

Platonism as a means of solving the problem of knowledge; where both the
content of our propositional knowledge (our "pictures") and that which they
are said to mirror (states of affairs) are expressions of one and the

same form:

"A picture has logico-pictorial form

in

As each displays

both of them a sentence comes

a

common

form

to

represent a state of affairs external to

common

it.

with what

That form

it

depicts"

a universal

is

—

(2.2).

to
a "fact in

logical space."

Wittgenstein's skepticism about the reality of properties existing as
possibles

is

We

a

view

that

he shares with many philosophers:

are physicalists or phenomenologists, with

them

no place

in either

mentioned. Even their
characterization as "logical" misleads us, given one or the other
of these ontological persuasions, for logic is understood as a set
of rules, not as the principles of order expressed in every domain
of being, including language, music and physics. Logical
of

for the possibilities just

possibilities are, this implies, the

not entities of any

shadows

cast

by

rules; they are

sort.^

In particular, Wittgenstein

would

prefer to eliminate universals in favor of

the internal properties or material conditions of objects, especially their

combinatorial powers.

It

follows that the reality of a state of affairs

exhausted by the internal properties

(or forms) of individual

^ Ibid.

^ Wcissman:1989b;86.
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and

is

particular

"substances" (or objects):

"If all

same time

objects are given, then at the

possible states of affairs are given" (2.0124).^^

Weissman

all

reconstructs

Wittgenstein’s argument as follows:

Objects and names do sometimes assemble into configurations,
because, among other reasons, they can do so; their
configurations are the sure sign of prior capacities. These

and names are their
"essence." It is because of essence that objects and names contain
the possibility of all situations (2.014). Every one of the
possibilities in logical space "must be part of the nature of the
object" (2.0123). If all objects and names are given, then all

capacities, the internal properties of objects

possible states of affairs are also given; latent form, the possibility
of form, is identical with the fact that objects and names have
internal properties qualifying

them

to

combine with one

another.

These remarks clearly suggest that Wittgenstein's reduction of
possibilities in logical space (forms) to the "essence" of objects has the effect of

limiting the real to the properties of particular objects
possibilities to material ones.^^

that

one or more of

its

it

First,

possible,

objects.

static,

eternal

we mean

Wittgenstein's theory of objects

cannot account for the structural, or

dynamic, properties of

is

material conditions are satisfied. This result

problematic in two respects.
in that

Saying that any event

and reducing

is

is

flawed

as well as dispositional, or

While Wittgenstein does

talk

configurations, this structural (or external) aspect of objects

is

about their

rendered

Wittgenstein;1963.

Weissman:1977:61.
possibility
often say that a sentence represents (or a state of affairs is) a material
either (i)
are
occurrence
its
for
when we suppose that some of the material, causal conditions
not
while
conditions,
material
present; eg., "Snow is possible;" or (ii) projected, i.e., these

12

conditions, eg..
necessarily present, could be formed from the combination of existing

possible that 10 feet of

snow

will fall this

summer."

See Weissman;! 977:64; 1965:187-90.

150

It is

obsolete by his identification of the essence of objects with their internal
properties (or dispositions).

What would be

the relation of objects, as "pure

potentiality,"!^ to their possible structural configurations?

assume

that all objects will

have both

(dispositional, internal) properties,

We

normally

static (structural, external)

where possession

and dynamic

of the former

is

a

necessary condition for an object having properties (or "powers") of the
sort.

We

fashion

is

latter

suppose, for example, that having a brain organized in a particular
a necessary feature of every being capable of philosophical

reflection, just as the

proper functioning of a pencil rests on

structure (mass and shape) of a certain sort.

It is

objects are not so constrained, existing prior to

Their configuration, moreover,

potentiality.

is

its

having a

clear that Wittgenstein's

any configuration as pure
purely "accidental" and not,

therefore, a necessary condition for having dispositions;
...Wittgenstein has not

proved

that objects

configurations; there seems to be

no

must

participate in

a priori reason against

saying that an object might, like a wholly inert gas, never join

Moreover, these external properties
result as objects are configured; they are no substitute for the
structural properties that are required if objects are to have their

others in configuration.

internal properties.!^

Second,

we

recall that Wittgenstein's reduction of eternal possibilities

to material

ones was

substance.

Since that account does not

to receive

support from his account of objects or

make room

properties of those objects, that reduction

now

for the

world were

fails.

for the structural, internal

Nothing seems

form of which true sentences and actual
to

Ibid:63.
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provide

states of affairs in the

be co-expressions. As Wittgenstein denies the

Weissman:! 977:63.

to

reality of

universals, the purported isomorphism of a sentence

reduces to mere likeness. This

is

and a

documented

the well

state of affairs

failure of

Wittgenstein's picture theory of knowledge: sentences and states of affairs

generally do not share the same form.

Is

there

some

other

way

of thinking

about possibilities that avoids having to refer to eternally existing

states of

affairs?
5.3 Properties Existing as Possibilities
It is

commonly assumed

that every legitimate use of possibility

is

reducible to a variety of material possibility. Typically, candidates for that

reduction

by

fall

into

one of these three categories:

their dispositions to interact

with one another;

(such as natural laws and linguistic rules); or

possibilities

(3)

Each of these are meant

(intentional objects).

by construing them

Our suggestion

is

(1) (efficient)

(2)

causes qualified

regulative principles

forms of mental intending

to explain the nature of

as material possibilities.

that there remains this other use of possibility, saying

that there exist logical possibilities for a certain property or set of properties.

The

actually existing or projected material conditions that undergird

through

(3)

above

will

existing as possibilities
for instantiation.

be

strictly irrelevant to the reality of these properties

and marking

These

"definite differences eternally available

possibilities are universals, a realist rendering of

Wittgenstein's "possibilities for form" or "facts in logical space."

Wittgenstein,

we

(1)

will argue that these universals exist ante

Ibid:72-79.

Ibid:70.

Ibid:1977:79.
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rem

Contra
as

possibilities; possibilities available,

How

of affairs.
reality is

will

we

acknowledged

moreover, for instantiation in actual

states

account for the reality of these universal? Their
in principles

independent of the natural laws and

having application to the world
linguistic rules

upon which they have

regulative force: the principles of non-contradiction and plenitude.

The Principle

5.3.1

It is

in

of Non-contradiction

generally accepted that the principle of non-contradiction operates

thought and language as a ineliminable formation rule or regulative

principle, specifying a least condition for coherence

A

.

If

that

were not the

case,

—

sentence and its negation are then co-assertible
both p and
not p
so that we may affirm that the principle of noncontradiction is and is not suspended. How could that be true,
short of ambiguity in what we intend by "suspended"?
Evidently, the principle operates in language as an ineliminable

—

rule of special force.^^

Here, the ontology of hypothesis

and suppose

up our ontology with

there" in the world,

Why

world

not go one step further

itself,

violate the principle of

application to the world

in

and thought? Those who would agree with

responses are in order.

fact of the principle's force

economy

(supposedly) account for the force of those

statement might adopt the maxim: "In ontology, the

Two

outside of thought

abstract principles supposedly operating "out

when we can

principles within language
last

daring:

that the principle has force in the

and language? Or do we simply
cluttering

is

First,

and

trivially, there is

less the better."20

no inference from the

within thought and language to

itself.

Second,

why

Ibid:81.

Dcvitt and Sterclny:1989:228.
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this

its

non-

not consider what would follow

from denying

any force

its

in the

application there, imagining that the principle

fails to

exert

world outside of thought and language?^^ Weissman

comments:

One

result will be that everything, for any respect in which it is
considered, both is and is not. This is true whether we construe
"is" to signify existence or predication. Whatever exists will, for
that very reason, also fail to exist, for if not, not both
p and not p,
then both p and not p; it will exist and not exist. If red is one of
its

attributes, then

This

first

result

is

it

will also be not-red.2^

what Weissman

calls the "both.. .and..." principle

according to which everything both

is

property;23 everything in that world

would both be

and

is

not an instance of any particular
a ferret

and not

a ferret,

four-legged and not four-legged. Yet our reluctance to admit co-existing
contradictories into the world leads us immediately to this second result: the

organizing principle of that world
reflections

on the

first

is

now

"neither. ..nor...,"

principle lead us to suspect that the

exclude one another, so that no thing

is

where our
two

contradictories

either four-legged or not-four-

legged.

We

normally suppose that items occurring in the world are
differentiated from one another in respect to their differing
properties. But on the first principle there is no way to
distinguish them, because everything would have and not have
every one of a set of contraries, or worse, every property. Were
the second principle to apply, no property would qualify
anything. Where the "both.. .and..." principle entails a world too

On
it

one reading of the claim

follows that contradictions

that the principle "has

may

no

force outside of language or thought,"

actually occur in the world.

Weissman:1977:84.
23 lbid:84.
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rich to imagine, this "neither. ..nor..."

one requires

that the

world

be devoid of character.24
will

I

assume

that neither of these imaginary principles

application to our world.

presupposes what

It

may

be objected that

supposed

it is

reductio that

namely, the applicability of the

to establish;

Have we

principle of non-contradiction to our world.

these

this is a

have

not simply rejected

two imaginary principles because they have resulted

in contraries not

We

admissable on the basis of the principle of non-contradiction?
all

agree that

attempts to demonstrate the necessity of this principle (or any other

principle so elementary) will

the last

word

assuming

shown

We

here, for

we

fail

because of presupposing

need only admit

must accept

is

a choice

have force

in

our world.

We

rest

between two worlds equally strange

that the final step of this

argument

the principle of non-contradiction since

contradiction)

is

not

claim only to have displayed one possible result of

that the principle did not

that the result

Yet that

it.

its

(i.e.,

having

to us.

saying that

we

denial leads to a

would be question-begging, while accepting

the principle as a

useful directive for inquiry.

There

is this

other reason for supposing that the principle of non-

contradiction does have force within the world

language and thought. Non-contradiction
principle of identity everything
:

Alternatively,

and

constituted of

its

in

is

what

itself

rests

it is

and not merely within

on the more fundamental

and not some other

terms of a thing's properties, no thing

is

thing.^^

both

properties and not-constituted of those properties.

be a material claim that helps us locate non-contradiction

24 Ibid:84.
2^ Wcissman:1989b:147.
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in the

This will

world

outside of language, though
its

we

still

will not

have a

logical

demonstration of

necessary application there:
Let us suppose that everything

whether

finite or infinitely

constituted of

is

its

properties,

denumerable, and that properties are

constitutive of each thing's identity.

Contradictions are
generated when we say of any thing that its properties both
include and do not include some particular property or

The thing is just itself,
Not having one or more of them,
properties.

as constituted of

its

properties.

or having other properties

additional to those constituting it would make that thing be
constituted at the same moment by its properties, and by these
same properties plus or minus one or more others.^^

These points suggest the following foundation

for the reality of universals

(properties) existing as eternal possibilities:
...contradiction operates in the

world as

association of properties to one another

a principle limiting the
[i.e.,

the principle of

Its application in thought and language assures that
meaningfully be able to ascribe to the world states of
affairs that already could not obtain there.^^

identity].

we

shall not

Only

this

one qualification remains: the principle of non-contradiction

serves only to determine which properties are free of contradiction. In order
to generate properties existing as possibilities,

further,

complementary assumption

fact possible

5.3.2

whatever

that

is

to introduce the

not contradictory

is

in

— the principle of plenitude.

The Principle
I

we need

of Plenitude

have argued

that

no property

is

possible

if it

violates the principle of

non-contradiction, so that nothing can be said to both have a property

four-legged) and not have that property (not-four-legged).
that a property satisfies the principle

is

Alternatively,

a necessary, but not sufficient.

26 Ibid:147.

22 Ibid:82.
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(eg.,

condition for

its

being a possibility. For any property to be possible

we must

invoke the further, complementary "principle of plenitude" which claims
that

whatever

is

not a contradiction

...something

is

either,

is

a possibility.^® In other

words

though not both, a contradiction or a

It follows now that properties satisfying the principle
of plenitude because they are not contradictions are, necessarily,

possibility.

possibilities. 29

Furthermore, possibilities that necessarily exist can be said
eternally.

As an example, consider

books (presently on the

arrangement of the books
sense.

First,

we

the numerous, yet finite, possible

may be

floor)

will

to exist

arranged on a

shelf.

Any

ways

10

particular

be possible in both a logical and a material

note that the principle of plenitude sanctions any

configuration not admitting of contradictory properties as necessarily, hence
eternally, possible; as

a

row

but

left to right,

also be the third.

books would

it is

possible to have the

it is

titles

not a possibility that the

arranged alphabetically in
first

The properties associated with the
even were

exist as logical possibilities

arrangement, or no arrangement
alphabetical arrangement

is

at all.

Second,

materially possible

I

book

their titles,

to

Wcissman:1977:89-91.
29 Ibid:92.
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will

choose a different

we suppose
whenever

that the

sufficient material
eg.,

the shelf, the

and someone capable

them accordingly.

row

alphabetically arranged

conditions for that state of affairs are present or projected,

books themselves along with

in that

of arranging

Philosophy and The Mind as a Theatre

5.4 First

The notion
world as

it

that the principle of non-contradiction has force in the

sets restrictions

believe, consistent with

on the possible association of properties

Ruth Millikan's

structures, or kinds of natural necessity

are properties

whose

is, I

realist identification of properties as

found

in the natural world.^o

These

character and existence are independent of language or

thought;^^

This structure [of an identity] is exhibited in the refusal of a
property to admit any of its contrary properties onto the ground

any substance it qualifies.... This structure
by the law of non-contradiction.^^
of

It

is

exactly expressed

follows that coherence, or the lack of contradiction in one's set of beliefs,

can serve as a

test of

correspondence between words and the world:

...coherence in thought corresponds to an abstract feature of the
world. The law of non-contradiction reflects the (or a) structure
of being. It is a template of the general structure of world affairs
as it should reflect in thought. ...^^

Both Millikan and Weissman want

to distance their theories

traditional concerns of "first philosophy," according to
role

is

to discover

prior to

important truths a

any empirical or

priori; that

scientific enterprise.

is,

We

by

from the

which philosophy's
reflection alone

and

have had opportunity

to

note that, in particular, traditional epistemology has been overly concerned

with the problem of justifying our knowledge-claims

Millikan:1984:Chl8.

Sec Wcissman:1977:89.
32 Millikan:1984:300.
33 lbid:300-301.
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in a

way

that

would

We

satisfy the skeptic.

mind and
the

its

"mind as

works,

when

activity

should emphasize

now

-

dominates these discussions

a theatre.

view

that a certain

In a very real sense, this

of the

the intuitionist view of

view

of the

mind and

its

not viewed simply as a prop for radical subjectivism, guarantees

that the skeptical challenge will not be met;

There

view
worry

a

is

of the

mind and

of perception that

makes

the

sometimes called, anachronistically,
"the movie-show model" of the mind. The mind, the
conscious self, does not have direct assess to the external world:
its access is via the sense organs.... The mind is like a person
sitting in a movie theatre watching these perceptual impressions
play on a screen. However, there is one crucial difference. The
person can leave the theatre and look outside, but the mind
cannot; it is forever confined to the action on the inner screen.^s

skeptical

Weissman

acute.

rejects this

privileged, a priori

It is

metaphor

knowledge

of the

in

entirety, along

its

world

it

promises: There

eye"36 capable of seeing things "as they are, with no gap or

our view of them. "37 Our only alternative

world whose

intelligibility is

is

we

we make

distorting

upon
about

a
it.

are rejecting altogether the notion of

understanding of perception as a process by which

Wcissman:1989b:15.

and

no "mind's

medium

"mental images" as a misleading metaphor deriving from the

Devitt

is

"to speculate fallibly

independent of the claims

This can be stated another way:

with the

Sterelny:! 987:199-200.

36 Weissman:1989b:15.

Ibid;63.

Ibid:136.
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we

common

"pick out"

and

"33

"entertain"

images (including photographs and moving pictures)

perceptual

field:

in the

When

I am in a state of awareness that we metaphorically call
"having a mental image," there is literally no object of
awareness at all. There seems to me to be an object because I am

in a state significantly like the state

I

am

in

when

I

see

something. The similarity of the experience explains why we
use this metaphor "mental image," but there literally are no
such images. If there are no such images, then there are no
objects for the state of awareness we call "having a mental
image.

We

can agree with Russman that the rejection of

the need for

undermine

all

this

metaphor eliminates

"mental images" and intentional objects, and serves to

that "ineluctable thrust

toward idealism" prefigured

in all

versions of "indirect" realism founded on the existence of these mental
entities.

For once

we

equate the referents of our mental activity with these

intentional objects

thought and language do fall into the solipsist
abyss, where nothing but a generous God secures the reference of
any thought or word beyond the stage of our private theatres.
...then surely

It is

objectless,

better, as

Russman

argues, that

but meaningful, and therefore

we

say "some judgments are

false.'"^^

conclusion from the rejection of this metaphor:

"meaning no longer requires

objects" of

any

Russman:1987:75.

Ibid:74.

Wcissman:1989b:86-7.

Russman:1987:74.
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Yet Russman draws a false

we

are to suppose that

sort, especially

ones

like

"eternally existing states of affairs. "43 In contrast, our treatment of properties

existing as possibilities suggests that the very

meaning

thoughts, words and sentences are possible states of
explicit:

I

am assuming

and thoughts are

affairs.

I

our

should be

that these eternal possibilities (along with their

instantiations in space-time) are both the "senses"

and language. The idea

(or sense) of

and

"objects" of thought

that the senses (or referents) of our words, sentences

possibilities is not vulnerable to the

problems associated

with mental or intentional objects rehearsed above; and that
eternal possibilities are not mental entities

is

so because

:

They

exist whether or not anyone thinks about them, just
because of embodying no contradiction. They are, as
Wittgenstein described them, the facts in logical space....
Everything actual is one of them, or more exactly, a possibility
instantiated. Thought and language secure their grip on the
world by signifying these possibles.... Meaning, this implies, is
prior to truth, as possibilities signified are prior to the ones

instantiated.44

We
First,

specify the conditions for

meaning and

way.

our thoughts and words are meaningful when construed as signs of

logical, as distinct

from material,

possibilities.

It

follows that these logical

possibilities are the objects (or senses, referents) of

thoughts and sentences^^ are true
actual.

cat

truth, then, in this

Something

is

actual

when

remains earth-bound, "the cat

when

these objects or states of affairs are
instantiated.

Even

on the moon" has sense,

i.e., is

a possibility
is

our signs. Second, our

is

as every

43 Ibid:73.
44 Weissman:1989b:87.

43 Sentences, rather than words, are the least units of truth because of representing the most
elementary facts of being, such as "x exists," or "x is round." See Weissman: 1989b:87.
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meaningful because of embodying no contradiction, whether or not that
possibility

is

ever instantiated. The nature of truth

relation: the truth of a sentence

that the possibility signified

on

a mat,

we

is

meaning and

upon

a correspondence

the extra-linguistic fact

in the presence of

an actual cat

correctly construe the natural signs of our perception as
affairs.

we

which thoughts and sentences
truth.

That

is

"first

are

still left

satisfy these conditions for

How

might

we

determine whether a

particular thought or sentence signifies a possibility; or,

does, whether that possibility

it

that

mat? The answers

hypothetical method:

to

all

and

closer to supplying the infallible foundations for

philosophy" seeks.

that

with the problem

to say, in specifying these conditions for truth

we have come no

our beliefs

when,

important to note, however, that

of identifying

meaning,

conditional

actual, as

representing that actual state of
It is

is

is

is

instantiated?

Is

when we convinced

there really a cat

on

such questions will bear the mark of the

of our contact with the world, including our

observation of cat-behavior, will be mediated by natural and conventional
signs organized into testable hypotheses.
It

question

should be clear that our naturalistic answer to Kant's legitimate

"How

is

Yet that does not

knowledge

mean

that

possible?"

is

not designed to satisfy the skeptic.

we have no answer

at all:

Kant expected the answer to his question to supply a foundation
for knowledge. And in a certain sense our answer does, but not
in the sense of propelling our knowledge to be any more real or
closer to some ideal of knowledge than it was before. The
answer supplies a foundation for our knowledge by enabling us

Ibid:Ch3; see also Weissman:1987a:289-91; 1977:Ch6.
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to

—

understand what foundation
what solid natural-world
it had been resting on all along. 47

rock

—

This brings us a bit closer to answering the following question. Does

method

the hypothetical

Our

rest

on

a foundation of truths "grasped" a priori?

application of the principles of plenitude and non-contradiction to the

world did seem
whatever

is

to

have that a

priori character, especially

not a contradiction

what separates

method from

this

unmediated access

is,

when we

said that

We want

necessarily, a possibility.

to

know

the intuitionist one that claims to achieve

to the given, as Plato's

nous regards the Forms, or

Descartes discovers the cogito.

We

begin by noting that the principles listed above are not sufficient

to

generate the existents of our theory, including the domain of eternal
possibilities.48

The substantive, and

fallible,

nature of our theory enters as

we

speculate that these eternal possibilities are properties or complexes of
properties having possibility as their

philosophic inquiry

is

and thoughts construed

and

inspection.

assume

that

all

method

Our words

as signs for these possibles could only provide

to the world, in contrast to the

demands

I

testing for their truth.

the variant forms of intuitionist thought.

intuitionism

of existence.49

best understood in terms of this hypothetical

of producing meaningful sentences

mediated access

mode

immediate access claimed

As we argued

for

in the last chapter,

that everything real be presented or presentable for

The very conditions

for existence

conditions for knowledge:

Millikan:1984:333.

See Weissman;1989b;162-4.

Ibid:164.
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were subsumed under the

Sensations, ideas, words, sentences, theories, and mind itself are
alleged to be inspectable, hence real. Other things, e.g., material
objects or eternal possibilities, have no claim to reality because
they are not inspectable. This idealist result is a consequence of
the intuitionist demand that we eliminate every chance of error

by closing the gap between thought and
precluded

when nothing

is

its

objects.

Error

is

concealed. ...^^

All forms of intuitionism derive from (or prefigure) Descartes'
naturalistic starting point in epistemology

separate from the
a "veil of ideas"

known

.

where the knower

is

non-

radically

This has the result of placing philosophers behind

where they

...sought vainly to reach the world. ..(or alternatively, to pull the
world in behind the veil). They placed themselves behind this

by beginning with a vision or theory of mind as a realm in
which ideas lived but which was outside the world these
philosophers wished to reach with their ideas
the world, at
veil

—

least, of nature.^^

We

immediately add that there are these contemporary,

that veil (or "language games")

where philosophers attempt

meaningful theories "floating loose from the
all

along has been that the attraction of

in the desire to eliminate every
is

given
I

linguistic versions of
to create

Our

rest of the world.

this sort of

idealism

is

point

rooted, for one,

chance of error by reducing reality to

to,

or created by and then set before, inspecting mind.

am

assuming, in contrast, that our status as natural beings

all

that

calls for a

different understanding of our capacities as knowers. Lacking the ability to

directly inspect or create the "given," our only alternative

Ibid:63.

5^ Millikan:1984:332.

52 lbid:332.
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is

to

formulate

meaningful hypotheses, and then
will

be speculative in

this

test for their truth.53

way: there

is

a

Most

of our thinking

world whose existence and character

are independent of our thoughts, so that

Every thought or sentence addressed to possibilities that may be,
but are not necessarily, actual (as none are) is a hypothesis ^4

The speculative nature
judgments, as

when we

of

much

of our thinking, including perceptual

falsely credit the cat

with being on the mat, speaks

to

the fallibility of that thinking:

man qua knower is a natural creature, we have no reason to
suppose that the way man knows is any more infallible than the
way man manages to do anything else

If

Now we

assume

that

method

is

not independent of our character as

natural beings; and having rejected as illusory the notion of "mental images,"

we suppose

that

our theories, language and thoughts must be

along with everything

else,

in the world,

accepting constraints from nature. That applies as

well to our understanding of the necessary applicability of the principles of

non-contradiction and plenitude as receiving support from the notion of
objective identity:
If

the law of non-contradiction

is

grasped "a

priori," this

must be

so only in the sense that nature, via evolution, has built this
grasp into us as a mirror or reflection... of a structural principle in
the natural world with

which we must deal

survive.

Peirce:1965:2:135-155.

5^^

Weissman:1989b:79.

55 Millikan:1984:298.

56 lbid:257-8.
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i

in order to

We

can have no "a priori illumination of the world"^^ and should be

prepared for the worst: "we might be permanently misled or deluded" about
its

nature.^^ Yet

it

Blanshard's term)
the naturalistic

and

is

not a correspondence relation.

(to

use Brand

Our assumption has been

one that the law of non-contradiction has force

human

that

does not follow that the nature of truth

in the world,

beings, qua natural creatures, are constitutively able to

construct meaningful, perhaps true sentences about that world:^9

From this standpoint it seems clear that man’s knowing must be
some kind of natural relation that he often bears to his world.
Hence true sentences, being direct vehicles for conveying
knowledge, must also bear some kind of natural relation.. .to
man's world.
5.5 Actuality
I

am

and

Possibility

suggesting that a property existing as a possibility

to the set of its actual occurrences.

I

is

not reducible

suppose instead that there are these two

complementary, yet irreducible, modes of existence: actuality and

where the difference between these two

is

possibility,

the one of properties instantiated

Wcissman:1989b:129.

Ibid:130.

I

therefore agree with Hilary Komblith that our naturalistic refusal to

answer the skeptic

own

terms signals our acceptance, at some level, of what he calls "ballpark
psychologism," a doctrine that suggests that "to know something. ..is to arrive at a true
belief. ..in a way very much like the way one ought" (Kornblith;1985:10). When it comes

on

his or her

specifying the features of

mind

capable of possessing knowledge, that

is,

we

to

are committed to

and an empirically tested cognitive psychology.
Something similar follows from Ruth Millikan's rejection of epistemological holism: If man is
a natural creature and a product of evolution, it is reasonable to suppose that man's capacities
as a knower are also a product of evolution.... Nor will it do to claim that coherence in a set of
beliefs is the test of truth without at the same time attempting some explanation of why
having a coherent set of beliefs rather than an incoherent set has anything to do with adapting
the mutual relevance of philosophy

to the

world

— that

is,

without explaining what coherence

(Millikan:1984:8).

Millikan:1984:7.
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is for,

how

it

helps...

and properties

existing as possibles, respectively.

We

must sharply

distinguish our view, therefore, from that version of modal realism
that

would reduce
5.5.1

properties to the "set of

all

the [actual] instances."6t

Modal Realism

Many

philosophers find talk of possible worlds or possible individuals

simply incredible .^2 David Lewis's theories do violence

to

common

sense,

I

suggest, for this reason: his reluctance to accept properties existing as possibles
leads

him

to conflate actuality

every property with the

possibility.

Specifically,

Lewis

identifies

set of its actual occurrences:

The simplest plan

—

and

to take a property just as the set of

is

all it

and other-worldly alike. Thus
donkey comes out as the set of all
donkeys, the donkeys of other worlds along with the donkeys

instances

all

of them, this-

the property of being a

of

ours.

His notion of "possible worlds"

designed, for one, to explain

is

statements about states of affairs that might have been: some things that did

not happen could have happened,

The "incredulous

stares"^^ follow

their actual occurrences

.

An

eg.,

"Germany might have won

WWII."^'^

from Lewis’s reduction of properties

to

ontology of possible worlds commits one to the

existence, in addition to this universe, of countless alternative universes

where "anything

that could

happen, did happen; and anything that could

Lcwis:1986:161.

Sec, for example, Devitt

and Sterelny:1989:31.

Lcwis:1986:50.

Devitt and Sterelny:1989:31.

<^5

Lcwis:1973:86.
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exist,

does

exist."^^

that universe that

we might suppose

while
is

to

be true "around here"

Germany

"actual-for-us"67) that

...to say that such and such
have happened
is to say

it

possible

lost

(in

WWII,

—

to say that it might
did happen somewhere else: it
happened in some other possible world. It is true that Germany
might have won because there is some unfortunate world where
it did win.
is

—

that

it

These remarks suggest that Lewis
possibility distinct

from

naturalistic view,

it is

i.e.,

we have no

to

"George Bush" would be
in other possible worlds.
relation: possible

of

causal access to them.^^

how

imagine

difficult to

serve as an explanation of anything that

would be committed

no conception

Possible worlds are just those actual worlds

actuality.

that are not actual-for-us,

in fact has

may

On

our

Lewis's possible worlds could

We

occur here, in our world.

non-natural relations: someone using the name
in a relation not just to

These are

entities to

our Bush, but also

which we stand

in

to entities

no causal

worlds are causally segregated from one another.^^

My

alternative has been to accept the reality of logical possibles sanctioned

principle of plenitude: whatever

is

not contradictory

excluded middle, necessarily possible.^^

is,

by the law

We replace Lewis's

by the

of the

possible (not-

Devitt and Sterelny:1989:30.

Ibid:30.

something

Devitt rightly points out that Lewis's use of "exists" often appears to mean
our example, "three-legged ferrets," as a possible property not

like "here": to use

instantiated here, does in fact designate

some

creature "someplace else."

lbid:31.

Lewis:1986:69-81.

Devitt and Sterelny:1989:30.
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We

possibility.
principle of plenitude claims only that whatever is not a contradiction is a
apply the
we
as
only
possibilities
those
of
arrive at the necessary, hence eternal, existence
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actual for us) worlds with properties existing
as uninstantiated possibilities;
eg.,

Lewis

s

And

talking donkeys.

anything that could
contradiction

exist,

does

Possibility, this implies, is a

not reducible to

it,

exist,"

and

a possibility,

is

we

modal

realist

claim that

say that everything that

of being

complementary

we

not a

.

to actuality, but

nothing in the principles of plenitude and

contradiction to suggest that anything possible must be actual, as

say about anything

is

in that sense, exists as a possibility

mode

for there is

in place of the

perceive

we do

not

— another person for instance — that he or

she exists necessarily because of being a complex of non-contradictory
properties.

We do not say this,

and we are not encouraged to say it, because
the principle of plenitude affirms only that it is possibles which
stand in alternation to contradiction: either a contradiction or a
possibility. It does not follow that the instantiation of any
possible

is

necessary.^^

Lewis's conflation of possibility with
the reduction of

and

all logical possibilities to

relations associated with "pure

that matter)

may

some form

of actuality parallels

material ones.

communism"

While the properties

(or "talking

donkeys," for

be examples of eternal possibilities with no instantiations,

those associated with a victorious

To think otherwise

is

Germany

in the early 20th century are not.

to confuse material possibilities

with eternal ones, for

the possibility of the latter state of affairs lapsed along with the material

conditions sufficient to bring

it

about.

This follows from the determinate

inference rule of the excluded middle, so that "something
or a possibility" (Weissman:1977;92).

Weissman:1989b:163.
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is either,

but not both, a contradiction

natuTG of individuals
state of affairs differs
5-5.2

Between

20th century Germany), where every actual

from a possible one

Possibility

How then
actuality are

(like early

and

in

being not further determinable .^^

Actuality: Possibilities Instantiated

do we distinguish

possibility

two complementary modes

from

actuality? Possibility

and

of existence distinguished from one

another on the basis of determinacy; "possibility differs from actuality as the

determinable differs from the determinate."^^ Actual states of

hungry person) are

relatively straightforward.

The complex

constitute that event, together with the natural

sounds and mental

states

of properties that

and conventional marks,

an observer might construe as signs of that event,

are properties configured in space

determinate with respect

affairs (like a

and time

to quality

(or "space-time")

and therefore

and number:

Properties configured in space and time include mass, charge,
spin, and all the emergent properties resulting from the

aggregation or configuration of these properties, as voice and a
capacity for walking result from assembling the parts of a body.
Actualities include, therefore, the things normally counted as
physical together with the assemblies of things transformed by
their interactions (i.e., events), and the dynamic, geometrized
space-time where differentiated things and events are generated

and

sustained.^5

— in contrast those actuals
receiving individuation in space and time — will remain further

Properties existing as possibilities, however

See Weissman:1977:Ch3.

Ibid:110.

^5 Wcissman:1989b:160.
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to

determinable in both quality and number, as the bare possibility of hunger
awaits

determinate expression (or instantiation) in a particular animal.76

its

Admittedly,
exposition, but that

this sketch of the
is

ontology of possibles requires added

a project for another time.

I

suspect that few will be

convinced from these remarks alone that "eternal"

more than mere "shadows

cast

by our

ideas."

possibilities represent

Fortunately, realists too can

ignore their ontological commitments, while continuing to use the method
of hypothesis.

We

can retreat a

bit,

therefore,

from

this ontological

characterization of those possibilities in the following
of our signs are, in the

first

summary. The

objects

instance, logically possible states of affairs: "she

hungry"

is

possible

— because non-contradictory — situation that may or may not

a

is

meaningful hypothesis organized from signs representing a

obtain in the world. The objects of our signs will be actual states of affairs

whenever

it

possibilities.

happens that we

to a determinate
is

our hypotheses to instantiated

Observability remains the

the nature of truth

person

refer in

in fact

is

and

a

correspondence

mark

(or test) of instantiation,

relation:

while

our hypothesis corresponds

extra-linguistic state of affairs in the

world when

that

hungry.

life presupposes a
note also that our every effort to secure the welfare of non-human
reclaim that world for itself, by
generally realist perspective on the external world: we are to
that would reduce it to one
freeing the natural order from all those anthropocentric distortions

76 yjq

experience.
or another extension of ourselves, our language or our

171

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alston, William P. (1980). "Level-Confusions in Epistemology." In Peter A.
French, et al., (Eds.). Midwest Studies in Philosophy V: Studies in

Epistemology pp. 135-150.
,

Austin,

J.

L. (1970).

Philosophical Papers London: Oxford University Press.
.

Barnes, Barry and Bloor, David. (1986). "Relativism, Rationalism and the
Sociology of Knowledge." In Martin Hollis and Stephen Lukes, (Ed.).
Rationality
Bartley,

W.W.

and Relativism Cambridge, MA; MIT
.

(1987).

Press, pp. 21-47.

"Philosophy of Biology versus Philosophy of

Physics." In G. Radnitzky

and W.W.

Bartley, (Eds.).

Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and The Sociology of

Knowledge La
.

Salle, IL:

Bateson, Gregory. (1979).
Bantam Books.

Open

Court, pp. 7-45.

Mind and Nature:

Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of
Berger, P. and

Luckmann,

T. (1966).

The

A Necessary Unity New York:
.

Mind New

York: Ballantine Books.

.

Social Construction of Reality

.

New

York: Doubleday.
R.J. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science.
Hermeneutics and Praxis Philadelphia, PA: University of PA

Bernstein,

.

Bhaskar, Roy. (1989). Reclaiming Reality:

A

Critical Introduction

Press.

To

Contemporary Philosophy London: Verso.
.

Bhaskar, R. (1979). The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of
the Contemporary Human Sciences Sussex, Great Britain: Harvester
.

Press.

Bhaskar, R. (1978). A Realist Theory of Science Sussex, Great Britain:
Harvester Press.
.

Braithwaite, Richard B. (1964). Scientific Explanation Cambridge: Cambridge
.

University Press.

172

Brown, Curtis.

(1988). "Internal Realism; Transcendental
Idealism’^" In
French, et al. (Eds). (1988). pp. 145-155.

Carnap, Rudolf. (1967). The Logical Structure of The
World Translated by
A. George. Berkeley: University of California Press.
.

R.

Carnap, R. (1966). "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology."
In Semantics and
the Philosophy of Language. L. Linsky, (Ed.). Urbana:
University of
Illinois Press.

Cashman, Tyrone.

"The Elysian Dialogues." In Continuine the
Newsletter Of Ideas In Cybernetics #17. Summer 1989

(1989).

Co nversation; A

.

pp. 1-9.

Chiari and Nuzzo. (1988). "Embodied Minds over Interacting Bodies." In Irish
lournal of Psychology Vol. 9. #1. pp. 91-100.
.

Davidson, Donald.

(1985).

Inquiries into Truth

"On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." In
and Interpretation Oxford; Oxford University
.

Press.

Dell,

Paul F. (1987). "Maturana's Constitutive Ontology of the Observer." In
Psychotherapy Vol. 24. pp. 462-466.
.

"Understanding Bateson and Maturana: Toward a
Biological Foundation for the Social Sciences." lournal of Marital and
Family Therapy Vol. 11. #1. pp. 1-20.

Dell, P.F. (1985).

.

"Beyond Homeostasis: Toward a Concept of Coherence."
Family Process. #21. pp. 21^1.

Dell, P.F. (1982a).

Theory and the Epistemology of Humberto
Maturana." In F.W.Kaslow, (Ed.). The International Book of Family
Therapy New York: Brunner/ Mazel.

Dell, P.F. (1982b). "Family

.

Descartes, Rene. (1955). Descartes: Selections Ralph
.

M. Eaton,

(Ed.).

New

York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Devitt, Michael. (1988). "Rorty's Mirrorless World." In French, et
Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XII. pp. 157-177.

al.,

(Eds.).

.

Devitt,

M. and Kim

the Philosophy of
Devitt,

M.

(1984).

Language and Reality: an Introduction
Language Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sterelny. (1987).

to

.

Realism and Truth Princeton: Princeton University Press.
.

173

Dewey, John.
Dilthey,

W.

(1965).

Experience and Nature La
.

(1976). Dilthev: Selected Writings (H.P.

Court.

Rickman,

.

Cambridge: Cambridge University

Open

Salle;

Ed.).

Press.

Doyal, Len and R. Harris. (1986). Empiricism, Explanation, and Rationality

.

London; Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Dummett, Michael. (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas Cambridge, MA;
Harvard University Press.
.

Metaphor: A Critical Examination of
Ecosystemic Epistemology as a Foundation of Family Therapy." In
Family Process #25. pp. 353-364.

Falzer, Paul R. (1986). "The Cybernetic

.

Notice of Nelson Goodman. Ways of
and The Structure of Appearance (1977).

Farrell, Robert. (1982). Critical

Worldmaking

(1978)

In

Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 60. #2. pp. 170-174.
.

Feyerabend, Paul. (1975). Against Method

.

New York:

Verso.

Franklin, R. L. (1986). "The Concept of Reality." In Australasian Journal of

Philosophy Vol.
.

64. #2. pp. 159-169.

French, Peter A., T. Uehling and H. Wettstein. (Eds.). (1988). Midwest Studies
in Philosophy XII: Realism and Antirealism Minneapolis; University
.

of Minnesota Press.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. (1976). Philosophical Hermeneutics Edited and
translated by David E. Linge. Berkeley; University of California Press.
.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg.
Seabury

(1975).

Truth and Method

.

New York;

The

Press.

Gasper, Philip. (1986). Review of Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth (1984).
.

In

Geras,

The Philosophical Review XCV.
.

Norman.

#3. pp. 446-461.

Marx and Human Nature: Refutation

(1983).

of a

Legend

.

Norfolk; Thetford Press, Ltd.

Gibson, Roger

F. (1989).

Metaphilosophy

.

"Stroud on Naturalized Epistemology." In
Vol. 20. #1. pp. 1-11.

South
Gibson, R.F. (1988). Enlightened Empiricism Tampa: University of
.

Florida Press.

174

Giere, Ronald. (1987). "Testing Theoretical
Hypotheses." In Scientific
Knowledge Janet Kourany, (Ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing
.

Company.

Goldman, Alvin. (1986). Epistemoloev and Cognition Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
.

Goodman, Nelson.

(1978).

Ways

of

Worldmaking

Indianapolis’

.

Hackett.

Goodman, N.

(1972).

Problems and Projects Indianapolis:Bobbs.

Merrill.

Gram, Moltke S. (1983). Direct Realism:
Martimus Nijhoff Publishers.

A

Study of Perception Boston:
.

Hacking, Ian. (1983). Representing and Intervening Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
.

Hanson, N.R.

(1958). Patterns of

Discovery Cambridge: The University Press.
.

Hawkesworth, Mary E. (1989). "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist
Theory and Claims to Truth." In Signs Vol. 14. #3. pp. 533-557.
.

Route To Anti-Realism." In Australasian
Tournal of Philosophy Vol. 66. #2. pp. 161-173.

Heil, John. (1988). "The Epistemic
.

Held,

and Pols, E. (1987a). "Dell on Maturana: A Real Foundation
Family Therapy?" In Psychotherapy Vol. 24. pp. 455-461.

B.

for

.

Held,

B.

and

E. Pols. (1987b).

Psychotherapy Vol.
.

Held,

B.

and

24. pp. 466-^68.

E. Pols. (1985a).

"Epistemology"

"The Philosophy of Dell and Maturana." In

"The Confusion About Epistemology and
to Do About It." In Family Process #24.

— and What

.

pp. 509-517.

Held,

B.

and

E. Pols. (1985b). "Rejoinder:

On

Contradiction." In Family

Process #24. pp. 521-524.
.

Heller, Mark. "Putnam, Reference,

Midwest Studies

and Realism." In French,

in Philosophy:

et al. (Eds.).

Vol XII pp. 113-127.
.

Hobart, Michael E. (1989). Critical Notice of Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of
Realism: The Paul Cams Lectures (1987). In Metaphilosophy Vol. 20.
.

#2. pp. 178-81.

175

Hollis,

Martin and Lukes, Stephen.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hookway, Christopher.

(1988).

(1986). Rationality

and Relativism

.

Quine: Language, Experience and

Reality Stanford: Stanford University Press.
.

Hume, David.

(1969).

The

Essential

David

Hume

Robert

.

P. Wolff, (Ed.).

New

York, NY: Mentor Books.
Kant, Immanuel. (1966). Critique of Pure Reason
New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.
Kelly, G.A. (1955).

The Psychology

.

F.

Max

Muller, (Trans.).

of Personal Constructs, Vol

II

New York:

.

Norton.

Kenny, Vincent.

(1988). "Constructions of Self-Organizing Systems."

Irish lournal of

Psychology Vol.
.

9. #1.

The

pp. 1-24.

Konold, Clifford and Johnson, D. K. (In Press). "Philosophical and
Psychological Aspects of Constructivism." In L. Steffe, (Ed.). The
Epistemological Foundations of Mathematical Experience Hillsdale,
.

NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Kordig, Carl. (1971). The lustification of Scientific Change Boston: Reidel.
.

Kornblith, Hilary. (1985). Naturalizing Epistemology Cambridge:
.

MIT

Press.

Krausz, M. and Meiland, J. (Eds.). (1982). Relativism: Cognitive and Moral
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Kuhn, Thomas. (1962). The Structure
Chicago University Press.

.

of Scientific Revolutions Chicago:
.

Lettvin, J.Y., H. Maturana, W.S. McCulloch and W.H. Pitts. (1959). "What the
Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain." In Proceedings of the IRE 47. #11. pp.
.

1940-1959.

Lewis, David. (1986).

On

the Plurality of Worlds Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
.

Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
.

AntiLuntley, Michael. (1988). Languaee, Logic and Ex perience: The Case For
Realism La Salle, IL: Open Court.
.

176

MacKinnon, Laurie katherine. (1987). "The New Epistemology and the Milan
Approach: Feminist and Sociopolitical Considerations." In Tournal of
Marital and Family Therapy Vol. 13. #2. pp. 139-155.
.

Madison, G.B.

(1988).

"The Hermeneutics of (inter)subjectivity,

Mind /Body Problem

Deconstructed." In

The
#21. pp 3-

or;

Man and World

.

33.

Marx, Karl and

F.

The German Ideology

Engels. (1947).

.

New York, NY:

International publishers.

Maturana, Humberto. (1988a). "Ontology of Observing: The Biological
foundations of Self Consciousness and the Physical Domains of
Existence." In Texts in Cybernetic Theory (Unpublished), pp. 2-53.
.

Maturana, H. (1988b). "Reality: The Search For objectivity or the Quest For a
Compelling Argument." In Irish Tournal of Psychology Vol. 9. #1. pp.
.

25-82.

Maturana, H.

(1985).

"What

is it

to See?" In

Cybernetic Vol.
.

#1. pp. 59-76.

1.

Maturana, H. (1980a). "Biology of Cognition." In Maturana and Varela
Autopoiesis and Cognition London: Reidel.

(1980).

.

Maturana, H. (1980b). "Man and Society." In F. Benseler, P.M. Hejl, and W.K.
Kock, (Eds.). Autopoiesis, Communication, and Society New York:
Campus-Verlag. pp. 11-32.
.

Maturana, H. and

F.

Varela. (1980). Autopoiesis

and Cognition: The

Realization of the Living London: Reidel.
.

Maturana, H.R.

(1978). "Biology of

Reality." In G.A. Miller

&

E.

Language: The Epistemology of
Lenneberg, (Eds.). (1978). Psychology and

Biology of Language and Thought

.

New York:

Academic

Press, pp. 27-

63.

Maturana, H. and F. Varela. (1988). The Tree of Knowledge: The
Biological Roots of Human Understanding Boston: New Science
.

Library.

Maturana, H. and
Living." In

F.

The Organization of the
Autopoiesis and Cognition

Varela. (1980). "Autopoiesis:

Maturana and Varela

(1980).

London; Reidel.
McCarthy, Thomas M. (1978). The
Cambridge: MIT Press.

Critical

177

Theory of T urgen Habermas,

.

McMichael, Alan.
French, et

(1988). "Creative

al.

(Eds.).

Ontology and Absolute Truth." In Peter A.

Midwest Studies

Volume

in Philosophy:

Xll:

Realism and Antirealism pp. 51-74.
,

Millikan, Ruth Garrett. (1984). Laneuage, Thought and Other Biological
Categories: New Foundations For Realism Cambridge: MIT Press.
.

Mundle, C.W.K.

(1971). Perception: Facts

and Theories

.

New

York, NY: Oxford

University Press.

Murphy,

Chris. (1981). Critical Notice of Richard Rorty. Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature (1980). In Australasian Tournal of Philosophy Vol.
.

.

59. #3. pp. 338-345.

Peirce, C. S. (1965). Collected Papers C.
.

Hartshorne and

P.

Weiss, (Eds.).

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Pols,

Edward.

(1987). "On Knowing Directly: The Actualization of First
Philosophy." In Review of Metaphysics 41. pp. 229-253.
.

Pols, E. (1986). "After the Linguistic Consensus:

The Real Foundation

Question." In Review of Metaphysics 40. pp. 17-40.
.

Pols, E. (1982).

The Acts

of

Our

Being:

A Reflection

on Agency and

Responsibility Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
.

Putnam, Hilary.

LaSalle, Illinois:

Putnam, H.

The Many Faces of Realism: The Paul Cams Lectures

(1987).

(1982).

Open

.

Court.

Reason, Truth and History Cambridge: Cambridge
.

University Press.

Putnam, H.

(1978).

Kegan

Meaning and The Moral Sciences London: Routledge and
.

Paul.

Quine, W.V. (1981). Theories and Things Cambridge: Harvard University
.

Press.

Quine, W.V. (1980). From a Logical Point of View Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
.

Quine, W.V. (1975). "The Nature of Natural Knowledge." In Mind and.
Language Samuel Guttenplan, (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
.

178

Quine, W.V. (1969). "Epistemology Naturalized." In Ontological Relativity
and Other Essays V.W. Quine, (Ed.). New York: Columbia University
.

Press.

Quine, W.V. (1967).

Word and

Object Cambridge:
.

MIT

Press.

Rescher, N. (1980). "Conceptual Schemes." In Peter Punch, (Ed.). Midwest
Studies in Philosophy Vol. 5. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, pp. 323-346.
.

Rorty, Richard. (1985). "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth." In Ernst LePore,
(Ed.). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of

Donald Davidson Oxford: Oxford University
.

Rorty, Richard. (1981)

The Consequences

of

Press.

Pragmatism Minneapolis:
.

University of Minnesota Press.
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
.

Ruben, David-Hillel.
Highlands,

Marxism and Materialism

(1977).

New

.

Atlantic

Jersey: Harvester Press.

Russell, Bertrand. (1948).

Human

Knowledge:

Its

Scope and Limits

.

New

York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

Russman, Thomas. (1987). A Prospectus For The Triumph
Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
Salinas, Roberto. (1989). "Realism

of Realism

and Conceptual Schemes."

.

In Southern

Tournal of Philosophy Vol. XXVII. #1. pp. 101-123.
.

Scheffler, Israel. (1982). Science

and

Subjectivity Indianapolis, Indiana:
.

Hacked Publishing Company.
Segal, Lynn. (1986).

The Dream

Constructivism

.

New

of Reality:

Heinz Von

Foerster's

York: Norton.

Sellars, Wilfred. (1963). Science, Perception

and Reality

.

New York:

Humanities Press.
Smart, Barry. (1976). Sociology. Phenomenoloev and Marxian Analysis

.

London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Speed, Bebe. (1984).

"How

Real

Is

Real?" In Family Process #23. pp. 511-520.

179

Stroud, Barry. (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
.

Suchting, Wal. (1986).

Marx and Philosophy London: MacMillan

Timpanero, Sebastiano.

.

On

(1980).

Press.

Materialism London: NLB.
.

Roger. (1980). Reality at Risk: A Defense of Realism
Philosophy Brighton: Harvestor Press.

in

The Sciences and

.

Tucker, Robert V. (1978). The Marx-Engels Reader

Van

Fraassen, Bas. (1980).

Varela, Francisco

J.

The

Scientific

.

New

York: Norton.

Image Oxford: Clarendon
.

Press.

on the Circulation of Concepts between
and systemic Family Therapy." In Family

(1989). "Refections

a Biology of Cognition

Process #28. pp. 15-24.
.

Varela, F. (1986). "Laying

New

Biology and

Down

its

a Path in Walking:

Ethics." In

A

Biologist's

Cybernetic Vol.
.

2.

Look

at a

No.l.

"The Creative Circle: Sketches on the Natural History of
Circularity." In Paul Watzlawick, (Ed.). The Invented Reality New
York: Norton.

Varela,

F. (1984).

.

Vinci,

Tom.

Philosophical Skepticism (1984). In
Vol. 16. #3. pp. 559-574.
.

von

The Significance of
Canadian lournal of Philosophy

(1986). Critical Notice of Barry Stroud.

The Construction
Conceptual Semantics Seaside, CA:

Eoerster, Heinz. (1987). "Preface." In E.

of

Knowledge: Contributions

to

.

von

Glasersfeld.

.

Intersystems Publications.

von

Foerster, H. (1984)

"On Constructing

Reality." In

Watzlawick,

(Ed.),

op

"Knowing Without Metaphysics: Aspects of
the Radical constructivist Position." In F. Steier, (Ed.). Research and

von Glasersfeld,

Ernst. (1989a).

Reflexivity:

Toward

a Cybernetic/Social Constructionist

Knowing London: Sage
.

Way

of

Publications. (In Press).

Observer: An Attempt at
Interpreting Maturana." (Unpublished manuscript).

von Glasersfeld,

E. (1989b). "Distinguishing the

"Cognition, Construction of Knowledge, and
Teaching." In Synthese 80. pp. 121-140.

von Glasersfeld,

E. (1989c).

.

180

cit.

von Glasersfeld,

some

like

"An Exposition

of Radical Constructivism; Why
Radical." In Constructivist Views on the Teaching and

E. (1989d).
It

Learning of Mathematics R.
.

(Eds.).

JRME Monographs.

von Glasersfeld,

B. Davis, C. A.

Maher, and N. Noddings,

(In Press).

"An Exposition of Radical Constructivism." In
Texts in Cybernetic Theory (Unpublished), pp. 1-25.
E. (1988a)

.

von Glasersfeld,

E. (1988b).

"The Reluctance to Change a

In Irish Tournal of Psychology Vol
.

von Glasersfeld,

9.

Way

of Thinking."

#1. pp. 83-90.

The Construction of Knowledge: Contributions
Conceptual Semantics Seaside, CA: Intersystems Publications
E. (1987).

to

.

von Glasersfeld,
Vol.

2.

E. (1986).

"Of Knowing, Telling and Showing." In Cybernetic

.

#1. pp. 64-67.

von Glasersfeld,

"An Introduction to Radical Constructivism."
Paul Watzlawick, (Ed.). The Invented Reality New York; Norton.
E. (1984a).

In

.

von

Glasersfeld, E. (1984b). "Reconstructing the Concept of Knowledge."

Conference Paper. Seminar on Constructivism. Geneva. June 25-29.
Watzlawick, Paul,

Weissman, David.

(Ed.). (1984).

The Invented Reality

.

New

York; Norton.

(1989a). "Metaphysics After Pragmatism." In

The Review

of Metaphysics 42. pp. 513-546.
.

Weissman, D.

(1989b).

University of

Hypothesis and the Spiral of Reflection Albany; State

New

.

York

Press.

Weissman, D. (1987a). Intuition and
York Press.

Weissman, D.

Ideality Albany: State University of
.

.

(Ed.).

New

Essays in
Albany; State University of New York

(1987b). "The Spiral of Reflection." In

Metaphysics R. Neville,

New

Press, pp. 275-310.

Weissman, D. (1977). Eternal Possibilities: A Neutral Ground For Meanin g
and Existence Carbondale, II: Southern Illinois University Press.
.

Weissman, D.

(1965). Dispositional Properties

.

Carbondale: Southern

Illinois

University Press.

Whitehead, A. N.

(1978). Process

and Reality

181

.

New

York; The Free Press.

